







FOREIGN SECRETARIES  
OF  
THE XIX. CENTURY TO 1834.

BY  
PERCY M. THORNTON.

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## AUTOGRAPH LETTERS.

\* Facsimile of Lord Castlereagh's, to face page 133, Vol. II.

Facsimile of George Canning (II.), to face page 221, Vol. II.

## ERRATUM.

At page 51 I have inadvertently applied the advice given by the Duke of Wellington to Lord Ellenborough, on the subject of the relations of the latter with his Council, to the Indian Council sitting in London, whereas they are applicable only to the Council of the Governor General in Calcutta. When Lord Ellenborough was at the Board of Control the Indian Council had not come into existence.





Lord Nelson.

FOREIGN SECRETARIES  
OF  
THE XIX. CENTURY TO 1834.  
THE MARQUIS WELLESLEY.

6TH DECEMBER 1810 TO 16TH JANUARY 1812.



AMONGST the greater minds engaged in rivalry with Napoleon's master spirit, none can o'ershadow that of the Indian Ruler, who lent all the influence of a great name and extraordinary genius to the sustenance of independence in Europe.

He had striven hard for his country and the elevation of her fame in the far east, and had there built up an empire on the ruins of French hopes. He had foiled the Imperial intrigues, which well-nigh threatened to gain Mysore for England's rivals, and stood foremost amongst his countrymen as the saviour of her Eastern Empire. The Mahratta chieftains bowed to his will, and all India acknowledged that for better or worse the

English were paramount in strength and superior in influence within the peninsula of Hindostan.

Such was the work accomplished, such the design, carried out, by Richard Earl of Mornington, who, for his great services, was created Marquis Wellesley.

Born on the 20th of June 1760, in Grafton Street, Dublin, the future Marquis passed his youth between the Irish capital and the old baronial family residence of the Wellesleys, at Dangan, county Meath.

The second Earl of Mornington, whose eldest son our hero was, is well known in the musical world as a composer of note, being likewise the friend of Handel, and possibly more familiar to some ears as the creator of those tuneful trifles, "Here in cool grot" and "Orpheus with his lute," than as the father of the great Duke of Wellington and the Marquis Wellesley.

Thus, under the gentle influence of the soothing art, were these youths of high destiny nurtured, and, indeed, they might almost have said with Milton, "Harps ever tuned hung glittering by their sides," for the Earl remained constant to his darling art.

Harrow was the school chosen for the musical Earl's eldest son, but his career there was cut short by a rebellion, in which the future statesman took an active part. Dr. Sumner having died in 1771, an Etonian by name of Heath was appointed to an office which the ardent Harrovians claimed for Dr. Parr, a young scholar of great repute connected with the place.

Ultimately, although the authorities both quelled the disturbance and reinstated Heath in full authority, they had to suffer a secession of forty pupils and the loss of

the young Wellesley, whose father, thinking it for the best to make a change at once, sent him to Eton, where, soon forgetting earlier predilections, he learned to love his school with all the ardour of Tom Brown himself. \*

\* These riotous proceedings of the young gentlemen at Harrow seem to have resulted entirely from the appointment of an Etonian to rule over them. Dr. Parr, a man of great learning, was a junior master, but his claims were laid aside, nominally on account of his youth, but, as he averred, in consequence of a vote he had given for Wilkes when standing for Middlesex. Be this as it may, the young Harrovians would have none of the Etonian interloper, and went as far as to arm themselves with the tempting round stones with which the place abounds, and threaten to break the windows of an unpopular governor.

The young Wellesley entered into the school feeling strongly, and it is strange to reflect how soon a removal to Eton caused his Harrovian prejudices to subside, and be replaced by the abiding sentiment of his life, which, in the shape of a pride in Eton, survived alike exposure to Indian distractions, and subsequent ministerial difficulties.

It remains a popular tradition amongst Harrovians of later days that the welfare of their school is more likely to be promoted by one imbued with the traditions of the place, than by a new comer hailing from Eton. This feeling was strongly evoked when the present distinguished head master, Dr. Butler, essayed to fulfil the difficult task of succeeding Dr. Vaughan.

The writer, who was himself in the school, will not easily forget the enthusiasm aroused by the announcement of an appointment of the most instructed and gifted old Harrovian of his time to a position it seemed almost hopeless to fill with effect. Like Dr. Parr, the newcomer was a Liberal in politics, whilst the only fault to be found by the critics was that specially urged on the occasion above-mentioned, viz. his extreme youth.

The fact of Lord Wellesley having received an Eton and Harrow education, suggests the remark that out of eighteen Prime Ministers who have held office in the nineteenth century, five only have not been educated at one of our public schools. Of the remainder,



The Eton of these days differed from that of the present in so far that participation in its delights was restricted, comparatively speaking, to the few, and therefore that the remarkable influence on men's careers due to that place of education redounded more manifestly to its fame.

There certainly seems to have been a peculiar idiosyncrasy, which residence near the royal shades of Windsor tended to foster, in the careers of men like Wellesley and Canning, whilst, as the friends of Lord Mulgrave tell us, much of the knowledge, resource, and charm of manner, together with the influence over men of his time, which that popular soldier and politician possessed, was acquired at Eton amongst the friends of his youth.

Oxford followed Eton in the young Wellesley's case, and with it a friendship with William, the future Lord Grenville. In London it became soon apparent that the Irish peer's eldest son was destined to serve the State, as he developed qualities leading Grenville to get Pitt's

*seven* hail from Eton, *five* from Harrow, and *one* (Lord Liverpool) from Charterhouse.

The advocates of the private-school system of education may console themselves with the fact that quality may sometimes atone for quantity, and that Pitt, Lord Russell, and Lord Beaconsfield were never at a public school. Of the Foreign Secretaries of State in whom we are here more specially interested, the total number since 1800 has been twenty, viz. ten old Etonians, four old Harrovians, one old Rugbeian (Lord Derby), one old Carthusian, and four who received a private training; conspicuous amongst the latter being the names of Castlereagh and Dudley. Lord Wellesley has been put down here as belonging to Eton, although he was also at Harrow.

interest excited, so that soon after becoming Earl of Mornington in 1781, he was elected member for Beeralston in Cornwall, and afterwards for the famous Old Sarum.

The sweets of office having been tasted as Junior Lord of the Treasury, promotion consequent on the display of great ability followed in 1792, when it became Mornington's task to overlook the fortunes of our rising Indian Empire from the Board of Control.

Here it was, doubtless, that, after careful study of the questions at issue, he evolved the theories on which he based the government held to have been so pre-eminent in merit.

On one point all, friends and foes alike, were agreed, and that was on the high ability Lord Mornington possessed, whilst fortunately his opinions on Continental affairs coincided with those of Mr. Pitt, who, in 1797 and after some hesitation, preferred him to the doubting Lord Cornwallis, and entrusted the Proconsulship of British India to the newly-created English Baron Wellesley.

A glance at the map will of itself tell what mighty work this statesman performed during the seven years of his pro-consulship at Fort William.

There may be those who think that on the whole India has been, and must continue to be, a doubtful benefit to England—a responsibility beyond her ultimate power of fulfilment, and a means of entanglement with and cause of jealousy for other nations.

They cannot, however, deny that if that rule was to continue, and be rendered compact by the welding together of scattered and disconnected fragments, the

architect who has contributed more than any other to the attainment of the desired result was the elder brother of the great Duke of Wellington, whose natural talents were probably unsurpassed by those of living man.

Despatched by Pitt to India with the idea that he was there destined to recover in the East empire lost to England in another sphere, he had never wavered in his task, and performed it triumphantly so far as time and opportunity was afforded.

Returning at his own desire in a moment of Indian Government weakness and uncertainty, he returned to England, as was said, a specimen of a sultanised Briton.\*

The estimation of Lord Wellesley's Indian administration must be judged by results.

The system of subsidiary alliance, which led to the ultimate absorption of Hindostan by the British,

\* The impossibility of setting forth a cut-and-dried policy for an Indian ruler to pursue is illustrated by an incident which occurred in 1821, after Mr. Canning had rejoined the King's Government. As President of the Board of Control for India, it fell to his lot to appoint a new Governor-General, and in a speech made in the presence of Lord Amherst, the man of Mr. Canning's choice, that eloquent minister spoke to the following effect:—

“Had a Governor-General been required to enlarge the boundaries of our empire, instead of spreading the oil of urbanity and kindness over its already amply extended surface, Lord Amherst would not have been the object of his selection.

“Unluckily, no sooner did the pacific pro-consul assume the reins than he became involved in a war, and the rhetoric of the orator hung like a millstone on his prestige and on his performance.”—Lord Teignmouth's *Reminiscences*, vol. ii. p. 212.

It is notorious that Lord Cornwallis was sent out to succeed Lord Wellesley with similar pacific intentions, but the new ruler died in the midst of conflict.

proceeded as follows:—Troops were first quartered in a native prince's dominions to protect him from his neighbours. Then he was persuaded to render up part of his territory to England, in order that the revenues thereof might defray the expense of occupation, such action being adopted to avoid the alternative of anarchy, which would probably be succeeded in turn by a French occupation.

Experience has certainly shown that as a direct result of Wellesley's policy the whole administration of India practically fell into the hands of the British, who had but to tolerate in certain cases the mere pomp and circumstance of royalty, supported by a liberal allowance of revenue.

Lord Castlereagh, when he at last found time to turn his mind to Indian affairs, doubted if the removal of the master mind would not render nugatory all the results gained at the outset of this far-reaching scheme.

The East India Directors, however, hesitated, and, frightened at the prospect of a contest with Holkar succeeding that with Scindia, sent Lord Cornwallis out to India, with orders to make peace at any price, and secure at once the magnificent profits which a recuperated empire offered to the Company.

Pitt was at the moment oppressed by the magnitude of the European interests committed to his charge, and in failing health had not the energy to support the very policy which he had previously desired to promote.

Fortunately, however, Wellesley's dispositions had

taken root amongst the eastern nations he understood so well. The reversal of his policy became impossible, and its consummation was but deferred for a season.\*

Living amongst Rajahs and Nabobs as one of them—giving rein to his natural talent for government in a way that one born to rule could alone effect, Lord Wellesley surrounded himself with able administrators and scientific generals, whilst no red tape was allowed to stand in the

\* A comparison between the rival policies of Cornwallis and Wellesley in India is not possible, inasmuch as they represent the varying state of the public mind in England, and were, therefore, to a great degree employed in the pursuit of different objects. It is, however, worthy of remark that during his first Indian administration, Lord Cornwallis was forced to adopt hostile measures against Tippoo Saib—measures which were carried to their logical conclusion by Lord Wellesley. When, moreover, Lord Cornwallis succeeded to the Governor-Generalship on Wellesley's return to England, his policy of peace at any price was found to be so unsuited to the requirements of India and the English rule, that Lord Hastings in 1818 was compelled to reverse it altogether. Lord Cornwallis' ill-success as a general in the American war has been generally condoned by posterity as resulting from no fault of his own, when carrying out schemes against which he had strongly protested as a statesman and disbelieved in as a soldier.

Moreover, the taint of failure has altogether been washed out by the services rendered towards the close of last century in advancing the union between England and Ireland. As the Lord-Lieutenant moderate and Liberal in his sympathies, and yet as the uncompromising foe of sedition, Lord Cornwallis did much to save Ireland from becoming a base of foreign operations against England, whilst by his dignified conduct at Amiens he helped to reconcile two rival peoples to that short but grateful peace.

Lord Cornwallis will ever be remembered as a high-minded disinterested Englishman, whose death, occurring as it did so soon after Pitt's, was a great blow to his suffering country.

way of a new system, theatrical in its appeal to eastern love of display, but calculated to promote the stability and permanence of our Indian rule.

No wonder, then, that although the public at home were to a degree dazed with the immensity of this splendid success, home politicians hesitated to endorse its full consequence. It formed, they feared, an interminable system of war, and could not forget that the seating ourselves upon the throne of the Mogul was entirely contrary to the original basis on which the East India Company had desired or professed to act.

In India, moreover, enemies had been made by the great conqueror, who at the same time had been a great innovator, whilst civil collectors of a middle age preferred the old hum-drum life in the provinces to the novel procedures which launched them into the vortex of Indian politics, and for a time changed a peaceful system into one of frequent war and general uncertainty.

There were those, moreover, who accused the Marquis of nepotism in preferring Arthur Wellesley to other senior officers in his profession, and it can scarcely be wondered at, when the objectors had no means of gauging the transcendent merit which the master mind of the elder brother thus early discerned.

Such had been the public conduct of the man who, returning to Europe, found himself but half appreciated and sadly misunderstood at a time when the eyes of all were fixed on Europe, and specially upon the prime mover in that mighty drama which dwarfed all contemporary political matter.

May be, it was with a feeling of relief mingled with fear of his influence nearer home, that Napoleon heard of the return to England of him who had checked French hopes of Eastern conquest, and, by despatch of troops to Egypt in the very crisis of time, had enabled Abercromby to foil one of the First Consul's most cherished schemes. Mr. McCullagh Torrens tells us in his delightful *Life of Wellesley*, how on landing at Portsmouth neither the society of his wife and children, nor the welcome of old friends, was any solace to the disenchanted ruler who, dazzled with the habits of command which his position had fostered and his great mind naturally adopted, looked with unfeigned disgust upon the commonplace future which seemed about to open for him in a country where other names were as household words amongst the people, and his own, but lately it is true, the wonder of a day, practically forgotten, whilst its owner was forced to recommence his career as it were anew. True it is that the talents and energy were there fresh and ready as of yore, but the great man's whole being revolted against a struggle for place amongst the cabals of political faction.

One solace, however, remained to the disenchanted and dethroned ruler in the friendly welcome given him by Pitt. On the afternoon of a winter's day in January 1806, did the Marquis Wellesley make a pilgrimage to Pitt's villa at Putney Heath. Situated off the main road from London to Kingston, and on an undulating part of the common above Roehampton, stands the house in which this last converse between two of the mightiest spirits of their time took place. This spot was formerly

known as the Old Bowling-Green House,\* and as a resort of fashionable Londoners who there held a club, where bowls out of doors and cards within alternated with public breakfasts and evening assemblies. A shady oasis in a wild of heath, the plantation overlooked by old cedars and Scotch firs (such as luxuriate on that side of London) could have told many a tale of romance concerning the former visitors to the long, low, rambling, gabled house, but none probably so replete with historic interest as the affectionate converse held on that sad occasion between Pitt and Wellesley.

Passing politics are believed to have been eschewed, possibly with a mutual feeling that one must grant a supremacy he could ill brook to yield. Those the gods love die young, and despite Pitt's sanguine hopes for the future, the speedy realisation of that heathen maxim seems to have possessed Wellesley's mind when he left Putney Heath. The great statesman was palpably broken, even if the mighty spirit struggled unceasingly with fast-increasing weakness.

Surely there must have dawdled on Wellesley's mind an idea of future and possibly uncontrolled power, the realisation of which probably lay beyond the reach of mortal in his situation to acquire, but which but for an inability to work smoothly under, or indeed with, other men, was but the natural possession of such talents as Richard Colley, Marquis Wellesley, possessed. One, however, who during his lifetime compassed two great imperial actions, when he first consolidated empire in India, and

\* Known now as Blenheim House.



afterwards sustained public spirit in support of his brother in the Peninsula. When in after years Lord Brougham visited the former home of William Pitt, it was with intense interest he contemplated the chamber where this historical meeting had taken place, so that, despite differences of opinion, he gave rein to a not unnatural sympathy which frequently animates the possessors of genius.

At home, the Opposition saw the strange likeness between the Imperial ventures of the French Emperor in Europe and Wellesley in Asia, and positively talked of impeachment rather than farther reward. Why should proceedings be condoned in Mysore and the Mahratta country, which we condemned and struggled against in Spain. The utter malignity and wickedness of Oriental rule was not, as may be imagined, realised by the Parliamentary followers of Mr. Paull, who forthwith commenced agitating for inquiry into a scheme of conquest and aggrandisement, such as they held to be contrary to the just and merciful system which the European professions of Great Britain bound her to follow.

Destined to collapse as this movement necessarily must have been, whenever the light of truth was thrown on the past, it could not but add to the overpowering sense of weariness which on return to Europe has afflicted most Indian magnates.

In the Marquis Wellesley's case, this awakening came with redoubled force, in consequence of certain personal characteristics of temper and feeling which verged on absolute weakness.

He had previously expressed to Pitt his intense disappointment at not having been created a Duke when

he overthrew Tippeo and took Seringapatam, and at having to rest content with an Irish marquise.

Judge, then, what must have been Wellesley's vexation when, instead of the universal approbation which he felt his actions deserved, he received cold comfort at the hands of political friends, and, to say the least of it, suffered indifference from a public absorbed in the contemplation of matters nearer home.

But after a time it was seen that the agitation in question had no root, and then he too became intensely desirous of joining in the ministerial efforts made for the protection of the country. In defence of Canning's action in the Baltic, he uplifted that eloquent voice which, repeating even balanced and logical periods, carried alike conviction to the mass, and genuine delight to the more refined amongst his hearers.

Not often, indeed, could he be prevailed upon to make one of these great displays, which, carefully prepared and laden with elaborate thought and classical embellishment, were frequently laid aside at the very moment of intended delivery.\*

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\* Two of Lord Wellesley's speeches were considered text-books of information concerning the questions with which they dealt. The first was spoken in 1794, and was an exposition of the dangers prevalent from French revolutionary measures and principles.

Published as a pamphlet, it may be set against the famous *Vindicia Gallie* of Sir James Mackintosh.

The second was specially brilliant in composition, and made a corresponding effect in delivery. It consisted in a complete summary of the Catholic claims. This speech occurred after Lord Wellesley's resignation of the Foreign Office, and his speeches henceforth became so scarce that it was said of him that originally he had formed his style on Cicero, but latterly adopted that of Tacitus.

Indeed, the nervous system of the man exceeded in delicacy and sensitiveness even that of his more popular oratorical rival George Canning.

Such was the individual whom a knowledge of his brother Arthur's military merits led to accept the British Ambassadorship in Spain. Specially accredited to the Sublime Junta at Cadiz, Wellesley journeyed thither, and arrived early in August 1809 as the guns were celebrating his brother's victory at Talavera, at a time when the countenance of his presence was urgently required to allay ill-feeling between the officials of Spain and those of Great Britain.

Notwithstanding Canning's perspicuous appreciation of England's opportunity, it had been found impracticable for the two countries to work in the field together. The Spanish commanders had their own theories of war, and scorned to submit to the dictation of military superiority, even when, as was subsequently the case, it became apparent that Wellington, and he alone, could hope to rid Spain of her invaders.

It is not proposed here to recount the petty cabals of aspirants for fame and office. Their personal differences, actuated doubtless by the prevalence of human nature in human affairs, defaced the fair fame of those whose talents shed lustre on the English name and whose memory is treasured up amongst us. It is enough to recount that the appointment of Lord Wellesley was cavilled at by those who doubted the military genius of his great brother, and objected to the public conduct of the ambassador himself.

Such, however, to his honour be it said, was not the

view of Lord Grenville. If he failed to see clearly in Spain, he had not equally misjudged Indian policy as administered by his old Etonian friend.

Both he and Lord Holland saw in the mission of the great pro-consul an earnest of statesmanship to be exercised in direction of Spanish affairs. Lord Grenville had supported his friend when the slur of the detractor promised to be most injurious, and although his hostility to the Government of Mr. Perceval was often as equally determined as that he had formerly expressed against the Duke of Portland's administration, there always remained a disposition on the Whig Lord's part to judge Lord Wellesley fairly.

At Cadiz and Seville, Wellesley appears to have comported himself in a manner worthy of the occasion which brought him to the shores of Spain. He was every inch the English envoy, as he previously had fully represented her might in the East.

He was no mere temporising actor, but the representative of a naturally prompted line of conduct such as would become England's messenger. The resources of Spain must follow those of Portugal, and be entrusted to Wellington, or there could be no permanent safety even for Cadiz.

Cadiz was at least untouched—the emporium of trade from the agitated Spanish West Indies, the basis of all the commerce which might flow from the Antilles.

Whilst Cadiz was safe, Spain was not irrecoverably lost, and it was to enforce these principles of action, give confidence to the maintenance of that defence, and inspire hope in the future of the ancient and romantic

Spanish kingdom, that the whole energies of England's ambassador were directed.

Not entirely in vain were these prodigious talents exerted ; for when, after the lapse of a few months, the retreat of Marshal Massena from Portugal left western Spain once again open to the British armies, the memory of the little, dignified man, whose conduct and bearing in Seville had been so acceptable to the Spaniards, was still fresh in the memory of many, and contributed not a little towards establishing the future authority of his all-conquering brother.

Mr. W. McCullagh Torrens, in his interesting *Life of Lord Wellesley*, gives a graphic description of the ambassador's reception at Seville. The heroine of Saragossa was there to bid him welcome, and with scant ceremony carried the British envoy in her arms into the crowded Hall of State, amidst the excited "bravas" of an enthusiastic people.

The Earl preserved dignity of demeanour until all was over, but then his temper seems to have fairly given way, and he relieved righteous indignation on the person of an unlucky Irish servant, whose natural love of merriment had betrayed him into laughter.

It is to the credit of the disgusted ambassador that throughout this trying scene he preserved intact an almost theatrical fitness of appearance ; likewise that he combined it on this occasion with a short oratorical effort worthy of the historical situation in which he found himself placed. The restorer of British Indian power had arrived as the fit messenger, bringing promise of abiding succour to the children of sunny Spain.

Himself with the pride of a grandee, never would he vex a tender susceptibility or misunderstand a national sentiment, however exaggerated it might be.

The writer can only desire those who wish for full information on this and other parts of the Marquis's career, to dive into the glowing and fascinating pages of Mr. Torrens' book, where the subject is treated with a completeness that cannot here be approached.

At the close of the year 1809, Wellesley's presence was required elsewhere. Internal dissensions had rent the Duke of Portland's cabinet in twain, and a successor had to be found for the man who, of all others, had originated English resistance to the subjugation of Spain.

Canning might with contentment resign the Foreign Secretaryship to the statesman most desirous of perpetuating his policy, and of carrying out his measures.

Thus it came to pass that Wellesley bade adieu to Cadiz and to the population who had so enthusiastically welcomed him. He might well have said:—

“Adieu, fair Cadiz, yea, a long adieu.

Who may forget how well thy walls have stood?

When all were changing, thou alone wert true—

“First to be free, and last to be subdued.”

His own feelings and disposition in accepting the Foreign Office will be best explained by the following from a letter to Lord Mulgrave, written from Seville at the end of October 1809, when Lord Wellesley first resolved to take office:—

“You will know from Mr. Perceval that I have obeyed the summons of my sovereign and of my friends,

and, that I shall enter the King's councils with a firm intention of devoting my exertions to His Majesty's cause. I assure you that the consideration of acting with you is very material to my confidence and comfort, and I hope we may yet be able to effect much good."

The Foreign Secretaryship of Lord Wellington's brother was avowedly undertaken for the purpose of rendering the great soldier support, and sorely did he need such assistance. The Opposition at home was rampant on the subject of Spain. Lord Grenville, Lord Grey, Windham, and Thomas Greville all echoed the same criticisms, varying only as to mere matters of detail. The war in the Peninsula was a mistake, and beyond the reach of our resources. Wellington's generalship, even after Talavera, was severely criticised, and the ministry were believed by the General himself to be doubtful and hesitating. This the publication of Lord Liverpool's letters by Mr. C. D. Yonge has proved to have been a mistake. Determined to trust nothing to chance, they, like the great commander whom they desired to serve, had prepared for every eventuality, and made ready for a long and continued struggle.

The great difficulty in Spain was known and felt to be that of specie payments, but the new Foreign Secretary had seen and learned enough to counsel strenuous efforts to meet the difficulty, whenever the time should arrive for a new advance.

But such an hour was clearly at a distance when Wellesley reached London. Wellington had with regret been forced to leave Ciudad Rodrigo to its fate. The fighting a battle with Ney for its succour involved the

risk of ruin in Portugal, for the defence of which the British general retained all his energies.

Supported by his younger brother, Henry Wellesley, as envoy at Cadiz, where General Graham still kept his foes at bay, Wellington gradually commenced to retreat into Portugal before the army of Massena.

The outcry in England therefore continued, and, as some who had hitherto supported the cause began to fear, not without reason.

Before leaving Cadiz Lord Wellesley elicited from his brother the reasons which impelled his advance into Spain, fighting the battle of Talavera, and subsequently retiring to the Portuguese frontier. He received for reply a minute which will be found quoted at length in the *Wellington Despatches* for 1809, but which in substance stated that with the support that might reasonably have been expected from the Spanish armies, in the duty of watching certain French divisions, there was good military reason to believe that an advance to Madrid might have at once proved successful. The Spanish, however, failed to perform their part of the programme, and Wellington, not finding the means of transport that Sir John Moore's previous experience had led him to hope for, fought the battle of Talavera, and then resolved on retreat.

It had been found to be impracticable to act in unison with our Spanish allies, whilst the fervid hopes of freedom gained through popular movements were in danger of coming to nought. Canning had fanned the original flame with avidity, and now, after fair trial, the spark was to be no longer unquenched, but smothered by the gathering French hosts, who were pouring into the



devoted country. Wellington indeed needed all the support a sympathetic and statesman-like band of ministers could give.

As Sir William Napier has characteristically declared, the English general had to pave a broad way through chaotic warfare. That he ultimately succeeded in so doing is largely due to that elder brother who gave the weight of his name, and the powerful qualities of his mind, to the task of sustaining public spirit in England.

It is nothing in comparison to this that he misunderstood his colleagues, that his whole system and habit were contrary to the received rules of ministerial conduct. He had been a great Indian ruler, and his help was sorely needed to reconcile England to the war in Spain and Portugal. To details of expense and questions of currency and future resource he could not descend at the time when, as he believed, everything was at stake in his brother's camp.

But Mr. Perceval and the other members of the ministry were but following out the clear duty of every minister, on principles laid down by Walpole and Chatham and maintained by Pitt, when resolving to restrain national efforts within limit of national resources.

An alternative policy would have been that of the gambler, which would have left English shores defenceless whenever the complete subjugation of the Peninsula to the French might have been effected.

In Europe the situation had been somewhat modified by the marriage of the French Emperor with an Austrian Archduchess. Metternich has left on record *how* the proposition was first mooted at a masked ball in Paris,

and how when subsequently submitted to the Emperor Francis he had left his daughter absolutely free to act.

The Archduchess may have been to a degree allured by the captivations of the situation, and not indisposed to admire the success of her future consort. Anyhow her consent was unreservedly given, and the position of her father's country rendered more tolerable than it otherwise could have remained under the questionable peace of Schonbrunn.

Poor Josephine, who, as Napoleon himself remarked, never would have forsaken him, was left to take comfort in an ample income and a title of courtesy.

Sweden had at last given way, and her King, deposed for his faithfulness to English policy, was conveyed to Switzerland, and there was destined to remain an outcast. In his place Bernadotte, one of Napoleon's marshals, was finally elevated to power.\*

The French had also formally annexed Holland to France, but as the proceedings detailed in an early part of this volume continued to encourage illicit trade between the two nations, the measure might have been expected as one of a commercial nature. Napoleon knew that absolute prohibition of trade between England and Holland would seriously injure the merchants of Great Britain, and determined to stretch his power to the uttermost.

Hence it came to pass that through the commercial house of Labouchere a proposal came to the Marquis

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\* By consent of the Duke of Sudermania, who adopted him when himself childless.

Wellesley, as Foreign Secretary. It purported to announce that France was prepared for peace on the basis of a division of Spain, and one is left to conjecture the freedom and independence of Portugal. Wellesley replied that he by no means held himself bound to wage perpetual war, but that no peace could be satisfactory not providing for the complete emancipation of the Peninsula. The negotiations fell through because Napoleon never intended they should succeed, but the employment by Napoleon and Fouché of the Dutch house of business cannot be doubted.

Hanover being annexed to France, and the Tyrol subjugated, the hopes of Europe declined with the advance of 1810. At home the Government proved their fidelity to Lord Wellington by passing through an unwilling House the proposition for subsidizing 30,000 Portuguese troops.

Moreover, they passed unscathed through the debates on the Walcheren expedition, defence of which was, according to previous agreement, not attempted by the Foreign Secretary, who totally disapproved of the policy which had been there followed out, having always believed that the whole of our available resources ought to have been concentrated in Spain and Portugal.

In October 1810, Lord Wellington was continuing his retreat through Portugal, when at Busaco, about thirty miles to the north of Coimbra, he was attacked by the French, and successfully defended his position.

Continuing his course westward, he reached the desired haven of Torres Vedras in November, and entered the long-prepared lines, within which his army proceeded to halt. They were found to be simply impregnable, and Massena in effect allowed them so to be, for after long circumspection he abandoned any idea of attack.

Probably at this moment the surpassing merits of Wellington first began to dawn upon Europe, and the year 1810 closed somewhat more hopefully.

The British ministry had, we must admit, made gigantic efforts to support their general. No less than 130,000 men were assembled within the lines of Torres Vedras; and Massena, outnumbered and out-manœuvred, relapsed into a fatal inactivity. Attacked in the rear by irregular bands of Portuguese, and insecure as to his communications, retreat became a military necessity even before its adoption.

At home the English ministry was harassed by a long-deferred financial crisis. Failures amongst merchants and men of business were frequent, and proceeded from a combination of circumstances which were liable to become the permanent accompaniments of a system of perpetual war, commercial exclusion from the Continent, and consequent drain on the exchequer.

Still national spirit ran high, and the Foreign Secretary had the country with him when he applied a spur to the half-doubting minister,\* whose watch over

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\* Perceval.

the public exchequer led him to question England's latent resources.

No individual merit stands out more completely during this crisis of the struggle than that of Lord Liverpool in his capacity as War Minister, his support to the Peninsula war proving as ungrudging as it has since been shown to have been guided by a well-informed judgment.

Let opponents rail as they will, no available reinforcement was ever refused, even when it involved an extraordinary effort such as filled the lines around Lisbon with an army the like of which Wellington himself had never dared hope for.

That the effort could not be permanently sustained was no fault of the ministers, but, as he pertinently remarked, that of the country's resources.

Additional gloom cast itself over England when at last it was known that the old King's reason had forsaken him, and that a Regency was inevitable. The immediate cause of this disaster being hastened, was, as Mr. Stephen beautifully expressed in the House of Commons, the death of his favourite daughter Amelia. Quoting the words of the then newly-published *Lady of the Lake*, the speaker drew tears from all eyes.

"Some feelings are to mortals given  
With less of earth in them than heaven.  
If there's a tear—a human tear—  
From passion's dross refined and clear,

A tear so gentle and so meek,  
 It would not stain an angel's cheek,—  
 'Tis that which pious fathers shed  
 Upon a duteous daughter's head."

During the progress of these events the Foreign Minister was giving all his energies to the support of his brother, and yet it became hourly more probable that the Government, of which he was so prominent a member, would cease to exist. The King's illness, moreover, necessitated a regency, which, agreed to after hotly contested debates, left the executive in the Prince of Wales' hands, who openly declared an intention of restoring his Whig friends to power.

During this crisis intrigues were constant, and their recital is no part of this narrative.

The reader seeking a reliable description of the various party moves of the day, will find them described in the first volume of Mr. Plumer Ward's memoir, published by Murray, Albermarle Street.

There he will read of a political excitement not, fortunately, reproduceable in our own times, one, moreover, which would give colour to the statement we have lately heard in high quarters, to the effect that statesmen are but the creatures of intrigue, and form a justification for their abolition in favour of mere popular delegates, sent to register straight off the decisions of the people's will. Fortunately England has not come to that pass as yet, or elected to disarm herself of the omnipotence of the highest individual intellect, which exercised in accordance with due Constitutional rule. Some accounts tell us that Lord Wellesley was

himself a schemer for the highest situation under the Sovereign when a member of Mr. Perceval's Government, but there is no direct proof that he desired to hasten a change which was believed to be certain when Fox's former friend became Regent.

Judge, then, of the amazement and disappointment which prevailed throughout all Whig circles when it became apparent that, with a bad grace enough, but still assuredly, the Prince had resolved to retain Perceval in power.

The Opposition were, moreover, in the very act of forming afresh the Government which left office in 1807, when all such arrangements were adjourned *sine die*. Perceval thenceforth became his Sovereign's chosen minister, as he previously had been successful leader of the Commons, and this supremacy proved ultimately fatal to the great Marquis's continuance in office.

Space cannot here be found for the notable inconsistencies which it was proposed to bridge over by the promiscuous banding together of those possessing experience, talents, and eloquence, a coalition which, however, it is well for England never was consummated.

It happened that the Regency was destined to open with the prestige of military success; as early in 1811 the retreat of the French through Portugal commenced.

Signs of absolute famine had not been absent from the enemies' camp, whilst in both British and Portuguese quarters the price of necessaries rose beyond the means of ordinary individuals, so that officials, civil and military, English and foreign, began to despair of the situation.

The disbelief in the possibility of Wellington's success which prevailed amongst the British officers, is an element which should not be lost sight of. It was constant from the time of Corunna to when at Lisbon, as we are relating, letters were written home full of military hopelessness. This feeling reported to Lords Grenville and Grey, led them presumedly to take a jaundiced view of a situation which undoubtedly possessed the darkest features. Two great minds, however, never wavered, and although by no means in isolation so far as official countenance could render support, there is something sublime in the spectacle of the elder and younger brother sustaining their country's cause through sheer force of character and greatness of mind. Wellington steadily pursued his object, despite professional and political criticism, whilst at the same time Wellesley did all that he could to inspire confidence at home.

But it must not be supposed that the year 1810 passed by without the Government policy in Spain being so roughly challenged, that the Foreign Secretary was called on to exert all his power in order to scatter his foes and refute their arguments. Lord Grenville, as has been said, ever preserved respect for Lord Wellesley, but he arraigned his policy at the bar of public opinion none the less. Lord Wellesley's replies were ever temperate but determined, breathing a high spirit of confidence in the skill and judgment of his brother.

It was not, however, until June the 8th, 1810, that, in reply to Lord Lansdowne, who, with his usual skill and ability, had moved two resolutions condemnatory of British efforts then, in progress—resolutions which, in



effect, amounted to urging a solely defensive contest on behalf of Portugal—the Marquis in reply rose to a height of eloquence the vigour of which alike delighted supporters and astounded foes, until the old tapestried chamber, we are told, rung again with the unwonted fervour of his finished periods, and with the sounding applause which greeted a magnificent peroration.

To such oratory, conceived in the highest vein of classic perfection, and delivered when the whole being of the speaker was inspired with the theme, it were impossible to do justice without a few extracts therefrom.

Beginning by a justification of Sir John Moore's campaign, and arguing from its importance as seen by Napoleon that its story should rather lead us to renewed effort, than sink our military hopes in despair, he proceeded to defend the later operations before and after Talavera, declaring that with our fresh experience, and the still high spirit of the Spaniards, there was every reason for confidence in the leader who so far had met with no check in the open field.

“Will any man pretend to say,” said his Lordship, “that Portugal does not afford an advantageous military position from whence to carry on military operations in Spain; one, moreover, necessary for the defence and essential to the safety of the whole Peninsula? The Government, then, had enjoined on Lord Wellington to extend his operations so far beyond the frontier of Portugal as should not be incompatible with the defence and security of Portugal.”

He proceeded to justify the Government for continuing to act with the Spanish Junta, notwithstanding their

proved impracticability, as demonstrated on more than one occasion, an inefficiency evidenced by their refusal to admit British troops within the lines of Cadiz, so that any attempt to succour the emporium of Spain had to be made by means of an independent covering force.

But everything had been done towards improving the Spanish Government, so far as was compatible with the harmony of the alliance.

As for the trust which Lord Wellington had placed in the Spanish armies and their general, he declared their ability to defend a mountainous country to have been again and again proved, and that if the general had been found wanting, there remained the materials for a future military alliance with our own forces, such as might free the Peninsula from the French, and foil Napoleon's schemes.

And what were those designs? His main object in attempting to establish domination in Spain was to wield with new vigour the naval and colonial resources of Spain to the detriment of Great Britain, and so outflank us in Europe.

The Marquis claimed that we had checked these schemes by making Portugal a base of operations, saving her navy, and preventing the Spanish ships in Ferrol from falling into French hands.

"If," said his Lordship, "I could discover anything in the aspect of Spanish affairs that wears the hue and complexion of despair, I would pause. If ardour was damped or energies broken down, I might believe further assistance to be unavailing. But the struggle in which Spain is now engaged is not merely a Spanish struggle.

With the fate of Spain that of England is blended. Should we not stand by her to the last? For my part, my Lords, as an adviser of the Crown, I shall not cease to recommend persistence in the struggle.

“In nature, and above all in Spain, how often have the apparent symptoms of dissolution been the presages of new life and of renovated vigour. Therefore, my Lords, I would cling to Spain in her last struggle. Therefore I would watch her last agonies, I would wash and heal her wounds, I would receive her parting breath, and catch the last vital spark of her expiring patriotism.”

Language such as this needs no comment. Used at such a time, and by such a man, it proved that the spirit of Canning animated the Government, whilst the harassed British commander knew he might rely on steady and constant support.

As the after-story of his life will show, the effort on Lord Wellesley's part must, on the occasion just narrated, have been considerable, because, although long official experience had inured the statesman to coping with those various turns and difficulties of debate which a Foreign minister should be specially prepared to meet, the strange constitutional nervousness which had characterized Lord Mornington still clung to the Marquis Wellesley, and gave an advantage to Lord Grenville he was not slow to improve on. Moreover, the character of the speeches which had assured the Foreign Secretary's Parliamentary position will be better indicated by describing them as model essays than by comparing them with any less prepared specimens of oratory.

They had, on the whole, been untinged with the passionate beauty with which Canning again and again stamped each passing occasion, or gifted with the readiness which gave Pitt his superiority over a more fervent and not less eloquent rival.

But the cause of Spain, and enthusiasm for his brother's talents and character, seemed ever to lift Lord Wellesley above himself, whilst the ardour of the minister's pleading was, on the occasion in question, doubtless kindled to the height of fervour by a knowledge of the intense nature of the military crisis around Lisbon.

But such unnatural tension could not continue, and, to the delight of all who knew what it portended, Massena gave in first. Retiring to Santarem, he besought Napoleon to send reinforcements to his ranks, thinned by disease and death. Resolutely and scientifically did he conduct his retreat, but the movement itself led to the final and entire delivery of Portugal.

On the 5th of April, 1811, the French army recrossed the frontier. How much the Foreign Secretary's genius had contributed to this result, can only be appreciated upon consideration of his immense influence in London.

*Arthur will not fail!* has come to be an historical sentence, and if it has something of family pride in the utterance, proves that there was a beneficent side to the ancient and obsolete custom of English political life, which had in India originally enabled Wellesley to bring his brother's talents to the fore.

The inevitable reaction ensued in England when, after the reception of the glorious news from Portugal, the

war dragged but wearily along in Spain. Relieved by Graham's gallant victory, gained in March 1811 at Barrosa, fought in defence of Cadiz, and the sanguinary struggle at Albuera (May 16th, 1811), which had no permanent result (inasmuch as the French ultimately succeeded in their object, which was to relieve Badajoz,) nothing but contradictory tidings of marching and counter-marching reached the ears of unprofessional men. The Foreign Secretary continued to exhort people to trust in his brother's schemes, and to do all that the advantage of his great position allowed to elevate the sinking hopes of the nation.

Extremely anxious not to see England involved in war with America, Wellesley endeavoured to stem the fast-rising wave of discontent which came across the Atlantic. Napoleon had done all that in him lay to embroil England with her former colonies, and the time was not far distant when success was to crown his efforts in this direction.

Wellesley, left to his own devices, would most certainly have renounced the Orders in Council if they remained a bar to peace, but the adverse opinions of his colleagues had, perforce, to be respected, so long as negotiations were carried on in joint responsibility. The right of search for deserters was resented so strongly by the Americans, that not even Wellesley's friendly conduct towards them succeeded in smoothing the troubled waters, so that the great man had to descend to tiresome and lengthy details, all to no purpose, and the bad feeling continued to increase rather than diminish.

In Europe the birth of an heir to Napoleon gave

hopes of permanence to the dynasty and apparent satisfaction to the French nation, but had not prevented certain premonitory symptoms of discontent escaping from Russia.

The French Emperor appears to have previously allowed to Metternich that the position of the great northern empire, and the pride of her ruler, were incompatible with his own scheme of universal sway, and believing that war must soon have ensued, he prepared for the venture. We know now, through the diary of Madame de Remusat, how weary Napoleon was of the Spanish contest, into which, although drawn by the original vortex of his own ambition, he had never followed up *con amore*. True it is that during 1810 and 1811 the whole available resources of France were poured into the Peninsula, whilst the Spaniards went down before the wave of his irresistible force, to rise, however, and reappear afresh in arms before long, an advantage which must ever accrue to the possession of less organised and, therefore, easier dispersed forces. But the British leader, if sometimes thwarted or occasionally betrayed into a mistake, wedged himself into whatever vantage-ground presented itself, and stood ever prepared to seize any opportunity which occasion might afford.

A struggle for possession of the frontier fortresses of Ciudad Rodrigo on the north and Badajoz on the east, characterised the phase of the struggle which rendered 1812 notorious; but before the former stronghold had gloriously fallen into British hands the Foreign Secretary surprised Europe by the resignation of his office.

When the news had arrived in England showing that Russia and Prussia were encouraged by the stand made in the Peninsula, Wellesley, emboldened by the success of his policy had buckled to hard work in a way which has left its abiding mark on the records of the Foreign Office. But on a sudden a great change came over his conduct. He absented himself from cabinet councils, refrained from social intercourse with his colleagues, and betrayed all his old Indian impatience of ministerial control.

The end could not be far off when the most distinguished member of the Government did not care to appear even in nominal sympathy with those equally responsible for public conduct.

The historian, moreover, cannot forget that at the national council-board were seated three former Foreign Secretaries, with two of whom Pitt had stooped to concert grave affairs of State.

Men of Lord Liverpool's, Lord Harrowby's, and Lord Mulgrave's calibre and experience could not possibly agree to become official nonentities when European affairs were on the *tapis*. Hence the Marquis Wellesley's resignation, although in one sense an evil, was a relief from an unnatural position which must have soon dissolved the Regent's Government.

More than one authority, writing on the political events of the times, has stated his opinion that no adequate cause has ever been stated to account for Wellesley's resignation.

In the seventh volume of the *Wellington Despatches*, and the 257th and following pages, will be found a

memorandum by Colonel Meyrick Shawe, setting forth the Foreign Secretary's reasons for resignation. .

He states in effect that Lord Wellesley thought a great effort ought to have been made to drive the French out of Spain in 1808, before Napoleon had arranged the Peace of Schonbrunn with Austria in 1809. Moreover, that the military and financial resources of Spain should have there and then been made over to English management.

Therefore it was that the Marquis had looked with disfavour on the scattering of British resources at Walcheren, and been unable to defend the policy there set forth, a circumstance which from the first put him out of accord with his colleagues.

Lord Wellesley also let it be known that he objected to his despatches having been commented on and altered in cabinet, and that he had desired the exact phrases he used to be allowed to stand. He moreover stated in private that he thought himself amongst a cabinet of statesmen, but found them a set of critics. He was convinced, by experience, that the cabinet neither possessed ability nor knowledge to devise a good plan, nor temper and discernment to adopt what he thought necessary.\* Such was the state of feeling under the influence of which Lord Wellesley left Mr. Perceval's government. The straw which may, however, be held to have finally broken the camel's back was undoubtedly a refusal of Lord Liverpool's, in the House of Lords, to accept Lord Fitzwilliam's proposal for a settlement of

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\* *Memoir of R. Plumer Ward*, vol. i. pp. 429 and 481.



the Catholic question, thereby announcing a final Government resolve to adhere closely to the old policy of exclusion, even if the open expression of contrary sentiments were to receive official toleration. A principle this on which Lord Liverpool's own Government came to be based ; one, however, which it is impossible to consider fraught with a healthy spirit of ministerial responsibility.

But for differences on other matters the Catholic Question would have been left in temporary abeyance, even by Lord Wellesley, who afterwards ignored it as a cause of resignation.

On March the 19th, 1812, the House of Lords was crowded to hear an explanation which Lord Wellesley had given to understand would be rendered regarding the late differences with his colleagues. But when the opportunity came, a somewhat sharp debate was allowed to conclude without the ex-Foreign Secretary saying one word ; so that we have perforce fallen back upon the somewhat scant documentary evidence which is available. Doubtless the constitutional nervousness from which Lord Wellesley suffered led to the above silence, which, according to the biographies of the time, was deemed unfortunate, as the general sense of the House of Lords was not left favourable to the great man's conduct.

The more immediate cause of complaint which led to secession from Mr. Perceval's cabinet appears to have been the inadequate support given to Lord Wellington in the Peninsula. Government efforts were, as the Foreign Secretary thought, *just too short*, whilst his own mind had rested so exclusively on his brother's move-

ments, that he had learned to believe some shortcomings as always existent.

When, for instance, towards the close of his tenure of office, news came from Prussia that the national spirit was again arising at Berlin as at Vienna, the Prince Regent desired to move an English army to the Elbe, for the recovery of his Hanoverian dominions. Wellesley again urged that it was our policy to recruit the Peninsula armies, and to concentrate all our energies there, so that the scheme in question was abandoned.

It follows, then, that the degree in which Lord Wellington's campaign contributed towards the ultimate overthrow of Napoleon casts a corresponding meed of praise on Wellesley's countenance and support, and this without allowing that he was always correct in his assumptions.

When in 1812 Lord Russell, as a young man, was taken to Lord Wellington's head-quarters in Spain, he heard the British commander-in-chief comment on the requests made by his elder brother in England for reinforcements. "The want," said the general, "is not for men, but commissariat and means of transport." He then added, "My Lord Wellesley is not aware of this."

On the 11th of May, Mr. Perceval met with a violent death in the lobby of the House of Commons.

It is known that Bellingham the assassin had no personal animus against the Prime Minister as a man, but rather against the Executive of which he was the guiding spirit.

The writer has, moreover, heard, through a family

source of undoubted value, that Bellingham had resolved to kill the first minister who passed him in the lobby, and that old Lord Eldon, in company with his servant, hurried by, having his coat collar up. Thus it happened that perhaps the best known public character in London escaped the fate which befel the excellent and able Perceval.

As the son of one of the minister's followers has testified to the writer, clearness of view and acute intelligence in administration characterised a term of office held in critical times.

His influence over the House of Commons was an increasing one, and approached that of North and Pitt in the completeness of its latter ascendancy.

It is not, therefore, difficult to judge of the feeling which arose against a letter written by Lord Wellesley's personal friends, throwing the blame of his resignation upon Mr. Perceval, and this at the very moment when Parliament and the educated British public were in general sorrow for the loss of that high-minded Prime Minister. It was, moreover, the very unkindest thing possible to represent Lord Wellesley in the light of Mr. Perceval's detractor when his criticisms had been directed against public policy and not private character. "Save me from my friends," might well be ejaculated by the statesman who, in his reply to Lord Harrowby's speech (made in ignorance of the fact that the statement was not Lord Wellesley's own) betrayed intense vexation at the painful situation so gratuitously prepared for him. The publication had clearly never received countenance from the Marquis, and was disavowed accordingly;

whilst the great Duke of Wellington, writing in 1835 to Mr. Perceval's son, used the following expressions, which should once and for all set at rest the controversy as to whether the British general received adequate ministerial support during the Peninsula War. The great Duke says:—

“I never, whether in public or in private, said one word of the ministers, or of any minister who was employed in the conduct of the affairs of the public during the war, excepting in praise of them; that I have repeatedly declared in public my obligations to them for the cordial support and encouragement which I received from them; and I should have been ungrateful and unjust indeed if I had excepted Mr. Perceval, than whom a more honest, zealous, and able minister never served the King.”

After alluding to the specie difficulty, which pressed on the Duke immensely in Spain, inasmuch as he had to pay for everything in gold, he concludes by saying there was no real cause of complaint, and that the encouragement and support received from the King's servants was the best they had in their power to give.

Surely direct testimony such as this afforded after years of contemplative reflection, should outweigh hasty expressions used in the heat of an arduous campaign, when the difficulties of home authorities were but imperfectly known to the anxious general.

The political crisis passed by without either Wellesley or Canning taking office. For a time the ex-Governor-General of India was, so to speak, on the threshold of the Treasury, and had the Premiership apparently within

his grasp. Grelville and Grey had again declined office. They were hopelessly antagonistic to a war which the nation had entered into with enthusiasm, and desired to pursue so long as the means of carrying it on remained. Moreover they could not return as the representatives of any decided Whig reaction, and the Prince Regent was averse to Catholic Emancipation being brought forward.

Upon this subject Wellesley was Liberal far beyond his time. He knew Ireland well, and rightly gauged the situation there, knowing that simple and pure justice could never endanger a State.

Moreover, his remaining public career was tinged with this one strong feeling. Doomed to be the most gifted living individual debarred from Premiership honours, he yet never ceased to watch with interest over public events.

With delight he saw the British policy triumphant in the Peninsula, although his own reputation was paling before that of his younger brother. After the battle of Salamanca the joy in London became general, and Lord Wellesley laid aside all his vexation, feeling with truth that his support of Canning's Peninsula policy had led to a triumphant issue. He sallied out in the evening of the illuminations, and when opposite Whitehall received recognition from the crowd, who drew Wellington's brother into the City and back amidst constant applause, which from time to time he stopped to acknowledge. Never again was popular triumph to reward the efforts of one whose public position was henceforth destined to remain altogether out of unison with the extraordinary genius and superlative talent which he possessed.

It is, therefore, somewhat painful to have the record of a life, the more vigorous portion of which, both in mind and body, was spent by an egotistical, restless, and seldom contented man; of one, may be, steeped in the delights of literature, but not possessing the composure or philosophy to take entire comfort and satisfaction either from the joys of his family hearth, or from frequent participation in those classical researches which would, we are told, have alone transmitted his name to fame.

The record of his public life comes before us like some bright meteor that flits across the sky, not, however, destined to remain fixed amongst the other heavenly bodies visible from time to time to our eyes. During the majority of this long career, notwithstanding the gigantic dimensions of Lord Wellesley's mind, an incompatibility of temperament thrust his influence into the background, and the gifted little aristocrat who created an Indian empire, saved Canning's Peninsula policy from failure, and England from renewed attempts at invasion, was condemned to comparative powerlessness and to play the satrap from time to time in Dublin. Unlike one of his great successors in India, Lord Lawrence, Wellesley was unable to occupy his mind with minor questions of social improvement, either concerning India or England. To great national advantage, it is true, did he perform his duty in Ireland, but not invested with the Imperial sway his instinct desired. Probably the phrase used advisedly by Lord Wellesley, when describing the passions stirred up at the time of Lord Liverpool's accession to office, does

represent the spirit animating politicians on both sides ; although it is difficult to believe the Prime Minister or Lord Harrowby with prolonged bitter feeling against any man. Dreadful personal animosities were declared by Lord Wellesley to have dominated the minds of those nominally devoted to public prosperity.

In 1815 Wellesley realised how thoroughly Great Britain had gone to the utmost tether of her resources. He disapproved of the Treaty of Paris in 1814, and thought that the events which led to Napoleon's return from Elba were the result of neglected forethought on the part of the negotiators.

He hoped for peace, and was prepared to tolerate Napoleon's rule. In this latter respect he was clearly out of accord with the nation. During 1819 Lord Brougham avers that Lord Wellesley made a magnificent speech in support of the Government, when he deemed the peace of the country and the safety of her institutions threatened by the proceedings of the demagogue party.\*

The record of such eloquence and its effect must, however, be left for a future chapter, where it bears chronologically upon the public conduct of affairs.

In 1816 we find the Marquis urging immediate reduction of the military establishment, and a year afterwards eloquent on the subject of the burdens of the nation.

He accepted the Lord-Lieutenancy of Ireland in 1821,

a position which he was held to have filled to perfection for seven years.

Although feeling that, to a certain degree, his difference with the Government on the subject of Catholic Emancipation placed him in a false position, the status which he possessed as a foremost Irishman eclipsed all other considerations in the eyes of that intensely national people.

Grandly would the man naturally bear himself on public occasions—adequately to the occasion both as regards attire and manner. Right worthily did he represent the Sovereign at Dublin, as he had formerly enacted an analogous part to perfection in Seville, and at Calcutta.

Retaining his position through the political changes incident on the elevation of Mr. Canning to power, and during the short Premiership of Lord Goderich, he resigned it when his illustrious brother was called to the councils of George IV. Differences of opinion on the great question of the day formed the cause, and his speech in which he announced the resolve in question must be declared worthy of the orator's reputation.

The great Duke was evidently wavering when he replied that he too was desirous of religious equality in Ireland, but desired security for the Protestant minority.

At the moment these lines are penned there exists a special interest in investigating the Government of Ireland, as administered by the greatest statesman called to the Lord-Lieutenancy before or since 1799. Throughout Lord Wellesley's first official residence in Dublin, Catholic Emancipation—and Catholic Eman-



cupation alone—occupied the thoughts of men. Not a word about the land or absenteeism can be discovered either in Pearse's *Life of Wellesley*, or in the more recent volumes replete with historic interest as to Ireland, published by the Honourable D. Plunket concerning his great-grandfather Lord Plunket.

We find, therefore, little in the time we mention to bear on practical politics of the present day, although it is impossible not to look with admiration at the statesmanship which impelled Lord Wellesley to abrogate in practice disabilities, which he justly saw would soon be swept from the statute book of our realm.

Consummate as was the tact and genius for Government evinced during Lord Wellesley's sway, there is some reason to believe that when emancipation did really arrive, the expectations formed of its benevolent results were, to use a modern financial phrase, discounted by the conciliatory and statesman-like conduct of Lord Wellesley.

The Marquis was the representative of a Government wherein the Catholic question was left open; but not only was the Foreign Minister, Mr. Canning, favourable to a removal of these impolitic and unjust shackles, but the balance of moderate opinion as represented by the Grenville connection was likewise favourable to religious liberty.\*

• \* Lord Colchester in his *Diary* has observed how unfriendly Lord Wellesley remained to Lord Liverpool's Government, as formed on a principle he could not approve, even if in its very inception there had not been a misunderstanding between himself

Under these circumstances a freedom of action was allowed to Lord Wellesley in asserting his well-known opinions, of which, as we have shown, he fully availed himself.

So far as was possible, Lord Wellesley desired to allow political justice and order to receive simultaneous assertion, but he never wavered in the rigid maintenance of statute law, whether in times of comparative calm or the most violent agitation.\*

Lord Wellesley had to deal with Ribbonism, and its secret action directed against landlords who offended or injured their tenants, but not as we have previously stated with the Land question as a political difficulty.

Thus it is that little guidance for the settlement of the

and the Prime Minister as to the publication of a correspondence connected with the political movements preceding the period of Lord Liverpool's installation as Premier. This, however, was obliterated by Lord Grenville's resolve to give his countenance to a Government which had put an end to the French war and drawn around it all the abilities available for the purpose of pursuing what appeared to be a natural and moderate course. Lord Grenville himself was so enfeebled that it was only as the head of a considerable political clan—so to speak—that he rendered this manifold service to the Government, and in so doing has left posterity to hail with satisfaction the knowledge of a restored good feeling between those whose names and merits are alike the pride of England.

\* It is curious to read of O'Connell writing to Mr. Plunkett in 1825, when that great lawyer and orator was Attorney-General, and suggesting a visit from the King's troops as alone likely to restore confidence in Irish disturbed districts. This opinion was given before O'Connell's days of agitation. It will be found under the correspondence connected with 1825 as published in the Hon. D. Plunkett's *Life of Lord Plunkett*.

most perplexing of all enigmas is gained by familiarity with the thoughts and desires which passed through the Viceroy's gigantic mind.

Mr Pitt's words would seem to be as true now (or nearly so) as they were when spoken during the incubation of the Union.

"The evils and calamities with which Ireland is afflicted," said Mr. Pitt, "lie deep in the situation of the country; they are to be attributed to the manners of the inhabitants—to the state of society—to the habits of the people at large—to the unequal distribution of property—to the want of civilised intercourse—to the discord of party—to the prejudices of religious sects."

Several of these evils have been mitigated, if not removed, but they remain substantially correct, or several of the finest harbours in the world would not remain without adequate use, or England's difficulty be notoriously Ireland's opportunity. Whether the Land Question be within the reach of legitimate legislation is beyond our power or province to decide, but Mr. Pitt's opinion clearly does seem to indicate the desirability of some change. To be made, however, if his example is to be produced, whilst carefully regarding the precepts of political economy and the concomitant rights of property.

With the evidence before us of Lord Wellesley's prescient apprehension of political dangers, as illustrated by a remarkable vice-regal administration in Ireland, few readers who connect such a triumph of government with the pre-eminent qualities shown by Colonel Malleſon, at the close of this chapter, to have been exercised in

Hindostan, will fail to wonder how such a statesman can have passed twenty years in England without attaining to the Premiership.

Such anomaly can be traced to two causes. First, the peculiar constitution of parties ; and secondly, to the habits of command which uncontrolled Indian rulership must necessarily instil into the human mind.

With Lord Wellesley's temperament, this latter tendency assumed a more decided character than with men of less commanding natures and inferior genius.

The letters written to Lord Plunkett, and published in that nobleman's life, illustrate fully what we mean. Wellesley, himself, felt an ever uneasy prompting of his fitness for command, the possession of which restless ambition neither can add to the happiness of the individual, nor reconcile others to his pre-eminence.

So far as political parties are concerned, Lord Wellesley's disagreement with Mr. Pitt's former colleagues was caused by differences on economical and financial questions of detail bearing on the prosecution of war in the Peninsula. But the prevalence of these cabinet estrangements shut Lord Wellesley out from official life until the great war closed, and the reins of Government were held by those who had latterly borne the heat and burden of the strife. His friend, Lord Grenville, with whose views those of Lord Wellesley's to a great degree approximated, was an enemy to the very Peninsula contest which the Marquis desired to wage to the bitter end.

Thus had a mind, inferior only to that of Pitt itself, a somewhat inadequate scope for the display of its

enormous power. On the question of Reform in Parliament, Lord Wellesley had in common with Mr. Canning feared the substitution of population rather than property being ultimately taken as an electoral basis; but concerning this matter he relaxed his idea so far as to believe that Lord Grey's measure was called for by the necessities of the time. By the acceptance of the Lord Stewardship in 1830, he gave, however, a silent support to the Reform Bill, thus giving both weighty and timely aid to a ministry charged by many with connivance in the undermining of our ancient Constitution.

In the year 1834 Lord Wellesley was once again sent to Ireland as Lord-Lieutenant by the Whig Government. Report had it that his energies were impaired, and that he was unequal to the renewed task of Government. But it was speedily proved to be otherwise, and the detractors were put to shame by an administration remarkable alike for its vigour and success.

Lord Brougham has told us, in his *Statesmen of the Time of George III.* how Lord Wellesley modelled his oratory upon ideas culled from the Homeric poems and the orations of Demosthenes. He tells us, likewise, that the statesman's education was cut short in this branch of perfection by his appointment to rule over India. Nevertheless, we are told of a chastened taste, fervent imagination, poetic force, combined with a clear understanding; advantages which, combined with a faculty for declamation, prove that as a public speaker Lord Wellesley has been underrated much in the ratio that he has suffered depreciation as a man.

Probably there is no such direct effect on record from

any speech, as that which his oration in Parliament against French Jacobinism is said to have wrought. in 1794.

Lord Wellesley's youngest brother, Henry Wellesley, had set out for Lisbon to bring home his widowed sister, whose husband, a son of the Duke of Grafton, had died there. On their return the brother and sister were taken prisoners on the ship in which they were sailing, carried into Brest, and there condemned to death by Robespierre's Directory for the crime of being related to the Lord Mornington whose outspoken and convincing speech had reached the ears of these sanguinary despots then ruling France. Fortunately Robespierre died before the sentence could be carried out, and young Wellesley and his sister got exchanged for Frenchmen incarcerated in England.

There is something truly in unison with English taste in Lord Wellesley's veneration for his beloved Eton. In old age the thoughts of other past glories were in a manner blotted out by the early memories of boyhood.

As we have previously stated, he had been educated both at Eton and Harrow, but it was Eton around whose classic and royal memories the statesman's own recollections were lovingly twined.

The friendship with Hodgson, the popular provost, seemed to inflame this zeal for early associations, and it remains on record as by no means the least remarkable sentiment of a unique career.

The sentiment as late in life he felt it, let his own graceful verse record. He had received continued veneration and respect from all, whether old or young,

connected with that noble college, and thus speaks his feelings :—

“ On my last steps Fame sheds her purest rays,  
And wreathis with bays the cypress and the yew !  
Eton, best guardian of my youthful days,  
Greets my rethring age with honours new.”

This source of joy, moreover, seems to have never failed, as his imagination constantly turned towards the scenes of his youth, and Eton memories shone brightly through the glories even of India and Spain. The following verses of his, translated from the Latin by the late Lord Derby, and placed on his tomb in Eton chapel, will at once form an apt conjuncture of Etonian ability and British statesmanship, whilst they tell of a sentiment which every public school man or boy will fully understand :—

“ Long tost on Fortune's waves, I come to rest,  
Eton, once more on thy maternal breast.  
On loftiest deed to fix th' aspiring gaze,  
To seek the purer lights of ancient days,  
To love the simple paths of manly truth—  
These were the lessons to my opening youth.  
If on my later life some glory shine,  
Some honours grace my name, the meed is thine.  
My boyhood's Muse, my aged dust receive,  
And one last tear of kind remembrance give.”

In October 1842 were gathered together in the old chapel all the *élite* of Eton's sons past and present, there to commit to the earth all that remained of her famous and most constant child.

• Equal in mental capacity to any who before or since have turned with pride towards Eton as the place of their education, he well deserved the unaccustomed honour. Foremost amongst the throng of mourners stood the Iron Duke, who himself was justly proud of his own connection with those royal shades.

It was the timely support given by the illustrious dead, which when most required had helped to raise Arthur Duke of Wellington into the unexampled position he then held in the realm of England.

It has been to give prominence to this fact, in a career probably but imperfectly appreciated or understood, that this record is mainly directed. Moreover, our task would have by no means reached completion without it being recorded how thoroughly the Duke himself appreciated his great relation. He again and again stated the pride he felt at being Lord Wellesley's brother, and had been accustomed to tell him that he need not have shrunk from attending the East India Council when his presence would have made him Governor-General in Council.

The Duke possessed practical qualities which were absent in his brother's composition, but for all that the mighty warrior was not likely to underrate decision such as that which succoured Abercromby by despatch of 5,000 sepoys to Egypt when they were most needed, or to have forgotten the support given to himself in India when the eyes of others failed to descry talents his brother consistently trusted. Many Englishmen are

Lord Ellenborough's Diary.



familiar with a print of Lord Wellesley, which has a prominent position in the Foreign Office amidst those of other Secretaries of State for the department.

It presents to the gaze a form small and in perfect proportion. There is the hereditary nobility of presence, which involuntarily reminds the beholder of another whose distinctive features are far more widely known. A face, moreover, is seen, as a contemporary declares, remarkable for intellectual beauty, the whole figure conveying, as much as a picture can do, the presence of conscious if natural dignity.

The Marquis was married twice. First, in 1794, to a French lady, Hyacinthe Roland, and again, in 1825, to the widow of Robert Paterson, of the United States. The Irish marquisate, however, lapsed in default of issue at his death, whilst the Earldom of Mornington and other honours finally devolved upon the present Duke of Wellington.

The following views on Lord Wellesley's Eastern rule, and its consequences, are from the pen of one who has made India and its history a persistent study.

### *The Indian Career of Marquis Wellesley.*

If the foundations of our Indian empire were laid by Clive, and were rendered secure by Warren Hastings, to Marquis Wellesley must be ascribed the merit of having built on those foundations the splendid superstructure which is the envy of other countries, the glory of our own.

Marquis Wellesley, then Lord Mornington, landed in Madras on the 26th April 1798. The times were very critical. In France General Bonaparte was preparing the plan for the invasion of Egypt which he carried out in the course of the same year - a plan which, in his capacious mind, was but the preliminary to an attack upon the English possessions in India. The governor of the Isle of France, M. Malartic, had not only entered into correspondence with the prince of Southern India, most notorious for his hatred of the English, but had sent his emissaries to his dominions, and these had actually landed in Maisur territory.

In the territories of the Nizam, bordering on those of Tippu Sultan, were three strong *corps d'armée* of disciplined troops, drilled, disciplined, and commanded by foreign officers, mostly Frenchmen, the chief of whom was the famous Raymond, one of the ablest adventurers that ever set foot on Indian soil. These corps were recruited for the most part from British territories, and to a certain extent from deserters from the British service. The officers were violent Jacobins, and the whole constituted in Marquis Wellesley's own words—"an armed French party of great zeal, diligence, and activity."

Nor, whilst this was the state of affairs in Southern India, was the outlook in the north-west more promising. Daolat Rao Sindia, the ruler of the most formidable Maratha power, possessed, in addition to an enormous body of irregular forces, a trained army upwards of 20,000 strong, drilled, disciplined, and led by foreign officers; the Peshwa, ruling at Poonah, always eager

for aggression, had a considerable though smaller army watching its opportunity; Tukaji Holkar was drilling another Maratha force, which was soon to rival that of Sindia; whilst to the north-west the ruler of Afghanistan, Zaman Shah, already in correspondence with Tippu, was menacing an invasion of Hindustan. Never had the outlook been more threatening.

Marquis Wellesley—I call him by the title by which he is best known in history, though he was then only Lord Mornington—met all these difficulties with a sagacity which proved his thorough acquaintance with the races with which he was thus suddenly brought into contact.

Knowing that the Marathas still cherished the recollection of the terror produced amongst them by the invasion of India by the grandfather of Zaman Shah and by the slaughter of Panipat; that they dreaded the ambition of Tippu, who was in avowed correspondence with that ruler; knowing likewise that he could work upon the Nizam through his fear of the ambitious ruler of Maisur; the great Marquis entered into a defensive alliance with the representatives of those powers against a possible invader from the north. To diminish the chances of any material assistance from France reaching Tippu Sultan by the sea route, he pressed upon the Home Government the desirability of at once taking possession of the Cape of Good Hope, and the Isles of France and Bourbon. His prescience with respect to this latter policy was soon to be vindicated. His advice was not followed, and for the ten subsequent years, piratical or semi-piratical cruisers, issuing from those

bases, inflicted upon British commerce with India an annual loss to be counted by millions. When the losses became too great to be borne, then and then only was the policy of Marquis Wellesley resorted to, and carried out with the results which he had foreseen.

To return to 1798. In September of that year Marquis Wellesley received official information from England that a large armament laden with troops and stores had set out from Toulon with the design, it was believed, of conveying material aid to Tippu, and with that information, authority, if satisfied of Tippu's duplicity, to carry British arms into his country.

Lord Wellesley's preparations had been made long before this letter had been received, and having in his possession positive proofs of the hostile intentions of Tippu towards England, he determined to call him to account. Before entering into a contest which might be prolonged, however, Lord Wellesley deemed it prudent to render the Nizam harmless. With the consent of that prince, reluctantly given, he disarmed the three *corps d'armée* trained and commanded by French officers, deposed the officers, and deprived the Nizam of the right to engage others in their place, without the express permission of the British Government.

This act having been accomplished, Tippu was called to account. Threatened with hostilities before his preparations had been completed, before more than a handful of the promised French auxiliaries had arrived, that prince endeavoured to explain all that was dubious, to deny all that was hostile, in his conduct. But the evidence was too clear. In a masterly despatch, Lord

Wellésley placed the proofs of his double-dealing before the Maisur ruler, exposed the hollowness of his excuses, and informed him that in consequence of his engagements with the enemies of England a new arrangement with himself had become necessary. The letter concluded with an earnest request that a reply might not be deferred for more than one day after it should reach him, otherwise dangerous consequences might ensue. The Marquis was as good as his word. The letter remained practically unanswered. Dangerous consequences did ensue—Tippu was attacked, was conquered, and was killed, and his dynasty was dethroned !

The disarmament of the Nizam's formidable corps, the disappearance of Tippu, followed by the partition of his territories, and the collapse, which occurred about the same time, of the pretensions of Zaman Shah, left Lord Wellesley free to deal with the Marathas. In his mode of dealing with that martial people we shall observe the same sagacity, the same promptitude, and the same success which characterised his proceedings with respect to Tippu and the Nizam. The leading Maratha nation at the time was that ruled over by Sindia. The disciplined forces of that prince, commanded by Europeans, occupied the country from Agra to Aligarh, from Aligarh to Delhi, and the country on the right bank of the river Jamna. Daolat Rao Sindia was the virtual successor of the Moghol. He kept the blinded representative of that race a prisoner in the imperial city, and ruled in his name. With far less abilities than his adopted father had possessed, Daolat Rao had inherited from that father a scheme of uniting all the native

princes of India against the foreigner. That project had been seriously injured by the destruction of Tippu and the neutralisation of the Nizam, but the forces upon which it was still possible to act were formidable in numbers and discipline. The stake, too, was a great one. It was no less than the empire of India.

Had Daolat Rao possessed a tenth part of the ability of his predecessor, the blow would have been struck when the English were waging war with Tippu. But with all the willingness to fight for empire, he possessed none of the foresight necessary for the task. Lord Wellesley discovered absolute proof of his intention to "overthrow the fortunes of that unprincipled race, the British." The English statesman then dealt with him as he had dealt with Tippu. He sent Lake against the northern, and his brother, General Wellesley, against the western portions of Sindia's dominions. A campaign of a few months ruined the power of the Marathas as represented by Sindia. But another branch of the race still remained. Holkar, who, from motives of jealousy, had declined to make common cause with his brother-chieftain, took up arms to avenge his defeat. Towards him Lord Wellesley pursued the same policy. And, though he did not stay long enough in India to see the issue, it was his policy which was victorious. Attacked and beaten, Holkar was driven in a very brief period across the Satlaj, carrying, to use his own expression, "his kingdom on his saddle-bow."

• Having thus conquered the inheritance of the Moghols, Marquis Wellesley took measures to consolidate it, measures so wise that, though repealed by ignorance

and folly, they were subsequently again resorted to, and have ever since formed the basis upon which British dominion in India rests. His principle was to establish over native princes the suzerainty of a great Power, which, while securing them from external aggression, should give them full liberty of internal administration. Under this principle the states of Rajputana were secured against Maratha invasion, and for them, as for others so situated, a new era of prosperity seemed to arise. But it only seemed to arise. Unhappily, the policy of the great Marquis in this respect was not ratified by the Court of Directors: Lord Wellesley returned to England: the English protectorate over the states of Rajputana was withdrawn; and the princes and people of those states were left to the tender mercies of the Marathas and Pindaris. The desolation which followed is not to be painted in words. Misery was shed broadcast over the brightest portions of Hindostan. Rapine and murder ruled unchecked. For twelve years this reign of terror lasted, and it was not till 1818 that the Marquis of Hastings was forced to recur to the wise and prescient policy of the greatest of our Governors-General.

I have contented myself with tracing the outlines of the policy of this most illustrious statesman. That policy was wise, the aims to which it was directed were heroic, the means by which it was carried out were manly. Looking back to that time, now eighty years distant, and reading the despatches of Marquis Wellesley with the aid of experience since acquired, we cannot sufficiently admire the broad grasp, seizing every detail,

even to the minutest ; the prescience, which detected at once the course affairs would follow ; the vigour, which directed the right action to meet them ; the glance which pierced the hearts of other men and read their inmost thoughts. Of him it may be said, that not only was his own success as Governor-General complete, but he made success possible for those who should follow him. In one word—he made the Indian Empire.





# LORD CASTLEREAGH.

JANUARY 1812 TO AUGUST 1822.

## CHAPTER I.

### GAINING THE LEAD.



WHEN Lord Wellesley retired the Foreign Office fell into Lord Castlereagh's hands. It was a high honour to be showered on any man, but one that at the age of thirty nine was gained as early as it certainly had been earned justly and through the exercise of sterling qualities.

Joined to a presence in itself noble and engaging, the young Robert Stewart had evinced talent of more than ordinary character when at St. John's College, Cambridge. In college examinations he invariably distinguished himself, so that it was to the dismay of his tutor, Dr. Bushby, when, following the not unfrequent habit of the times, he disappeared from Alma Mater to perform somewhat prematurely the European tour then



Lord Castlereagh.



considered supremely important in a young nobleman's education. Herein, however, he incurred a disadvantage the results of which clung to him through life. In the opinion of the erudite and thoughtful Alexander Knox (who, as Lord Castlereagh's private secretary, had ample opportunity of observing his character) it was solely owing to an unfinished education that long-continued practice, combined with official experience and unsurpassed knowledge of Parliament, never rendered the young Irishman either a clear or polished rhetorician. That there must have existed merit of some sort in his public speaking the evidence of contemporaries will attest, even if the fact of a long-sustained supremacy over the House of Commons did not itself show that in the main he succeeded in making his ends and desires understood. But experience demonstrates that study of the classical models in oratory, super-added to a sound educational basis, has for the most part preceded forensic success, save and except where the orator is, so to speak, to the manner born, and owes all to the divine fire burning within. •

Lord Castlereagh has been ushered into the world during the same year, 1769, which has become eternally famous as that of Napoleon's and Wellington's nativity. Thus his career was coeval with that of many other great minds, but few of whom have, however, been destined to leave such indelible and beneficent mark on the history of their country.

• The secret of this success appears to have been untiring application, unflinching courage, constant diligence, and unequalled tact. •

Striking genius did not show early in the development of Mr. Stewart's character, but his extraordinary cleverness was described by no less a competent observer than Lord Malmesbury, when early in the future minister's career he had an opportunity of conversing with him. Gifted he most certainly was, even if not endowed with supreme powers of oratory, and owing much to patient and unswerving fidelity to any task he undertook to fulfil.

It was not his fault that high birth and breeding had led enemies to stigmatise his geniality as patrician condescension, or that around his memory has raged a savage and embittered controversy, through the clouds of which the sun of truth and justice has but lately been able to break.

Even now it is in some quarters obscured by the prejudices of those who, clinging to fallacy with a persistency worthy of a truer and better cause, are fain to believe that the black picture painted by political enemies has at least some foundation for its false colouring. History, however, fighting on the side of truth, is daily gaining the triumph which is the natural reward of silent, patient, and sterling merit. Therefore it is that the writer will trust to facts and honoured contemporary opinion to assert a natural influence over the minds of his readers.

When the young Robert Stewart first left his home in county Down for the to him undiscovered country of Dublin, the ship in which he sailed was nearly overwhelmed in a violent storm, and but for the courage and presence of mind displayed by the future statesman, one

of the crew would have been sacrificed to the fury of the gale.

When half overboard, Mr. Stewart sprang into the chains of the rigging, and seizing the endangered seaman by the collar of his coat, dragged him on board at the risk of his own life.

He had left his native coasts amidst the laments of his father's tenants, who, honouring his family, loved him also for his generosity and kindness of heart.

The tidings of his contempt for danger when human life was in question, was calculated to increase a popularity which he never lost amongst these simple country people. He had built suitable houses for his father's tenants; established a horse-fair which remains celebrated to this day, and helped to build church accommodation both for the Protestants and Roman Catholics.

When, then, after the half-wrecked ship had been driven to take shelter in the harbour of Castletown, Isle of Man, Lord Castlereagh arrived from thence in safety at Dublin, there was great rejoicing amongst his countrymen, who believed him to have been lost at sea.

He first took his place in the Irish Parliament for county Down, the seats of which had formerly been monopolised by Lord Downshire's nominees, while the one seat gained for young Stewart by his father, the first Lord Londonderry, cost no less than £60,000, and the good parent, contented to have gained the political opening he desired for his son, lived henceforth in an old barn, to which a few rooms had been lately added: Such was his enthusiasm for that high-minded and

gifted youth' whose talents it was desired to devote to the public life which he promised to fulfil so usefully. An alliance in 1794 with the youngest daughter of Lord Buckinghamshire contributed much to his future contentment and success in life, for her sympathy was ever constant, even to the moment when, with just pride, she claimed for him the grave in Westminster Abbey which a grateful nation delighted to give. Mr. Stewart's early career in the Irish House of Commons was characterised by a genuine sympathy shown for all real Liberal measures.

As the Irish Parliament was then situated he was in favour of its reform, but in common with Mr. Ponsonby, the Opposition leader, would not have desired to extend such a change to the English legislature.

It is not proposed here to thread the labyrinth of Irish politics up to the year 1797, when Lord Londonderry being raised to the Marquisate, his son took the title of Viscount Castlereagh, which he was destined to render so famous.

After Mr. Pelham had retired hastily from the Chief Secretaryship, Lord Castlereagh was induced to act as his *locum tenens*, under Lord Camden's Viceroyalty.

In 1797 Ireland was in a ferment.

It was the eve of the Rebellion raised by the United Irishmen, which, fostered as it was by promise of French assistance, placed the British rule in grave danger.

Under these circumstances Government, determined to hold the country as an integral part of the United Kingdom, resorted to measures of vigilance and repres-

sive precaution, whilst on Lord Castlereagh appears to have fallen all the odium which his position as Government mouth-piece laid him open to.

There was a romance thrown around the actions of the Irish patriots which, if they did not absolutely deserve, it is difficult to refuse to those who acted in many instances from the promptings of a mistaken patriotism. That all-ruling love of country which in the passionate bosom of the Hibernian burns so fiercely, and not unfrequently takes a form antagonistic to the powers that be, has ever been at once the pride and the difficulty of her rulers. Allied as it naturally is with great bravery, impulsiveness, and kindness of heart, it has ever been sought to direct its force into a channel where its power may prove of vital use to the State.

A book might be written describing the services of Irishmen to the kingdom. The deeds of the Irish brigade in the Peninsula contributed not a little to the success of their great countryman and leader, whilst the actions of other prominent individuals hailing from the Emerald Isle are inscribed prominently on the roll of our fame, civil and military.

To guide this sentiment into a useful channel was, however, found to be beyond official skill in 1798, when the whisper of sedition was insinuated by Buonaparté's agents, ever ready to plant the standard of revolt on the spot they judged England to be weakest.

Hence the necessity for that union which Castlereagh, when a young man, arranged the complicated details of, which was passed with the full concurrence of Lord



Cornwallis the Viceroy, and with the grateful approval of Mr. Pitt, then English Prime Minister.

There was, however, a party amongst the Irish aristocracy who, although loyal in intent and faithful to British interests, could not brook what they considered the degradation of Ireland below the sister country.

Lord Cornwallis says on the Union :—

“We have hitherto carried all our questions by majorities, between 40 and 50, but I am sorry to say it is an unwilling majority, dragged out to vote by order of the borough proprietors, and detesting the measure which precluded future hopes of douceurs so long enjoyed by members of the Irish House of Commons.”

The aristocratic Whig families of that day never forgot the way in which the Union had been obtained, and whatever was underhand, whatever was base in the transaction, they were not slow to fix on the name and memory of that young man, who in the purest and simplest manner had negotiated matters of the most complicated nature, and performed work which, whatever may be thought of its results, lay open before the world.

The fact of holding official position in Ireland when foreigners were scheming to gain a footing in that island, acted against the popularity of Lord Castlereagh much the same as any necessity for repressive measures, or indeed sustaining the ordinary laws, would prejudice, however unjustly, any Chief Secretary who might have the bad fortune to put them in practice.

Such was the fate of Lord Castlereagh when, as we scarcely realise at this distance of time, a French fleet

was brought to action, taken, and dispersed within six leagues of Tory Island.

Admiral Sir J. B. Warren was the individual who, by his bravery and seamanship, probably saved Ireland from invasion. But Castlereagh suffered every stigma for the strong measures he took to punish foreign interference, either direct or in the form of tampering with the Irish themselves, who notoriously would keep all their demands within legal and constitutional limits, but for the perpetual trade of agitation which thrives in their midst. But it is open to say that nothing has been adduced to account for unpopularity exceptional and for a long time notorious.

The solution of what at first sight does seem a difficult problem will be arrived at when the circumstances of Ireland during the years 1798-1800 are considered, together with their bearings on more modern events. The authorities were in possession of undoubted information which led them to conclude that an organised minority of the nation were in collusion with England's foes abroad. Now, Lord Castlereagh's chief power in his native country consisted, first, in a thorough knowledge of the various districts labouring under excitement, and the faculty he possessed for attaining personal influence over well-favoured individuals (a power which the Irish Secretary used for purposes of forming counter organisations to neutralise, and, if possible, destroy, these influences threatening to subvert the realm); led to a necessary knowledge of the quarters where treason was rampant, and to exertions such as Lord Castlereagh's position forced him to make, and

which may have led to the punishment of individual offenders.

It is an anomaly, not peculiar to insurrectionary movements in Ireland alone, that in the meshes of crime and disorder are involved the persons of those whose private conduct and noble bearing lend a halo to revolt itself; and in some degree the ruling spirit at Dublin Castle suffers an ever-recurring unpopularity when its duties lead to the branding as felons those who, often beloved by their neighbours and honoured as men, have yet yielded to the specious wiles of revolutionary agitation. From hostile darts hurled by the sympathisers with these purblind but unfortunate individuals, it will become the duty of a future historian to protect the names of others besides Lords Castlereagh and Cornwallis.

The shaft that wounds in the case of those promoters of union between England and Ireland must strike with equal effect when aimed at Wellington, Wellesley, Peel, Clarendon, and Chichester Fortescue, whilst the latest chapter of history must add those of Lowther, Forster, and even Vernon Harcourt (whose speech in the House of Commons, February 23rd, 1881, stating the duties of Government towards sedition, precisely illustrates our meaning) to the list of those whom the performance of official duty may condemn to obloquy thoroughly unmerited, but still reproduced from time to time by those who essay to play the patriot and impose on the credibility of the untaught masses.

During the arrangement of the political campaigns preceding the Union it became necessary to form some counter organisation to balance the secret societies whose

anti-national and subversive schemes were likely to be temporarily, at least, foiled by a legislative fusion between the two countries. Lord Castlereagh appears, from a correspondence which has been placed before us, to have succeeded in eliciting publicly how strong a feeling existed in Belfast and the north in favour of Union. He contrived to bring those favouring a consolidation of Imperial strength into public meeting, and so allowed them to testify in the mass their desire for a change that few dare avow in writing, being naturally reluctant to place themselves in the power of those secret and irresponsible organisations which have from time to time been the curse of Ireland.

The conspirators and ill-affected never forgave this exercise of personal influence on behalf of the Union, and coadjutors in the English press, combining with twopenny pamphleteers and partial historians, have contrived to affix a stigma on a name which, as we shall show, Grattan was nationally proud of, but which the great Irish Whig families most unjustly allowed to be maligned and misinterpreted.

It is not too much to say that but for Lord Castlereagh's endeavours, the French would in all probability have gained a footing in the sister kingdom. But, nevertheless, if the necessity for coercive action in Ireland during 1798, and in subsequent years of disturbance, could not be fully proved, the cause of those engaged in the repulsive duty would find no justification in these pages. Moreover, as in all cases where coercion has to be resorted to, the need may continue to be questioned by some amongst us.

But the House of Commons made an inquiry into the facts, and, although the result was kept secret at first, details were reprinted for the benefit of members of the legislature.

The volume in question has been placed in the author's hand. It is styled *Report from the Committee of Secrecy*, and is most conclusive. The disorders fostered by the French Directory certainly did bring their authors into trouble, when not only the union with England was threatened, but the whole country about to be delivered up as a place of arms to an implacable foe.

In the words of a treasonable song placed in evidence before the Parliamentary Committee :—

- “ They come, they come, see myriads come  
Of Frenchmen to relieve us,  
Seize, seize the pike, beat, beat the drum,  
They come, my friends, to save us.  
Whilst trembling despots fly this land  
To shun impending danger,  
We stretch forth our fraternal hand,  
• To hail each welcome stranger.  
Plant, plant the tree, fair freedom's tree,  
Midst danger, wounds, and slaughter,  
• Erin's green fields its soil shall be,  
Her tyrants' blood its water.”

The same necessity, present. may be, in a more or less varied degree, has since subjected men like Sir Robert Peel, Mr. Chichester Fortescue, and Mr. Forster, to the same injustice and misrepresentation that dogged the memory of Lord Castlereagh, who, as Mr. Bright said in effect to the House of Commons on January 27th,

1881, lived in a time when barbarism was rampant in Ireland, such as we know not of now.

It is, therefore, clear that a far stronger necessity for the repressive measures in Ireland (inquisitorial and hateful as they necessarily were, and as their counterpart at the present time must be) existed in 1798, than by any possibility can be claimed for the national resolve to pass coercion under Mr. Gladstone's Premiership in 1881. There should be, therefore, to say the least of it, the utmost caution exercised before the loose statements of well-meaning but, as we contend, misled chroniclers, be accepted now as history, and Lord Castlereagh condemned to an unpopularity which his extraordinary after-acquirements have failed totally to obliterate. Even Mr. Perceval had to admit the force of this antagonistic feeling when, in November 1802, he admitted to Mr. Plumer Ward (*Memoirs*, vol. i. p. 291) that, notwithstanding Lord Castlereagh's considerable talents and great conciliation of manner, an impossibility existed in *some people's minds* as to deriving advantage from a junction with him.\*

\* Mr. Perceval laid a stress upon the words "some people's minds" to demonstrate that such prejudice was by no means his own. It is, however, strange to reflect that in a year's time the mob were found attacking both Mr. Perceval's own house in Downing Street and Lord Castlereagh's in St. James's Square, whilst after his own cruel death in May 1812, a section of the people openly rejoiced over the assassination of one they had learned to believe was an oppressor and enemy to their welfare. Mr. McCullagh Torrens tells a characteristic story of Lord Castlereagh in connection with the above-mentioned riot in St.

Lord Castlereagh, it is true, never temporised with sedition, and we have yet to learn from solid proof that such conduct did not tend to promote the happiness of his countrymen, and spread confusion in the hearts of their alien despoilers and perverters.

When Mr. Addington became Prime Minister, Lord Castlereagh resigned his office of Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, in favour of Mr. Abbot. But as the office was found to be a twofold one, containing the honorary distinction of Keeper of the Privy Seal in Ireland, together with the salaried ministerial position at Dublin Castle, it was proposed by the new Prime Minister that as some honour should clearly be conferred upon Lord Castlereagh for accomplishing the great work of the Union, it should be rendered in the shape of an ample income being attached to the ancient office of Privy Seal, and given for life to him who, by skilfully bringing to the front the sentiments of the solid minority in favour of a union, had made such a measure possible, and so saved Ireland from becoming the battle-field of Europe.

James's Square. The obnoxious politician's house being in danger of destruction, a company of the Guards were placed at the door. The officer, a young Guardsman, was, however, astonished by being accosted by a muffled figure, who demanded admittance—proving to be Lord Castlereagh himself, who quietly observed that he must go to his wife, who was unwell, and this, notwithstanding that the crowd avowed their desire to wreak vengeance on his person. The people seem to have dispersed at midnight.

The ill-success of the Walcheren expedition had, doubtless, much to do with this popular ebullition of hatred, met by Lord Castlereagh with his natural contempt for all personal danger, and combated with the calm courage so characteristic of himself.

It is a fact, however, that Lord Castlereagh, although by no means was his family over-burdened with wealth, refused to accept any such reward for performing his duty. Such conduct fully deserves the encomium to which Mr. Abbot, the future Speaker (in his *Diary*, written when, as Lord Colchester, he had himself received a peerage) (Lord Colchester's *Diary*, vol. i. pp. 258-59) lavishes on the young statesman whose disinterestedness he held above all question, and yet this is the individual who, after a long official career, during which he secured Europe (as we shall show) from the renewal of a consuming and apparently endless struggle, was, three days before the battle of Waterloo, chased to his home by a savage crowd, who, steeped in ignorance and prejudice, had imbibed the false teaching of those whose position and means of information at once gave colour to their assertions, and justified in the popular mind the sustenance of unjustifiable calumny, such as truth, bursting through the clouds of contemporary jealousy and malice, is at last gradually dispersing.\*

Lord Castlereagh supported the early measures of Mr. Addington's ministry. In common with the remainder of Mr. Pitt's friends, he was responsible for

\* The explanation given by those best informed on the subject is to the effect that Lord Castlereagh in his early days of Irish official life gave rein to his naturally warm temperament, and associated freely with the many individuals with whom he came in contact. When, during the Rebellion, it was discovered that certain of these were implicated therein, their friends and associates roundly charged their arrests against Lord Castlereagh



the quarrel with Denmark, incident to her joining the northern coalition against this country. The English plenipotentiary sent to avert conflict on the occasion in question was Mr. Vansittart (afterwards Lord Bexley) whose account of his mission and its failure to detach Denmark from Prussian, and, therefore, indirectly from Buonaparte's influence, is narrated in Pellew's *Life of Lord Sidmouth*, vol. i. pp. 368-73.\*

In the year 1802 Lord Castlereagh joined Mr. Addington's Government, and in the same year he attended the famous meeting of Mr. Pitt's friends at the

as instances of personal perfidy exercised against those with whom he had held friendly converse so short a time before. A charge of this nature is distinctly made in a periodical to which the writer has had access.

What wonder then that the statesman in maturer years shrank somewhat within his official shell, and bore undeserved stigma with the contempt he felt therefor.

\* When Lord Nelson returned home he said to Mr. Addington, in reference to his disobedience of orders when Sir H. Parker gave the signal not to engage the enemy :—" I did not fear, for I knew you would stand by me " : a tribute to the Prime Minister's well-known resolution and fidelity, which goes far to explain the reason why the latter's elevation to supreme power occurred, and was stamped with Mr. Pitt's approval.

Thomas Campbell has, in a single stanza of his immortal poem, told the story of England's action on this occasion, and expresses more in that short space than might be conveyed to the mind by a whole folio of international law :—

" Out spoke the victor then,  
As he hailed them o'er the wave,  
Ye are brothers, we are men,  
And we conquer but to save.

London Tavern on May 28th.\* It is, however, clear that the sympathy of the Modern (Pitt's name amongst his friends) was with the new Government; a sympathy, moreover, which is believed not to have

So peace instead of death let us bring. •  
 But yield, proud foe, thy fleet,  
 With thy crews at England's feet,  
 And make submission meet •  
 To our King."

Lord Colchester tells us in his *Diary* that, although Mr. Pitt had partially prepared an armament for the purpose of breaking up the Northern Coalition, Mr. Addington's Government perfected such preparations. The expedition under Abercromby had gone so far towards Egypt that its recall was impossible. Therefore, it follows that the credit accruing from the rescue of Denmark from Continental despotism should be divided between the two administrations, but that the laurels gathered by Abercromby and Wellesley must likewise entwine Pitt's lofty brow.

\* The flower of the nation assembled on this occasion to the number of 904, no less than three large rooms being occupied by the guests. Mr. Pitt was absent himself. It was on this occasion that Mr. Canning's famous "Pilot that weathered the storm" was first heard, and sung before a truly appreciative audience. We have quoted from it previously, so now reproduce the last stanzas only, as applicable to the occasion of the great statesman's temporary retirement:—

" So Pitt, when the course of thy greatness is o'er,  
 Thy talents, thy virtues we fondly recal ;  
 Now justly we prize thee, when lost we deplore,  
 Admired in thy zenith, but loved in thy fall.

" Oh, take, then, for dangers by wisdom repelled,  
 For evils by courage and constancy braved ;  
 Oh, take, for a throne by thy counsels upheld,  
 The thanks of a people thy firmness has saved.

existed entirely without influence in the national counsels, such as once led Pitt inadvertently to tell Lord Malmesbury in the course of conversation that he would *inform Addington* on a certain subject; and the fact that such approval was undoubtedly given to the policy of consolidating resources which Mr. Addington and Lord Hawkesbury adopted, makes us sooner alive to the palpable injustice of the clamour so soon to be

“ And oh, if again the rude whirlwind should rise,  
The dawning of peace should fresh darkness deform,  
The regrets of the good, and the fears of the wise,  
Shall turn to the pilot who weathered the storm.”

It is remarkable that the president on this notable occasion was the Lord Spencer of that time, whose perspicuous speeches in the House of Lords had given timely support to Mr. Pitt's policy. An averment in a former part of this volume to the effect that the Whig traditions connect themselves with Althorpe must be then held to apply rather to a later period of our history. It is incidentally worthy of remark that Lord Castlereagh warmly supported the peace of Amiens, a truce which, from an English point of view, better deserved the manifestations of delight evinced in England, than the hasty condemnation of contemporary history. It is curious to read of the universal excitement prevalent in London on that occasion. The authorities, moreover, seem to have been totally unequal to the management of great crowds. The Lord Mayor and Corporation came on horseback to Temple Bar to hear the heralds proclaim peace, but one of their number lost control over his horse and was thrown. Moreover, a stand in front of the Mansion House gave way, and injured many people, the Lady Mayoress' brother suffering from a broken limb; whilst, to cap all, a man on the highest gallery of St. Martin's Church, in the Strand, pushed a stone ball from its pedestal, whence, having been insecurely fastened, it descended into the crowd, killing three people and injuring others.

raised against the ministry. Indeed, the very presence of Hawkesbury and Castlereagh in the Government demonstrates the friendliness of him to whom they bore primary allegiance.

Lord Castlereagh throughout the years 1802 and 1803 was a consistent and outspoken supporter of Government. His speeches, culled from the Parliamentary debates and *Annual Register*, show that he favoured the volunteer system for purposes of defence, and urged its adoption by similar arguments to those used by thinking men in our own days. On the other hand he deprecated a popular selection of officers as impossible in times of danger.

We find him at this time, it is true, engaged frequently in the unequal task of combating the arguments of both Pitt and Fox, and there can be little doubt that it was whilst observing the manœuvres of those great masters of debate, that he gained his own stock of experience and ultimate mastery over the House of Commons.

As Pitt's Colonial Secretary during his second administration, Lord Castlereagh was called on to give attention to Indian affairs.

At the Board of Control Lord Castlereagh's administration has received the favourable comment of Lord Wellesley himself, whose opinion on the subject was, as his great brother averred, paramount. Indeed, when the great master of modern politics had returned to his too short lease of power, it became the duty of Lord Castlereagh to defend Lord Wellesley against the attacks of his enemies. Deftly and with consummate

skill, did he grant to Mr. Paull every ray of light which a Blue Book could afford, knowing that truth could but strengthen a good cause, and, smiling as he agreed to the production in question, calmly smelt the rose which was wont to adorn his coat.

On this point let Lord Wellesley speak when writing to Lord Castlereagh's brother, Lord Londonderry :—

“He came to the chief conduct of the affairs of India at a most critical period, when the British Government was engaged in that contest with the Mahrattah chiefs, which, under the happy auspices of Lord Lake and General Wellesley, terminated so gloriously, and completed the destruction of the French power in the East.

“Although he differed with me in some points connected with the origin of the war, he most zealously and honourably assisted me in the conduct of it, and gave me his powerful support in Parliament against all the assaults of my enemies.”

When Lords Hawkesbury and Castlereagh paid that famous last official visit to Putney, there was transacted public business which appeared to distress the dying Pitt. A glance at those Parliamentary records which Mr. Canning tells us make up history, will soon unravel the mystery. In June the House of Lords, at Lord Hawkesbury's instance, had given the Government *carte blanche* as to dealing with the Continental Powers, and the House of Commons had voted five millions to be devoted for carrying out the details of such proposed arrangements. But at the time we write of, utter and

irreparable disaster had overtaken the military forces of our allies, and the coalition for which Pitt and Lord Harrowby had sacrificed so much was crumbling away before the Prime Minister's eyes. And in this moment of weakness it became necessary to decide nice questions of financial detail, which were perforce entrusted to these two chosen counsellors, who, with a prescience such as Pitt alone could claim, were by him pointed out as the inheritors of his political position, to the attainment of which high estate they were destined to fight their way successfully in the teeth of opponents such as the brilliant Canning, the gifted Wellesley, and the experienced Grenville.

The intense interest surrounding Lord Castlereagh's public administrations leaves but little space in a limited notice, such as the present, for consideration of the duties and objects he elected to pursue as a private individual. We read of journeyings to and fro between London and County Down, where general happiness of the peasantry chiefly occupied his thoughts, a sphere of duty which, however, did not prevent Lord Castlereagh from using both talents and influence in support of the Bible Society, where with Wilberforce, Whitbread, Lord Teignmouth, the Grants, Rose, Vansittart, and others known to fame, he joined enthusiastically in the then by no means universal efforts on behalf of diffusing Christianity. A speech of his remains to this day amongst the archives of the Bible Society, an extract from which we here append. It discloses religious fervour and liberality of sentiment towards mankind generally, which no one would have learned to associate

with an unjustly maligned name, had not Sir Archibald Alison made it an object to diffuse a contrary opinion, and so encouraged research into maxims of conduct valuable amongst all societies, and during each successive period. After hearing reports of progress at home and abroad, Lord Castlereagh made the following remarks in the course of a speech of considerable length :—

“ There is no view of this interesting subject that will be more gratifying to the feelings of a British audience, than knowing that among the variety of interests which divide the Christian world, there is one great interest which covers all our interests, in which we are all embarked, the interest and the influence of the blessed Word of God. I am sure it must be grateful to the generous feelings of the nation to which we have the happiness to belong, that in the midst of the war in which we are now engaged, and which we are all anxious to see terminated, as soon as the honour and the safety of the nation will admit, that even in the midst of such war we are not unmindful of those common ties that bind us to the rest of mankind, that we are ready to exert our energies to save our enemy from the greatest danger that can await the species, namely, ignorance of the duties he is bound to fulfil.

“ If that be the feeling which impresses this assembly with respect to foreign nations, I am sure it is not less gratifying to every intelligent and liberal mind to learn the effects which an institution of this nature is calculated to produce upon the internal state of England. I trust that I feel as strongly attached as any man to the particular merits of that religious system which, as an

individual, I profess—to the established religion of this realm. But I hope I shall not be suspected of indifference to that religion when I behold with gratitude and satisfaction that amid those shades of difference which divide Christians at home, we are yet united under that standard we now desire to plant throughout the world.

“The points which separate the Christian world are small and unimportant compared with the great truths contained in God’s Word, and which form our bond of union and common interest.

“No religious difference or controversial point should impede the great principle upon which the Bible Society is founded, namely, that of delivering the unsophisticated Word of God without comment, in the purest text, to all mankind.”

Sentiments these breathing the true desire of every Christian and liberal-minded Englishman.

In the year 1806 Lord Castlereagh lost his seat for County Down. Party capital had been made out of the repression of sedition which Mr. Pitt’s Government had been forced to have recourse to. Mr. Fox in 1803 charged it on the late ministry, that through their unwise and reprehensible policy it was found necessary to keep up a high military establishment in the sister kingdom. We know that after-events have scarcely justified this conclusion, and future readers of Lord Bexley’s correspondence will know the hourly expectation in which Mr. Addington’s Government lived of a general rebellion, which danger culminating in Emmett’s ineffectual rising fully justified the previous measures taken by Lord Castlereagh, who was behoven to the little Devonshire



borough of Plympton for a seat in Parliament. Lord Castlereagh does not appear to have offered any but a legitimate opposition to Lord Grenville's Government in 1806 and 1807, so that this phase of his career is memorable rather for the production of a financial scheme framed for the purpose of coping with a period of indefinite war, and placed in competition with that of the Government as proposed by Lord Henry Petty (afterwards Lord Lansdowne). It is, however, no stigma upon the clever resource displayed by the future Foreign Secretary to note that competent judges of finance have for the most part chimed in with the public preference then felt for Lord Henry Petty's propositions.

Lord Castlereagh's policy at the Colonial Office in the Duke of Portland's Cabinet during 1808 and 1809 has been somewhat roughly handled by various disputants. The impolicy of the two simultaneous efforts in the Peninsula and the Scheldt was said to be felt by Canning, who, as a member of the Duke of Portland's ministry, never shrank from the joint responsibility which his acquiescence had entailed. In Stapleton's *Life of Canning* a suggestion is, moreover, thrown out to the effect that Canning never approved the diversion on the west of Spain, which had for its outcome a forced retreat of the British army, and death of its leader at Corunna.

Of Sir John Moore as a general the more one learns the clearer do his merits appear.

As Napier tells us, the British soldiers trained under his guidance at Shorncliffe formed the flower of that Peninsula force which in the earlier Portuguese and

Spanish conflicts raised the English name to its military level. Moreover, in the field he had succeeded in all he undertook, until when in Spain the genius and resources of Napoleon were banded together against a comparatively small force.

This being true, Lord Castlereagh's loyal support of Sir John Moore can scarcely deserve the doubt thrown on its wisdom by Mr. Canning's biographer, whilst it is clear that Sir John Moore was but performing a manifest duty when he informed Lord Castlereagh that he foresaw difficulties in the invasion of Spain, as devised by the War Office.

There was, however, no time for hesitation, and at any cost it was judged rightly that the attempt to succour the Spanish armies should be straightway made.

The importance attached by Napoleon to Sir John Moore's operations of itself justified the joint policy of Canning and Castlereagh. It has been urged, again and again, that Lord Castlereagh's responsibility in accepting the Convention of Cintra, and as Minister of War allowing its ratification by the cabinet, was adverse to his reputation as a statesman. If it were possible to separate the actions of an individual member of a Government from that of his colleagues, then most surely would Lord Castlereagh stand either stained by the ignominy, or crowned with the credit, which might accrue from such pact.

In the absence of the Foreign Secretary from Council, it was inevitable that guidance should be sought from the individual responsible for the military organisation.

of the nation. Public opinion, which excited almost to frenzy, condemned the conveyance of Junot and his troops to France—avowedly to recommence hostilities against England—was expressed during one of those periodical stages of excitement during which the English nation can see but one side of a question. Had Sir Arthur Wellesley's advice, after the battle of Vimeira, been followed, and an aggressive advance instantly have taken place, Junot would most certainly have been forced to submit to military capitulation. But when the English Government, after establishing a triune authority in the camp, so timed it that the last-comer, in the person of Sir Hew Dalrymple, had to decide in a few hours on his course of conduct, there can be little wonder that, with all the British strategic advantage, compromise was resolved on, and compromise that fortunately not only placed the main question at issue out of uncertainty, but established at Lisbon a permanent basis for England's future efforts in the Peninsula. By the Convention of Cintra the French evacuation of Portugal was secured, and it is with this fact more than any temporary shifting of troops from point to point that the historian has to deal.

The British War Office and Lord Castlereagh as its head were responsible for their selection of general officers to conduct the campaign. Lord Castlereagh had notoriously evinced his preference for Sir Arthur Wellesley, and Mr. Canning concurred in such choice, but the traditions of seniority decided that Sir Harry Burrard should supersede the already famous Indian general, and that within a few hours of such a change being made a

new commander should arrive from Gibraltar in the person of Sir Hew Dalrymple.

We, in England, who know how strong has ever been such prejudice, cannot fail to see that in 1808 no Government could hope to burst the trammels of a system of selection, which neither policy nor opinion has ever allowed the authorities to abrogate entirely.

It is clear, therefore, that all the advantage which has accrued to England from the valour of her private soldiers and the skill of her rising general at Rolicca and Vimiera, were secured by Lord Castlereagh when, with his colleagues, he consented to the Convention of Cintra, objurgated by Napoleon because it injured the cause he fought for, and defended by Wellington because its results made his after-triumphs possible.

It is true that the contemporary verdict of the diplomatist was not that of the military man.

Lord Malmesbury considered the Convention of Cintra blameable, and he believed that better terms might have been secured. So, again, thought the historian, Sir Archibald Alison, who, nevertheless, recognised the value of the results gained by this unpopular Convention.

An event occurred in April 1809, which must receive notice in any summary of Lord Castlereagh's career. The Minister for War and the Colonies was accused in Parliament by Lord Archibald Hamilton of having held converse, during the year 1805, with a trafficking broker on the subject of obtaining a seat in Parliament for a Government nominee, in return for which Parliamentary vote an Indian writership was to be given. The subject was much talked of at the time, and great

excitement prevailed when the matter really came before the House.

A thorough discussion dissipated the exaggerations which previously passed current as truth.

The most that could be proved was a conversation between Lord Castlereagh and a certain Mr. Reding, from which nothing resulted, but during which the possibility of gaining a seat in Parliament for Lord Clancarty, the eminent diplomatist, was discussed.

The consequence was that the House of Commons rallied round the minister on behalf of whom even Mr. Canning, then on the verge of his growing antagonism to Lord Castlereagh, spoke boldly out, and maintained that no Parliamentary privilege had been infringed.\*

The incident is illustrative of the times during which it occurred. When Mr. Pitt, as Prime Minister, desired a seat in Parliament for Mr. R. P. Ward, Lord Mulgrave's brother-in-law, he settled the whole affair in correspondence with Lord Lonsdale, who used Mr. Ward as a warming-pan for his son who, at the end of three years, was to enter Parliament. The constituency and its desires were not even worth considering.

It certainly does appear that Lord Grey had solid ground for his pertinacious resolve not to rest until such constituencies as these under consideration were greatly diminished in number, and a more popular element infused into the electoral system.

The Secretary of War in 1808 claims the merit of

\* See *Hansard*, April 1809.

originally having selected the young General Sir Arthur Wellesley. The traditions of seniority were, it is true, for a time destructive of the master-plan which thus early had been devised ; but when Canning exercised his power and fast-rising influence to replace Sir Arthur and retain him in his position, no warmer coadjutor could have been found in the sustentation of a policy in the wisdom of which Castlereagh fully concurred.

It is impossible to avoid allusion to the Walcheren expedition in any account of either Mr. Canning's or Lord Castlereagh's lives. It was the greatest offensive effort made by Great Britain up to the date of its departure, and although in the Peninsula more sustained efforts had of necessity to be made, nothing of equal magnitude sailed from British shores until in 1853 the Crimean armament received equipment. Mr. Kinglake, taking the latter as his text, has alluded at length to circumstances connected with the Walcheren expedition, to which venture—for we fear under such category must it be classed—Professor Burrows has also drawn attention when, in Imperial England, with quiet nonchalance, he affixes the stigma of such failure on Lord Castlereagh's memory. Now we adjudge this ruling of the historian to be partial to a degree. In the first place he ignores the never-to-be-forgotten principle of ministerial responsibility. Mr. Canning, for instance, might urge that his absence from council during the deliberation on the Convention of Cintra absolved him from the moral results of a decision he could not approve. True ; but if so, surely the converse holds good when a great effort such as the

attack on Holland was agreed upon collectively, without Mr. Canning protesting publicly and resigning. Therefore he and the remaining members of the cabinet were individually responsible for the designing of this enterprise in an equal degree with Lord Castlereagh.

When we come to execution of details, several different executants have to receive judgment. In the first place the delay in sailing was such, that the pressure in favour of Austria was not brought to bear in the direction of Holland until the campaign on the Danube was near its close. Still, as Metternich tells us, the English attack on Holland was one excellent reason out of several why Austria should not have agreed to the Peace of Schonbrunn. In the second place military information was found to be defective, and Antwerp, which Lord Chatham's experiences in 1794 with the Duke of York had led him to believe to be a weak place, had, by the scientific efforts of Napoleon, been rendered supremely strong. Further, the military and naval commanders came into an unfriendly collision of opinion, while Lord Chatham chose a waiting game such as, to do Lord Castlereagh justice, was the very contrary to that which he and his advisers at the War Office had conceived.

The delay in execution was doubtless due to the defective war organisation pointed out by Mr. Kinglake, the amending of which, if it is to cast well-deserved praise upon Dundas and Liverpool, can scarcely impute previous blame to an immediate predecessor who had to find means for sustaining a conflict on a distant shore, at the very moment when every arsenal was resounding

with the sound of preparation for this attempt to succour Austria and paralyse Napoleon's fast-gathering naval strength.

Reform, in the sense Mr. Kinglake means the word, was never adopted until the sustained necessities of the Peninsula campaign forced our administrators to concentrate their energies for the purpose.

There remains but the neglect of information concerning the fortresses we were about to assail, which, even in the absence of any Intelligence Department, does appear to cast responsibility upon the official projector of such a scheme as that which resulted from the Scheldt.

Lord Castlereagh certainly seems to us to a degree responsible for the fact that the commander-in-chief of the expedition did not know whether the arsenal commanded the harbour and docks or not.

The objects of the venture were scarcely altogether unattained, and success was most surely within the grasp of a bold and energetic leader. Each and every account and criticism of value carries this much, and we must say that the degree of censure which falls to Lord Castlereagh's share is, after all, nothing more than any individual in high position runs the risk of undergoing when he designs a great stroke of policy, such as that in question, which, had the Austrians availed themselves of, might, despite all our errors, have issued in magnificent results.

It appears that Lord Chatham on his return wrote his version of the military operations to the King, which communication being adjudged unconstitutional, led to future debates in Parliament, during which Lord



Castlereagh found himself obliged to give his vote as a private individual against the late commander-in-chief in Holland. We pass lightly over the differences between Castlereagh and Canning for the reason that they have no practical bearing on the career of Lord Castlereagh beyond giving the latter an opportunity to display his natural nobility of character, and generously forgive what all must admit to have been a great wrong, even if, as we truly believe, it was suffered under a misconception so far as Canning was concerned.

The breach was soon bridged over, and would have been forgotten, had not external interference been encouraged in its unsavoury task by the poisoned pens of partisan writers. But for the views of Mr. Canning's political friends, there can, moreover, be little doubt that the Foreign Secretaryship would have two years after fallen into the hands of the man who held it in the Duke of Portland's Government, and that instead of going to Chatillon or Vienna, Lord Castlereagh would have remained content with leading the House of Commons at home.

Mr. Canning, however, decided to hold aloof, and Lord Castlereagh proceeded to perform the duties of the two positions which consecutively fell to his lot, fulfilling his duties with the same patience and tact which had previously carried him triumphantly through the difficulties connected with the Union.

It is strange to reflect that but for the intervention of so-called political friends, Mr. Canning would have become Foreign Secretary under Lord Liverpool, and have garnered in all the *prestige* which the possession of

such a position ensued during the culminating glory of 1814 and 1815.

It was clearly not Mr. Canning's own judgment which led him to decline an offer he spoke of to Mr. Stapleton as the handsomest ever made to an individual. If he had not the equality in the Commons, certain would-be coadjutors had, however, told him, the opportunity ought not to be accepted.

Under this delusion—for so we must describe it—he acted, and for this reason, and this alone, Lord Russell was enabled to uplift a lament that the treaties of 1815 were not supervised by Mr. Canning as Foreign Secretary.\*

It was natural for the veteran statesman to look somewhat jealously on the party prestige which in this particular case was not for the Whigs, and which he desired to have seen guided by what some men assumed to be a more liberal influence than that which predominated.

So far as the result itself is concerned, no unbiassed historian could have wished the complicated and delicate task taken from out of Lord Castlereagh's hands, since he, to use Mr. C. D. Yonge's words, displayed alternately every quality which is most required in those invested with great influence. Nothing, however, prevented Mr. Canning from filling the office of Foreign Secretary, and going to Vienna in 1813-14, but the intrigues of his own political associates.

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\* Lord Russell generally approved the treaties of 1815, and found no fault with the policy pursued until after that date.—Lord Russell's *Recollections*.

When the reader rises from each political biography, he will often be surfeited and repelled by the recount of small personal motives, which led followers of great statesmen to hamper their leader, and repress his more generous instincts. It will, after such reflection, be possible to trace some method and reason in the dictum of a great popular tribune who has lately declared statesmen to be the creatures of intrigue, and averred a preference for a delegated authority more nearly allied, and therefore more immediately responsible to the people.

So possibly in the future may an advantage be gained in furthering the happiness of the many, if only when attaining such a consummation oratorical talent be not unduly exalted at the expense of sterling merit, combined with that utter absence of vanity, such as those who knew him best tell us graced Lord Castlereagh's character.

When Lord Wellesley resigned the seals of the Foreign Office in 1812, he had formed a plan for the renewal of English alliances with Russia, Prussia, and Sweden.

An embassy was despatched to Bernadotte, the new Crown Prince of Sweden, and a letter written by the Prince Regent to the Emperor Alexander. Lord Wellesley has left on record\* that the first act of his successor was to carry out this proposal, and despatch M. Pozzo di Borgo to Russia.

Both missions succeeded, and, thanks to the continuity of English policy as administered by Lord Wellesley and

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\* Letter to second Lord Londonderry,

Castlereagh, the seeds were laid for the final combination against France.

No prejudice, as Lord Wellesley remarks, prevented the new Foreign Secretary from pursuing with ardour a plan devised by his predecessor, but, as he saw, full of hope for the future of Europe.

Wellington's campaign of 1812 proved, from a military point of view, the most celebrated of all his Peninsula efforts. On January the 19th, he stormed Ciudad Rodrigo, took Badajoz on April 6th, and on July 22nd, as the result of manœuvres which have no superior in recorded military history, sprang upon the left of Marmont's army at Salamanca, and drove it in a disorganised condition from the field.

How from the rocky heights of the Arapiles Wellington discovered Marmont's error, and by a few words spoken to his aide-de-camp let loose the flower of his army on the French left, has been described to perfection in the pages of Napier's *Peninsula War*.

The occupation of Madrid was the result of the victory of Salamanca, and Wellington, at the head of his troops, entered the capital. Visitors to Strathfieldsaye will have observed a picture representing this event, which aroused all the latent enthusiasm of the inhabitants.

It was a day never to be forgotten in the annals alike of England or the Wellesley family, for although stress of circumstances was to force Wellington back to the Portuguese frontier under the depressing influence of a failure to capture Burgos, yet the renewed campaign, most perforce take place under altered circumstances, much in favour of the British.

The thunderbolt had fallen in Europe, and at the head of 400,000 men Napoleon started on his Russian campaign. As Napier tells us, 160,000 troops reached Moscow, after fighting gigantic battles at Pultusk, Smolensk, and Borodino. Not for one moment, however, were the French communications imperfect; although the tract of country in military occupation was greater than had ever been subjected to military operations before, yet not a letter miscarried, nor were the aforesaid lines of communication disturbed.\*

Adhering to a fixed plan of campaigning, the Russians allied themselves with their own frigid climate, and so sapped Napoleon's power at the root.

Such, however, was the paralysis in France, that notwithstanding the terrible decimation of their countrymen, the legislature assented to a further conscription, and allowed Napoleon to approach Europe once more, armed to the teeth.

Meanwhile treason† was rampant in the counsels of Napoleon's European allies.

Saxony alone remained sincere in her adhesion to the great Usurper, and Austria waited but for a fitting opportunity to declare herself, whilst Prussia was likewise wavering, so that the cup of Germany was indeed full.

\*Residents in her cities have told the writer how numbers of citizens, maimed in body but strong in mind,

\* Napier's *Peninsula War*.

† The hesitation and final defection of the Prussian General York occurred at a crucial moment.

had sworn to revenge the ills they suffered, and to demand compensation for homes destroyed and households broken up, or to die in the *melée* which ill-success would at least offer as an alternative to a shameful subjection.

The nation of citizen soldiers was at least united.\*

Blucher might not represent a scientific type of warfare, but in Marshal Forwards Prussia possessed a military leader typical of her national spirit as at the moment aroused.

The wily Metternich had so schemed for exhausted Austria that she should gain repose and yet in name succour Napoleon in his Russian venture. Prince Swartzenburgh's contingent formed the extreme right wing of the Grand Armée, but never moved from its position and remained a security for Austrian neutrality during the war.

In 1813 all was changed, and the long-delayed moment for action was destined to arrive. Metternich and Austria, moreover, after being all things to all men, were daily nearing the time when, as commanding the European position, nations would look to them for a decision. At Cadiz Wellington concerted schemes for the ensuing campaign in Spain. The Junta was perplexed by the alienation of the South American Colonies, who in effect acted as if they had decided to rid themselves of the Spanish yoke. For the usurper they would

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\* "The Prussian King wavered. He thought himself honourably pledged to Napoleon, but the enthusiasm of his subjects would brook no denial."—*Alison*.

never allow their resources and influence to be utilised, and the sway of the Cadiz rulers appeared to be but as a rope of sand. Wellington could only counsel vigorous measures in the Peninsula itself, and as Captain-General of the Spanish forces unite them with the British and Portuguese, and once more cross the frontier. In hopeful forecast of coming triumph, he stood up in his stirrups and cried "Farewell, Portugal!" and proceeded on a venture celebrated equally for its skill, celerity, and success.

At home, after long scarcely-concealed hostility, America had declared war on England.\* No matter that ere a shot was fired or a ship seized, Lord Liverpool's cabinet withdrew the nominal cause of complaint, and suppressed the Order in Council—the resolution to break the peace had been taken, if not in *absoluté* concert with France, at least with a knowledge that the British burdens, financial and military, were becoming distressful.† Fortunately the almost

\* June 18th, 1812.

† The early events of the American war were not encouraging. Large and admirably-manned frigates sustained the conflict on behalf of America, and the British lost several ships and suffered from depredations on their commerce. Moreover, at home the results of Napoleon's Continental system, combined with our own efforts in the Peninsula, had led to an appreciation of gold metal, such as made it possible to buy as much corn or other marketable article with twenty pounds as you could obtain with twenty-nine pounds in bank-notes. Certain artificial restrictions had been previously imposed on the Bank of England, forbidding the establishment to pay their notes in gold. A committee was appointed, under the presidency of the able Whig statesman Mr. Horner, and the balance of financial opinion was found to be adverse to the continuance of

simultaneous withdrawal of Russian hostility, gave relief to those suffering from the more than partial success which had hitherto attended Napoleon's commercial decrees in the north of Europe.

Napoleon devoted the winter of 1812-13 to preparations for a fresh campaign, whilst, strange to say, new levies started up as if by magic to replace those sacrificed amidst the snows of Muscovy.

Conqueror and conquered were, it is true, alike weary for repose.\* In France internal peace, however, prevailed, and the universal success of her arms had precluded the country from becoming the battle-field of Europe. Therefore it was that, feeling the pressure of absolute conflict less than from the magnitude of her efforts might have been supposed, France looked with

such restriction. Lord Castlereagh, however, was of a contrary opinion, because he believed that the resumption of cash payments would prove incompatible with the continuance of the death-struggle with Napoleon, calculated, as he urged, to hasten a financial crisis at a moment when every energy should be applied to sustain the conflict with France. It so happened, that, if the recommendations of the committee had received adoption, the crisis would have occurred in 1812, when a turning-point of the war was about to be reached, and we state this without presuming to express an opinion on so difficult a subject. Without, however, pretending to any recondite monetary knowledge, it must be clear to the veriest tyro that the Government expedient of declaring the bank-note for one pound one shilling equal in value to the golden guinea, was a doubtful proceeding, justifiable only on the ground of a necessity. Such interference with the law of supply and demand was by some financiers excused upon Sir Francis Baring's averment that gold was appreciated and not paper depreciated.

\* Prince Metternich's *Autobiography*.



equanimity on a struggle which exposed her to ruin and humiliation in the event of defeat.\*

In the spring of 1813 France and Saxony on one side, Russia and Prussia on the other, took up strategic positions.

The Austrian army, however, remained in Bohemia; for Metternich was determined to husband his country's strength, and to refrain from plucking the fruit before it became fully ripe, and thus did he prepare himself for every eventuality.

The allies had the advantage of the celebrated General Moreau's aid, but a divided command could not possess the compactness which Napoleon's unquestioned sway secured for his army, so that the two earlier conflicts of Lutzen fought on May the 2nd, and Bautzen on the

\* Napoleon employed part of his time whilst recouping for a fresh campaign in an attempt to overawe the Pope, who had been so long a prisoner that he appears to have become enfeebled in intellect.

† The old man for some time, however, still refused to accept the concordat offered him on behalf of the Empire, but, in a moment of weakness, yielded to the fascinations brought to bear on him by the French Emperor.

No sooner, however, had Napoleon left his presence than the venerable Pontiff was overwhelmed with grief and shame at the results of his conduct, and, like our own Cranmer, retracted the action which he had been brought to give countenance to.

Napoleon is said to have been furious when he learned the effervescent character of the spell which he had exercised. But the Pope, saving his conscience, was still physically a prisoner, but unsubdued in spirit.

Napoleon's temporary victory was not one, therefore, worth proclaiming to the world.

20th, resulted in a projected allied retreat into Silesia. At this crisis either side turned towards Austria, whose crafty minister held the balance.

To his eternal credit, however, be it told that he had from the first decided for the cause of Europe.\* In the other scale was thrown the benefits to be possibly wrung out of Napoleon at this crucial moment, and the natural predisposition of the Austrian royal family to support the Imperial alliance contracted by a French ruler with a princess of their race.

But, as Metternich tells us, he saw in Napoleon the incarnation of that revolution which had covered Europe with corpses, and bid fair to unhinge the foundations of universal society.

The Emperor Francis yielded definitely and finally to his minister's representations, so that when the famous interview between Metternich and Napoleon took place at Dresden, the alliance with Russia, Prussia, and England had already been practically decided on.

Metternich has described the scene with the baffled French Emperor, and its story ought to be read † by all who would understand the politics of Europe in 1813, and Napoleon's peculiar position. There was truth in Napoleon's theatrical declaration which, when the full importance of Metternich's decision burst upon him, he made:—"I shall know how to die; but I shall not

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\* Neither Louis XVIII. nor his brothers could be induced for some time to believe in Austrian fidelity to the allied cause.

† Metternich's *Autobiography*, vol. i. p. 185.

yield one handful of soil." "Fortune," said Metternich, "may play you false again, as it did in 1812." The decision to resume the war was received with silent but sad consent by the Napoleonic generals, who most of all Frenchmen seemed to have longed for peace.

The campaign in Spain, if carried on under fair numerical equality, saw Wellington operating with advantages he had never before enjoyed. The flower of the French army in Spain being recalled to Europe, the substitution of younger soldiers followed. Marshal Soult, moreover, the accomplished military chief, had left Spain, and been placed at the head of Napoleon's Imperial Guard. King Joseph abhorred him as a man, and insisted on a removal which Napoleon knew full well was a mistake. The brave and excellent Marshal Jourdan, left nominally at the head of the army, effected, however, all that a divided command shared with King Joseph would allow.

In the face of a less capable commander than Wellington, the French tactics might have passed muster, and their hurried concentration of men, stores, and munitions of war at Vittoria remained undetected and unassailed.

But their scientific opponent caught the French army again at a disadvantage, and after a struggle where, as Napier says, "the soldiery were never allowed fair play," the army of King Joseph was scattered as chaff before the wind.

On the 21st of June 1813 no less than 151 cannon, 451 waggons of provisions and camp necessities fell into the conqueror's hands.

The slaughter on the side of the French was, moreover, totally inadequate to the stupendous results consequent on their defeat, and out of unison with the admirable temper which in combat, here as ever, the soldiers of the French empire maintained.

Be the nation however brave, or her children endowed with more than ordinary courage and wisdom, success may not cleave to her standards, or tangible advantage accrue to her counsels, without the possession of generals and statesmen. Society has, moreover, been long constituted so that the mind has an ever-increasing influence in the government of the world. Napoleon held Europe in captivity by no other means. His was a giant intellect, and in its progress met no equal. But England sent her due share of thought to arrest that isolated but paramount influence.

The intellectual power wielded by Wellington, Wellesley, Canning, Liverpool, Grenville, and Castlereagh, was each in its several sphere united to achieve the same object, and, as the oft-told story tells, prevailed. Napoleon had met but one mind in any degree compared to his own. In Pitt there was intellectual, and above all, moral power, unsurpassed in the annals of mortal story, but dragged down to an earthly level by the force of circumstances and the possession of a weak frame. Wellington proved himself at least an equal military tactician. The Archduke Charles once bid fair to approach the subtlety of his strategy, whilst with Fox

as a statesman, Napoleon cannot be said to have coped fairly in the arena of European politics.

The peace offered to the latter British statesman must have proved a hollow and, therefore, uncertain one. He knew it, and elected to resign the realisation of his hopes, and concur in warfare, the barbarity of which he loathed, the demoralisation and hideous character of which he shrank from as calculated to undermine the stability of our finance, and sap the strength of the kingdom.

Great Britain's mission came, therefore, to be diplomatically accomplished by those who were, so to speak, but disciples of the giant minds preceding them. Who of these caught the spirit of Pitt, that nationally declared father of us all, more than did Robert Viscount Castlereagh, who, if not endowed with the surpassing eloquence of his master, was many-sided in his excellence?

The transcendent talents of Wellesley, or the brilliancy of Canning, may not have fallen to his share, but his diplomatic skill, patience, and unvarying tact rendered Lord Castlereagh a worthy coadjutor of the great Wellington himself, who represented not the sword of England alone, but possessed high moral qualities befitting him to rule in any possible society of men.

The time had arrived to which Napoleon alluded when he said that Lord Castlereagh ruled the House of Commons by a nod. We, accustomed during our own lifetimes to the noble elocution of a Derby, the perfect diction and passionate eloquence of a Bright, the fascinating and facile periods of an Ellenborough, the

unrivalled genius and ever bright stream of powerful declamation which characterises a Gladstone, and the thoughtful statesmanship which a Beaconsfield shrouded under a never-failing dignity, are accustomed to look upon the years 1807-15 as a sort of interregnum between the sway of Pitt and Fox and our own times; one, moreover, which had not yet been broken by those more famous pictorial descriptions of Canning, or thrilled by mingled astonishment and delight at the powerful pleading of the matchless political swordsman, Lord Brougham \*

But even if Canning had scarcely arrived at the fullest height of his oratorical fame in 1814, and, indeed, was absent from the scene of his future triumphs, yet Brougham's powers, if not at their absolute zenith, were the admiration of all his hearers. He was surrounded,

\* Lord Brougham had succeeded in inducing the Government to revoke the Orders in Council, and this, one of the first acts of Lord Castlereagh as leader of the House of Commons, was condemned by Canning, who objected, as he urged in a letter to Mr. Wilberforce (*Wilberforce's Life*, vol. iv. p. 39) to such a concession being made to Mr. Brougham's honour and glory. This of itself seems to testify to the talent displayed by Brougham. Mr. Canning had made the manner in which this concession was offered a reason for refusing to accept the Foreign Secretaryship, and allow his rival to retain the lead; thus involving a deadlock in the negotiations that Mr. Wilberforce was endeavouring to forward. The Speaker (afterwards Lord Colchester) in his *Diary*, vol. ii. p. 397, summarises the contention as follows:—Canning was ready to agree to equality in the House, nominal lead being left with Mr. Vansittart. Castlereagh, on the other hand, offered to vacate the Foreign Secretaryship, but no field the leadership in the House of Commons.

moreover, on the Opposition benches by a galaxy of legal and argumentative talent. Ponsonby was there, skilled in the forms of political combat; Romilly, whom no difficulty could dissuade, no chartered abuse appal; Plunket, the 'very embodiment of logical and legal acumen; Erskine, who mingled solidity with eloquence, to a degree little realised in these days; Grattan, the chosen orator of Ireland, and acknowledged a worthy representative of the silver-tongued race from which he sprang.\*

But Lord Castlereagh ruled over the storm, wielding a silent power, the disclosure of which justified Lord Liverpool's choice and his own unwillingness to surrender the lead.

So it came to pass that when the Foreign Secretary was chosen to represent England at the Congress of Europe, Lord Liverpool's Government, in consenting to his absence, had to sacrifice much, nay, what might at any moment have closed their very existence

\* "When Grattan was dying he turned to his friends, and said: 'Don't be hard on Castlereagh; he loves our country.' Lord Russell was told that when this was reported to Lord Castlereagh he shed tears."—*Anecdotal History of British Parliament*.

Grattan, when he used these words, was probably moved by memory of a scene which occurred in the Irish Parliament just before the Union in 1800. The patriot orator had just been returned for Wicklow, and essayed to take his seat whilst in a state of natural weakness. Scarcely able to walk, he was supported, whilst taking the oath, by his friends Moore and Ponsonby. Lord Plunket's biographer tells us how Castlereagh, acting on the impulse of his really noble nature, remained standing and uncovered during the ceremony.

as an Administration. If ever statesmen took as their motto Burke's famous rule of Parliamentary conduct, it was the English Cabinet in 1813, 1814, and 1815. "Party," said Burke, "ought to be made for politics, not politics for party." With the enormous risk of failure before him, Lord Castlereagh was about to hazard all at the shrine of duty. It was, therefore, on a maxim of the great Marquis of Montrose that the Foreign Secretary acted on this occasion :—

‘ He either fears his fate too much,  
Or his deserts are small,  
Who dares not put it to the touch  
To make or mar them all.”





# LORD CASTLEREAGH.

JANUARY 1812 TO AUGUST 1822.

"The Continent I believe to be deeply impressed with the disinterestedness of England. People there believe England throughout the war to have been struggling for a common security. Driven into the war by nothing short of overruling necessity, it is at least gratifying to feel that she has emerged from the tremulous contest with a reputation unstained by reproach."—*Speech on Treaty with France 1814*

## CHAPTER II.

### THE SETTLEMENT OF EUROPE.



UNDER the supreme generalship of Prince Schwarzenberg the allies passed on to Dresden, the object being to cut the French communications by forcing the city to surrender. There could then be no direct road open between Napoleon's army and the Rhine. The plan was Moreau's, who accompanied the Emperors in their campaign. A hesitation, as it happened, saved Dresden, and was counselled by Prince Schwarzenberg in order to give time for the arrival of fresh reinforcements.

Napoleon, however, profited thereby, and brought the main part of his army within the lines before the allied attack commenced. The first day's fighting

(August 26th, 1813) was memorable for the fearful bombardment launched into the city by Schwarzenberg's army, and, by two successful French sorties made on the right and left flanks,

On the 27th the battle raged fiercer, if possible. General Moreau was mortally wounded at the side of Alexander, and, notwithstanding all the excuses advanced, retreat became the order of the day for the allies.

Some few hours after this striking success, Vandamme, who had been despatched to attack the allies in flank, himself fell into a trap in the plains of Bohemia, at Culm, and lost 18,000 men, thus equalising the late disastrous engagement.

Napoleon exercised supreme skill during the difficulties which fast thickened around him. Notwithstanding that his reserves were failing, and on all sides he saw accession to the ranks of his enemies, he scouted the idea of resorting to compromise, and held together his forces by the magic of a personal presence, the traditions concerning which have enabled this great man to leave France a name to conjure with—the glamour around which, moreover, neither memories of Leipsic, Moscow, Waterloo, or Sedan, will ever obliterate.

Notwithstanding this soldierly resolution, more Russians crowded into Europe, all Prussia flew to arms, and Austrians pressed on Napoleon's flank, so that slowly but surely events tended to bring about the great conflict of the nations fought at Leipsic on the 16th and two following days of October 1813. To fight a pitched battle with a foe who had contrived to be present in superior force, and to do so with a river in his rear,

or retire towards the Rhine, was the alternative submitted to the greatest captain of modern times.

So it happened that, after a conflict gigantic alike in its size and results, French retreat across the Elbe became a necessity. True it was that the first day's fighting had not been decisive, but the gathering allied hosts gained ground, and this to Napoleon, as then circumstanced, was fatal.

After a pause the battle was renewed with increased violence on the 18th, and although the French for a time held their own, the defection of 8,000 Saxons at a critical moment served at once to weaken them morally and materially. When finally retreat was determined on, the mistake of an engineer caused premature destruction of the sole remaining bridge over the river, and led to a more complete allied victory, accompanied with increased carnage.

The rout that followed was unprecedented in modern history. The King of Saxony fell into the allies' hands, and it was evident that the star of Imperial conquest had waned. As Lord Wellesley had forecasted, Napoleon's means proved unequal to the results he desired to effect. It followed that the allied armies pressed on, and early in November reached Frankfort, whence they straightway prepared to cross the Rhine.

Before taking further action they offered peace on the terms of retention by France of all her conquests between the Alps and Pyrenees. Napoleon was to keep the Rhine, with an understanding that England on her part was not unwilling to make sacrifices for the cause of peace. Not only, however, did Napoleon refuse to

listen, but dissolved the French Legislative Assembly for imploring him to restore peace to the country.

In Holland a rising took place against the French, and a force of British and Prussians were sent to attack Antwerp and Bergen op Zoom.

These two fortresses of the first class were defended by the skilful aid of Carnot, the old Republican soldier, and again was a diversion in this quarter to meet with questionable military success.

As subsequently every Prussian bayonet was required beyond the Rhine, Sir Thomas Graham, the English commander, was left to continue the blockade of Antwerp, and to do so with means totally inadequate for effecting any further offensive movements.

After keeping Europe in suspense for months, Napoleon at last agreed to send Caulaincourt to meet the plenipotentiaries of England, Austria, Russia, and Prussia at Chatillon in the first week of February 1814. The hostile armies had previously passed the Rhine and established themselves on French territory. But Wellington had not been idle. He likewise had invaded France as the result of his victory at Vittoria and the combats of the Pyrenees which ensued.

On October the 7th, 1813, an English army once more quartered itself on French soil. Never since the days of Agincourt had such a conquering advance into French territory been made by an English general, or had British troops taken such decided possession of a Gallic city since Queen Mary surrendered Calais and declared its name would be found written on her heart. True it is that the great Marlborough crossed the northern

frontier of France, and, after a desperate struggle at Malplaquet, gained substantial advantage for the allies, whilst the Duke of York, in 1793, captured Valenciennes; but neither achievement can vie with those of Wellington. Napoleon straightway despatched Soult to meet Wellington, regretting, doubtless, that he had ever listened to the complaints of King Joseph against the captain who, of all his other marshals, had been most distinguished as a strategist in Spain. This honourable precedence the Duke of Dalmatia proceeded to justify. Wellington discovered the prevalence of a strong Bourbon feeling amongst the people in the south, and Soult was consequently not operating amongst an entirely friendly population.

Early in November 1813, Wellington resumed his operations, which he had been forced to suspend in consequence of long-continued stormy weather. Forcing the lines of the Nivelle and Nive, he drove Soult back upon Bayonne.

Such was, in effect, the situation when Lord Castlereagh landed in Holland. The later events of the war had opened the more eastern part of Brabant to England, and, thanks to the prescience displayed by Lord Harrowby when he selected Castlereagh as the man for the occasion, England was destined to take a leading part in the coming negotiations. Ready with a precedent for the occasion, and instancing Lord Bolingbroke's journey to Spain in James I.'s reign as a case in point, where a Secretary of State had left the kingdom, Lord Harrowby gracefully and modestly drew back from a task beyond his health, at the same time

pointing to Castlereagh's speedy departure as alone affording hope for the disentanglement of the difficulties which oppressed the counsels of Europe.

Travelling with Mr. Goderich, afterwards the first Lord Ripon, Lord Castlereagh landed at the Hague, and passed through Frankfort to Basle, where, for the first time, he encountered Metternich. The meeting appears to have proved propitious for the future of the world, the two statesmen thoroughly understanding the needs of the several Powers concerned in the impending settlement. As Metternich says, "A few hours' conversation sufficed to lay the foundation between this upright and enlightened statesman and myself. . . . Lord Castlereagh's straightforward feeling, free from all prejudice and prepossession, and his justice and benevolence, gave him a true insight into the truth of things."

Such was the early impression formed of the British Secretary of State by his Austrian coadjutor in the forthcoming settlement.

The Congress of Chatillon has an interest beyond the record of its inoperative discussions. The proposals refused by Napoleon were made to him in good faith by Europe, who, even after Leipsic and during the invasion of France, was prepared to accept the empire as the ruling power. Napoleon, however, evinced such determination to retain conquest, out of all proportion with the existing territorial position, that the deliberations were doomed to fail at the outset. Caulaincourt—who Napoleon never fully empowered to act for him—was clearly personally desirous of peace, but when, after considerable delay, and after reference to Napoleon, he

demanded restitution of Italy and Holland to France, both of which territories had suffered partial occupation by the allied armies, his views were seen to be out of the range of possible compromise. He claimed also the retention of Antwerp, a fortress in French hands it is true, but cut off entirely from other French provinces.

The assertion that an attempt at interference with the internal government of France was meditated by the allies is thus shown to be historically incorrect.\*

After a sitting of six weeks the Chatillon Congress

\* It is interesting to learn the contemporary political gossip as it appeared in a well-known publication of the time :—

“For some days rumours were very prevalent respecting a change of administration in consequence of a difference of opinion in the cabinet as to the propriety of instructing Lord Castlereagh not to treat with Napoleon. It was said that Lord Liverpool, being averse to any such instruction, tendered his resignation, which was not accepted, and that the affair ended in the acquiescence of the majority of the cabinet in his Lordship’s policy of leaving Lord Castlereagh unfettered to act according to circumstances.”

Rumours of a like description are not entirely new to ourselves in later years, judging from the political experiences from 1878 to 1881.

They invariably contain a degree of truth, and on the occasion in question the feeling of antagonism to Napoleon so strong in England was doubtless reflected in the cabinet.

At Chatillon Lord Castlereagh recognised this when he declared to Lord Cathcart his readiness to sign peace in twenty-four hours. “We must do it,” he said, “after entering into these negotiations, even if we are stoned on our return to England.”

Lord Colchester tells us in his *Diary*, vol. ii. p. 477, writing of the feeling in the House of Commons, of which he was Speaker :—“General dread of preliminaries of peace having been signed at Chatillon. An almost universal dread of any pretended peace with Buonaparte.” Such feeling seems to demonstrate what a supremely difficult task Lord Castlereagh had undertaken.

was finally dissolved on March 21st, and war again claimed the attention of the world.

A few hours after the Congress had closed, however, a messenger arrived, granting Caulaincourt full powers to make peace on the allies' terms ; but it was too late.

As Mr. C. D. Yonge pertinently observes, Napoleon should have known that it was only his genius that was keeping the events of the campaign in tolerable equality in the north, whilst Wellington was still irresistible in the south. With an army probably never surpassed, considering its moderate size, and literally perfect as a fighting machine, the British commander gained point after point. Soult's capacity was undoubted, but he fought with inferior materials.

At Orthez on February 27th the English success was a marked one, and was soon followed by the fall of Bordeaux, and the elevation of the white flag throughout the city. In the north of France, it is true, Napoleon struggled with his foes gradually closing around him. Such was the power of genius, and the superiority of science over respectable mediocrity, or the mere courage of a citizen soldiery, that the Emperors trembled for the fate of their legions, and half desired to appease this great captain who appeared more terrible than ever when at bay.

But the wily Metternich gauged the truth of the situation, and his expectation gained speedy realisation.

On the other hand a conviction forced upon diplomatists was gaining ground, that safety alone remained for France in the return of her old line of kings ; a sentiment, moreover, fanned into life by the reports that came alike from the south and south-east of France.



At home Lord Liverpool openly told the French Princes that neither honour nor policy could admit of the British Government furthering their designs, which could only be supported in concert with our allies, and in response to an outspoken desire amongst the French themselves.

Napoleon, after winning the battle of Montereau, on February 18th, and separating the Austrian and Prussian forces, suddenly turned eastward with his army, as if to threaten the allied communications.

This movement was intended to bring about the retreat of the Austrian army, instead of which, to Napoleon's surprise, and thanks to Lord Castlereagh's determination, Schwarzenbergh answered with the right move, and advanced on Paris, which fell straightway into the hands of the allies on March 31st, 1814.

In the south of France a sanguinary conflict took place at Toulouse between Wellington and Soult as late as April the 10th.

The bloodshed was useless, inasmuch as at the moment of conflict Napoleon had abdicated. But with regard to the conflict itself, if undecided in its direct results, a French evacuation of Toulouse followed, as a consequence, and with it the close of Wellington's campaign.

The first Lord Ripon has left on record how, when after the Congress of Chatillon the allied counsels were apparently paralyzed by the genius of their doughty opponent, whilst in every combat Napoleon endeavoured to be present in superior force, the fatal measure of a retreat to the Rhine was mooted in counsel.

The fact appeared to be that the French population showed signs of rising and disturbing the allied

communications, and the military situation must have remained critical and uncertain until the right wing, under Blücher, received adequate reinforcement. But the troops for the purpose were not within reach without the withdrawal of Bulow from Holland, and the advance of some Swedish battalions from Eastern Brabant, the whole of which detachment was under the jealous leadership of Bernadotte, Crown Prince of Sweden.

To obtain his sanction to the measure was held to be necessary, and would involve precious time, and a possible controversy.

But Lord Castlereagh took a bolder view of the situation. England, according to his idea, had a right to claim unqualified and ungrudging aid from her allies. He therefore took upon himself the responsibility of calling up the troops immediately, and undertook to reckon with Bernadotte.

Blücher's command thus being strengthened, the allied generals were enabled to advance when the supreme moment arrived.

Such predominance as Lord Castlereagh exercised all through the European deliberations, could only have been possessed by one despatched on his errand by a united nation, and it is therefore of importance to remember that the concurrence of Lord Grenville in the later measures of Lord Liverpool's Government had been given when unity was of most value to the nation.

Early in the session of 1813 he had approved the general scope of policy set forward in the king's speech, and from that moment opposition to the Government measures was restricted to wholesome and necessary

criticism. It does in truth appear worthy but of the narrowest partisan to defame the memory of so high-minded a statesman as Lord Grenville, because he dreaded the results of the Spanish war both military and financial.

The unjust estimate of Lord Grenville's political action has been inflamed by the distortion of truth which it suited the foes of England to indulge in. With Lord Grenville's return to power would ensue peace, argued Napoleon, and the chorus was taken up by a suborned and servile press, ignorant entirely of the British Constitutional forms, which they neither regarded nor understood. Faults of temperament may be laid to Lord Grenville's charge; but it should be remembered to his eternal credit that when the enemies of his country were most ready to look for aid to the results of his criticisms, that logical voice was upraised only in extolling all that he believed just and wise in a policy former details of which he had unsuccessfully opposed.

If the true scope of public policy could be gauged straight off by the astuter minds of each period, then would just discredit cling to the memory of statesmen guilty of political mistakes. But as the wisest have failed to forecast the future, so should our judgment remain silent when events belie the fears of those seeking to guide our steps.

Thus we see Lord Castlereagh the completely accredited plenipotentiary of the British Parliament, at that supreme moment when a nation of at most seventeen millions was called on to direct the future of Europe and the world.

This happy concurrence in sentiment amongst English politicians was more creditable to Lord Grenville and the Whigs, inasmuch as with their failure to enlist public feeling on behalf of their party was linked a general impression that none of their fears had been realised.

If true as regards the issue of war in the Peninsula, a study of Lord Bexley's correspondence will show the public exchequer to have reached an almost exhausted condition. "Bring us peace," forms the constant burden of his prayer to Lord Castlereagh. "The nation requires it."

Now the fear of such a condition of things had again and again been stated by Lord Grenville as a reason for his somewhat exaggerated comments on projects, the carrying out of which, after incurring lavish expenditure, he looked upon as exceedingly problematical.

Events justified Government in their business-like restraint, which lost them Lord Wellesley's services, but proved the Whig conduct in Parliament to deserve a more favourable judgment than we traditionally have been led to bestow thereon. What would England have had the power to accomplish when public credit became lowered, and her resources permanently impaired.

The task before Lord Castlereagh and his coadjutors was twofold.

First it became incumbent on them to restore peace to France, and to seal the same by the signature of a European treaty.

Secondly, to adjudicate the various and differing claims of the nations, either to regain former possessions,

or in special cases themselves earn an accretion of territory.

The French Senate having declared Napoleon's dynasty to be at an end, the Emperor agreed to abdicate and accept the crown of Elba. Surrounded by the remnants of his army, Napoleon awaited the allied decision at Fontainebleau, which came straightway in the shape of an offer of peace on the above terms, but not assuredly the result of a united counsel.\*

Lord Castlereagh and Prince Metternich were, as it unfortunately happened, not with the armies in Paris, but remained at Dijon, where the Emperor of Austria was located. Decisive action was, however, taken by the Czar and Frederick William of Prussia, so that practically England and Austria were compelled to accept Napoleon as Emperor of Elba, an arrangement which both Castlereagh and Metternich foresaw might be productive of fresh disorders on the European stage.

\* Private information received from France afterwards justified the wisdom of this compromise.—Lord Bexley's *Papers*.

At home the prevalent sentiment of repugnance to Napoleon was skilfully fanned into a flame which, so to speak, scorched up the natural feeling of pity and respect felt for fallen greatness. With the pungent criticisms of Lanfrey and the gossiping disclosures of Madame de Remusat still ringing in our ears, we cannot find it in our hearts to chime in with the able *Quarterly Reviewer* of October 1814, who scoffs at the tears shed at Fontainebleau as being, "iron tears down Pluto's cheek," and proceeds to pronounce a judgment conceived in a spirit which none but an angelic being could with complaisance desire applied to the unravelment of his own history. The *Quarterly* has certainly here supplied a companion picture to the most uncharitable party-strictures of its famous rival.

Lord Castlereagh on arrival in Paris refused to concur at first, but when he saw the alternative to be an immediate renewal of war, he, after consulting with Metternich and Schwarzenbergh, consented to sign a treaty which contained the objectionable provision. The Emperor Alexander here showed such a disposition to over-ride all opposition, that, as the British plenipotentiary foresaw, his domineering self-assertion might plunge Europe afresh into war.

The position of Napoleon at Elba appeared to be the more undesirable, owing to the contiguity of his old cavalry leader, Murat, who retained the kingdom of Naples by Austrian, and indirectly by British aid. For Lord Castlereagh had at Chatillon given a promise to Murat fully implying future recognition in return for military co-operation, without which it is extremely doubtful whether the allies could have brought the campaign of 1814 to a triumphant conclusion.

When Louis XVIII. returned to Paris, and with him his brothers, the Count d'Artois and the Dukes de Berri and d'Angouleme, it was felt by many in England that a great principle had been violated by interference in the internal affairs of another nation. There was a certain plausibility about this accusation against the policy of Lord Liverpool's cabinet, and that of their allies. They could not say that the French king returned to his capital, called thither by the unprompted demand of the French nation and its legislature. It was, however, as a substitute for certain disorder consequent on Napoleon's overthrow, that the Bourbons were recalled, not entirely without

signs of sympathy in the provinces'—Dijon and Bordeaux, together with a large tract of the south, and, of course, La Vendée, having demonstrated their affection for the old regime.

The allies could not again treat with the empire, as its leader both at Dresden and Chatillon had failed to embrace the opportunities offered to him, and had impressed all concerned with the idea that war for its own sake was his motto. Eager as we may be not to record one single word which shall press unduly on the memory of one whose talents were so transcendent, and whose family subsequently was destined to eradicate all bad feeling between two great nations, there was that in the conduct of Napoleon I. during the campaign of 1813 and 1814 that could allow no fair minded man to hope or believe his continuance in power possible if peace was to be preserved.

The essence of the system he struggled so manfully to maintain, was founded on the presumption that war or universal French dominion must prevail in Europe. No unalterable hostility to the Napoleonic legend animated Lord Castlereagh, who, as he declared in Parliament, would have embraced peace at Chatillon, had not the ruler to whom it was offered, together with the continued occupation of his throne, refused such moderate accommodation with contumely.

In that treaty of Fontainebleau several points lay open to the attacks of Parliamentary foes, which, to the credit of the latter, were made in a modified form when it became evident that peace was, at any rate, secured.

But there were rocks ahead at the coming Congress

to be held at Vienna, where the spoil was to be apportioned and the balance of power, so far as possible, restored.\*

England alone of the allies wanted nothing for herself. No foe had planted his standard on the Tower, nor had the tramp of armed men been heard in the streets of London. Gratefully, then, may her children ever call to mind the efforts of Pitt, Nelson, and Wellington, who, most of all men, aided in securing this immunity from

\* The Prince Regent invited the allied sovereigns to England, and entertained them regally. We subjoin the impressions of a military foreigner on this occasion. The Prussian officer Schack had been aide-de-camp to General York, who during the spring of 1813 joined the advancing Russians, and so led the Prussian nation to declare against Napoleon. Schack, who had shared the hardships and been witness of the horrors attendant on the ensuing campaign, came to England with the allied sovereigns, and thus speaks of the immunity from general rapine and destruction which the resolution of Pitt, combined with the fidelity of his adherents, secured for England, enabling Wellington to wield his all-conquering sword on other battle-fields than those chosen amidst the hop gardens of Kent or the woodland scenery of Sussex.

Approaching the British coast when Louis XVIII. was departing for France amidst a salute of 101 guns from the grand and world-renowned line-of-battle ships (as he styles them), Schack was struck by the unanimity of the welcome offered with acclamation by an entire people. Every town and village on the road tried to outvie the other.

Moreover, the then unwonted appearance to a German eye of trees in ancient growth, unscathed by the blast of war and surrounded by everything tending to domestic and popular well-being, filled the foreigner with delight, not unmixed with natural envy at Canning's aptly described "kingdom preserved midst the wreck of the world." For account of Schack's impressions, see Baron Bunsen's *Memoirs*, vol. i. p. 175.



terror and distress which the sea itself could never have saved us from.

England had undoubtedly contributed potently towards the restoration of the Bourbons to France, and by so doing contributed, in a certain sense, towards Louis' insecurity by concentrating against him French hatred of foreign interference. Moreover, to ensure his respectable entry into the kingdom, he borrowed £100,000 from our Treasury, which the ministry advanced as a matter of policy.\* Money was early his difficulty, and to obtain it he had recourse to a loan, which, negotiated by the great firm of Baring, issued in a successful financial operation, but one that looked by no means prosperous when, as was shortly to be the case, Louis and his family were once more in exile.

Meantime matters look dark enough in Paris. The scowling looks of the late Imperial Guards as they escorted the King into his capital were not unobserved by Metternich, who duly noted that unwelcome sign of the times.

The British Government took measures to ascertain the state of feeling all over France, and their information was such as by no means would have led them to aid in restoring the Bourbons if any stable alternative had been at hand, inasmuch as, after allowing a reasonable scope for opinion, there was clear evidence of indifference towards the person of the Sovereign,† absolute hatred towards his brothers, and, above all,

\* Lord Bexley's *Papers*.

† *Ibid*.

general military uneasiness amongst the unreduced military force.

A few months later, and it was feared in England and confidently believed in France that Napoleon's return would be hailed with delight in many of the provinces.

Such was the condition of the very artery of Europe when its combined sagacity met in conference at Vienna. Such the field on which the talents and popularity of Lord Castlereagh were to serve England so well.

The Emperor Alexander, to commence with, had peculiar views as to Poland. The remaining portion of that unhappy country not partitioned had, from 1807 to 1813, existed under the title of Duchy of Warsaw. Prussia, represented by her able minister Hardenbergh, was at the Congress ready to support Russia's desire to place the whole of the Duchy under Muscovite protection, a viceroy of Alexander's to govern Warsaw, whilst what we know by the name of "autonomy," or self-government, was to be granted to the Poles of the disputed district.

Again, by previous arrangement, Russia had determined to wipe Saxony out of the map and incorporate her king's territory with that of Prussia; and to do so as an answer to the late alliance which Saxony contracted with France, and to which her aged king remained faithful. To carry these and other schemes Alexander did not scruple to talk of the 400,000 armed men at his beck and call, and, acting in unison with Prussia, threatened the establishment of a fresh military despotism in European affairs.

Alexander, moreover, went so far as to halt 280,000 of this boasted host in Poland, prepared for war as an eventuality.

Had not Lord Castlereagh seen through these schemes they might have passed muster unchallenged, but in unison with Talleyrand and Metternich he brought about an alliance between England, Austria, and France, which, binding the two countries to act together should necessity compel, led to a prevalence of a more compromising spirit even in the counsels of the imperious Czar. In the first place, this timely protest brought about the admission of France, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, and ultimately of the Roman plenipotentiaries into Congress, without whose presence Alexander desired that the deliberations might proceed.

The Russians were prepared for English and Austrian opposition, but not for that of France, but nevertheless appeared unabashed in face even of the triple alliance with which Lord Castlereagh confronted them.

It is to this day uncertain whether renewed conflict could have been avoided but for Napoleon's return from Elba uniting all in a common cause, while it seems more than probable that an embittered struggle would earlier have commenced, but for Lord Castlereagh's statesman-like address. And the more credit should fall to the share of the British plenipotentiary inasmuch as we now know how various were the messages from the Home Government desiring the protection of differing interests, such as Saxony and the slave trade, but at the same time explaining that, above all things, peace was the object which England should prize most dearly.

Lord Castlereagh, bent on securing liberty for Europe and peace for the world, courteously but firmly took up ground adverse to Alexander, and yet as Metternich\* complained, held aloof from the entire scheme of policy desired by that diplomatist.

No perfect arrangement could possibly ensue out of such elementary confusion, but Lord Castlereagh knew that Alexander's self-will had, on a previous occasion, yielded to the force of circumstances. The Russian Emperor had desired to elevate Bernadotte to the French throne, and backed his opinion with a pertinacity equal to that displayed in forwarding newer political schemes.

He had then concurred in the general resolve, and, as Castlereagh judged, would do so once more.

But one power was in the English plenipotentiary's hands. It was that of the purse, which, although the Chancellor of the Exchequer besought him to use sparingly, must be held to have tended considerably to calm the troubled waters. The Chancellor of the Exchequer writes to Lord Castlereagh at the end of April 1814, saying that he had obtained large sums of money in cash and bills, procured through a Jew house of large and extensive connection on the Continent, of the name of Rothschild. He adds that the public and Parliament "are highly elated, and I think more satisfied than elated."

Again, later in the year, Lord Castlereagh gets a letter from the same authority, impressing on him the

importance of the peaceful settlement then threatened by conflicting circumstances.

"I consider," says Mr. Vansittart, "the renewal of a Continental war at all like that we have lately concluded as absolutely impracticable for some years. As the foreign powers were circumstanced he believed there to be more menace than danger in the situation at Vienna." "But the great point," he says, "is to secure the *present peace of Europe*. We are not responsible as to Saxony." The question of Naples he recommended should be passed lightly over.\*

In another letter he adds: "I have strongly insisted on the necessity of preserving peace, not from any despondency with regard to our resources whenever the defence or honour of the country may require their exertion, but from a conviction that after such a continuance of exertion this nation requires repose, and could only be aroused by some *extraordinary emergency*. An interval of peace would strengthen our finances if properly improved." Much was done in the short Peace of Amiens, and might be done at the moment if England could only close her American contest, which,

\* The fact being Murat was in possession with an Austrian guarantee. Dangerous as was his position to Europe, it might be impossible to remove him without a renewal of war. Whatever may be urged on Murat's behalf, in consequence of the acceptance of his indispensable aid by the allies when they invaded France in 1818, Great Britain had previously incurred a debt of gratitude to her old and faithful ally the Bourbon king, which might well lead Mr. Vansittart to advise diplomatic silence. Murat himself solved the problem by joining Napoleon in 1815.

if persisted in, would, as the writer believed, lead to a separation amongst the states themselves.

Two of the eventualities alluded to in this letter were destined to be soon realised. Peace was signed with America at Ghent on the very day after which the above was penned, viz. December 24th, 1814.\* The

\* The early stages of the American contest had not redounded to the fame of England's naval reputation. American frigates of superior size and more modern build, injured British commerce and on the whole prevailed in conflict over their rivals. Two causes seem to have tended towards these conditions—one being the long and deliberate preparation made by our American cousins for the special description of conflict in which they were to engage, and the other the advantage given by the number of skilled Englishmen who enrolled themselves under the stars and stripes. Time does not here allow of probing the cause of this defection, but it existed, and together with an improvement in small-arm shooting, caused by constant practising at a mark, the American frigate of this class became, not only equal in seamanship, but superior in strength and fighting-power to any one given assailant.

This inequality was rendered more equal when, after bitter experience, the British Admiralty turned their attention towards the remedy of defects in naval teaching and structure. The issue of such combats as those between the *Shannon* and *Chesapeake* and the *Phoebe* and *Essex* (vide James' *Naval History*) reflected credit on the British navy, who at one and the same time were engaged in neutralising the efforts of Napoleon and his allies, and competing on advantageous terms with the smart sailorship of the rising Western Power.

On land, an equality was on the whole sustained between the rival forces.

The British victory by General Ross at Bladensburg on 24th August 1814, and the subsequent capture of Washington, being equalised by the check suffered at New Orleans later in the war (8th January 1815.)

extraordinary emergency we know to have subsequently arisen in Europe, and demanded British patience and resource to combat its dangers.

A letter of surpassing interest is extant amongst Lord Bexley's papers, which, showing Lord Castlereagh's views and displaying his energy at a crucial moment of the Congress, may not be out of place here.

Moreover, its historical value is undoubted. Writing to the Chancellor of the Exchequer from Vienna on November the 11th, 1814, Lord Castlereagh speaks as follows:—

“If the Emperor of Russia shall persist in refusing to acknowledge his treaties, or to treat in pursuance of them *à l'amiable*, I shall have no difficulty in stopping that demand,\* provided that I can secure the Low

\* The guarantee of the Russian debt to Holland, a debt incurred by the Empress Catherine in 1788, through Hope of Amsterdam (eighty million florins.)

In 1812, when war with Napoleon was declared, Russia desired England should take charge of this debt. The request was refused then, but in 1814, in return for the guarantees for Flemish independence, Russia succeeded in gaining her point. Mr. Herries' biographer, in vol. ii. p. 135, has proved Lord Liverpool's repugnance to this arrangement, whilst the letter we now quote evidences the objections felt by Mr. Vansittart.

Mr. Herries biographer well observes that the practical effect of the arrangement was only the transfer of a loss sustained by some Dutch capitalists to English taxpayers.

The intense importance of securing Alexander's friendship and with it the peace of the world, can alone justify what Mr. E. Herries, in his excellent life of his father, stigmatises as a questionable engagement. He adds, as a significant fact, that a few months after this agreement was made a Russian loan was raised at Amsterdam.

Countries against his arms and his intrigues ; but if his Imperial Majesty shall change his tone and make a reasonable arrangement of treaties on the side of Poland, if he shall allow the other European arrangements to be equitably settled, including those of Holland, and alter his tariffs besides, then, my dear Vansittart, I must come upon you for my pound of flesh ; or if I cannot stop his power upon the Vistula, and it break loose and carry all before it to the Meuse, I cannot answer for the consequences. I only beg you will believe I shall do my best to save your purse. The engagement with Holland shall be no obstacle to this as I had rather give the Prince of Orange something more to defend and fortify the Low Countries than assist the credit of a Calmuck prince to overturn Europe."

The ends and aims described in this letter were not all attained, but the general scope of Castlereagh's intentions are here placed before us.

It is well known that the outcome resulted in compromise. Saxony was divided, but her king remained in possession of a smaller kingdom. The British minister, moreover, was unable to save Poland from the ultimate absorption which must follow any autonomous subjection to the magic of Muscovite diplomacy ; but he at least ensured that the experiment should be tried in the shape of a national constitution conferred on the Poles of Warsaw and its district.

The former conduct of France after Tilsit, together with the experiences of her children in the war of 1812, had alienated Poland from Napoleon, and many of her



people looked towards Alexander as a deliverer. Such having been the passing feeling, we must allow that a fair arrangement was effected, which afterwards allowed the Poles in 1830 to resist Russian armies for six months, and not to succumb until Prussia joined in suppression of their liberties. Lord Castlereagh was from the first strongly in favour of an independent Polish State between Russia and Prussia, but agreed to the above compromise for the purpose of unity and peace in congress. The fortress of Thorn was, however, to be dismantled, and Cracow, with 61,000 souls, erected into an independent Republic.

Austrian supremacy was also restored in Italy and the south of Germany. The Genoese Republic merged in Piedmont, and a general acquiescence in the *status quo* elsewhere arrived at. The question of Genoa was long debated amongst those disposed to look with unfriendly eye on the Treaties of 1814.

Lord W. Bentinck, when about to approach the place with a British force, issued a proclamation calling on the inhabitants to rise against the French, promising them liberty if they did so. It appears, however, that the Genoese remained silent until the British operations seemed likely to be successful, and then sent a deputation to concert measures with their deliverers.

“How then,” asked the opponents of the definitive Treaty, “can the subsequent annexation to Piedmont be justified?” Lord Liverpool averred in Parliament that Lord W. Bentinck had alone power to establish a *Provisional* Government, and that he had acted on his own responsibility whilst undertaking more. This was

no case similar to that which occurred in 1879 and 1880 in Afghanistan, when the general in command was desired by the Home and Indian Governments to promise permanent British protection to the inhabitants and merchants of certain conquered territories, but the British commander had taken on himself a decision which the allies were alone competent to decide on. Lord Harrowby, in one of his statesman-like speeches, convinced the House of Lords that Government were but carrying out the foreign policy of Mr. Pitt, who always upheld the wisdom of a juncture between Genoa and Piedmont—a project carried out, as we have elsewhere observed, to the profit of ultimate Italian unity. It will be seen, on reading the debates in Parliament, that Lord Castlereagh was not personally responsible for dispositions resolved on in council at home, and stamped—as they alone could be—by the approval of our allies in congress.

That the European outlook became peaceful, was, however, almost entirely owing to his tact and discretion, an averment which, acting on the dictum of Demosthenes, that “repetition ensures attention,” we do not hesitate to state here as elsewhere.

These arrangements, although mapped out in the minds of the British ministers, and favourably received at Vienna, were not entirely decided on when, on the suggestion of Lord Harrowby, Lord Castlereagh returned to England, and was replaced by the Duke of Wellington.

Information of the most decided character had reached His Majesty's ministers to the effect that a

conspiracy was afoot amongst officers of the French army; having for its object the assassination of the Duke of Wellington, who at the time was English ambassador in Paris.

He himself, although not informed as to details, afterwards admitted that it was probable that he might have been laid violent hands on, and possibly detained, if resident in Paris when the Empire was temporarily restored.

At Vienna, as Metternich tells us, Wellington's demeanour was one of acquiescence in Castlereagh's conclusions.

When the Foreign Secretary returned to his Parliamentary duties in England, on March 6th, 1815, the whole House of Commons rose as he entered.\* There

\* Several controverted matters, such as the transference of Norway from Denmark to Sweden, had been previously fully debated.

There was one voice silent on this occasion, that of Mr. Wilberforce, who was at first intensely dissatisfied with the arrangements as to the slave trade.

"I can assure my noble friend, however," said the philanthropist "that if I have not been able to concur in the salutations with which he has been welcomed on his return, it is not from any want of personal cordiality." Judge, then, what must have been Wilberforce's satisfaction when, after Louis XVIII. was a second time restored, in 1815, the following arrived from Lord Castlereagh, who wrote from Paris:—

"I have the gratification of acquainting you that the long-desired object is accomplished, and that the present messenger carries to Lord Liverpool the unqualified and total abolition of the slave trade throughout the dominions of France."

Well might Wilberforce say, after hearing from Lord Castlereagh

as a wonderful unanimity of sentiment existing as to the value of his great services, both in securing the first

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reagh's own lips the character of his efforts at Vienna and elsewhere:—"I believe all done that could be done."—*Life of Wilberforce*.

The following letter of Lord Castlereagh's from Vienna has been transcribed from the Bexley *Papers* because its contents bear upon more than one controverted point. Written just before the minister left the Congress, it contains additional proof of his independent and firm resolve to remain until the critical point of the main negotiation was past.

Professor Burrows' contention—in *Imperial England*—that behind Lord Castlereagh, and influencing his conduct at the Congress, stood the figure of the great Duke, can scarcely be maintained when it is shown that Lord Castlereagh did not surrender the threads of diplomacy to the greatest of British generals until an unravelment had been effected. Again, the minister's difficulties as to the slave trade are brought prominently forward, and show his exertions to have deserved the recognition finally bestowed by Mr. Wilberforce. Thirdly, the letter adduces additional evidence of the financial difficulties which made peace urgent for England —

"Vienna, January 30th, 1815.

"MY DEAR VANSITTART,

"As we shall so soon meet, I shall only thank you in a few words for your most interesting report upon our financial state, the difficulties of which it is impossible to disguise, but which you look at with your usual spirit.

"I flatter myself you will not begrudge my Portuguese *douceur*. In getting Portugal over the equator we have carried a great point. I am sorry to find from Talleyrand's note in our letter of yesterday that France recoils from Cape Formosa to Cape Three Points, and Spain is yet in our way. It is thenceforth of vital consequence to obtain this standard of abolition from the chief slave-trading Power of the three.

"I have seen Labrador's instructions, and am sorry to see a royal promise stated to have been given to the Spanish colonists, that the King would secure to them the trade for eight years.

peace of Paris, and soothing the violent passions rampant at Vienna.

Much had been earned for us through the suavity of demeanour and gentleness of disposition which, combined with a dignity equal to the magnitude of the occasion, had helped to promote that personal good feeling without which the deliberations of the congress never could have issued in success.

The work itself has stood the test of time. One blot has been felt to be the conjunction of Roman Catholic Belgium with ultra Protestant Holland, of a people cold in temperament with one French in sympathy and ardent in strength of imagination.

It was effected in order that if France should again desire the coveted seaboard belonging to the Low Countries, Antwerp and the Scheldt should not be seized without a war arising, in which German interests would be arrayed against the invaders.

The speech in which Lord Castlereagh justified his action in Congress to Parliament and his countrymen, should be studied for a due understanding of the intricacies that were shelved if not solved at Vienna.

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“In the present state of the main negotiations, which you will perceive is at the most *critical point*, and, until I see the Duke of Wellington, I cannot fix the precise time for my departure, but it shall not be unnecessarily protracted.

“Believe me, dear Vansittart,

“Faithfully yours,

“CASTLEREAGH.”

It is impossible to urge, after perusing the above, that the critical stage of negotiation was attained under other auspices than that of the Foreign Secretary.

When he spoke, the shadow of a purposeless war had not altogether been removed—of a war for territorial gain on the part of those who had assembled to calm the already troubled waters. The British Legislature allowed the justice of his pleadings, and condoned shortcomings which they judged to be the results of inherent and irremovable causes. He had done what man could to arrest the tide of French and Spanish opinion in favour of what proved but a gradual extinction of slavery. The blot was destined to deface the escutcheon of the world for some few years, but the demonstration put forward on England's behalf at Vienna, dealt a death-blow to the admitted slur on humanity which, so far as France is concerned, was retained by the Bourbons simply and solely because the French King's majority in the House of Peers depended on the West Indian interest, which was, commercially speaking, paramount at the time.

So rested matters in Europe when the news of the return from Elba cemented the alliances formed at Vienna. The action of Prussia, Austria, and Russia appears to have been not only decided but simultaneous,\* and if the Duke of Wellington had to await orders from home, their purport could scarcely be doubtful.†

Not even the hesitation of Lord Wellesley could arrest the tide of determination which set in. The liberties of Europe should be preserved at all hazards. Moreover,

\* Prince Metternich's *Autobiography*.

† The Duke had an option left him of remaining at Vienna or heading the army in the Netherlands.—*Wellington Despatches*, vol. ix.

Lord Grenville and the bulk of Opposition were at one with the nation on this point.

The character of government devised by Napoleon on his return from Elba was adapted to the altered circumstances of the case. He had observed the importance given to the slave-trade and its abolition, both by Lord Castlereagh at Vienna and in the British Parliament. With a stroke of his pen he abolished the system in French colonies. Anxious to gain the tolerance of the English Government, he foreshadowed an era of peace, and openly regretted the former molestation of individual Englishmen when travelling in his domains.\*

With the loss of little or none of his former vigour, he appears to have taken a more statesman-like view of the situation than he held during the earlier days of the war, when fulminating vengeance against the British press and people. Like a vast majority of foreigners, Napoleon had long misunderstood the British Constitution, and imagined that all the dissatisfaction expressed with our own ministers represented a corresponding sympathy with the nation's enemies. There is, however, ground for believing that in 1815 a truce might have been arranged with the Empire in consequence of the momentary disposition of its ruler, inasmuch as the antecedent impossibility of such tolerance no longer, from a British point of view, existed. Neither religion, the rights of property, nor the framework of our English Constitution were assailed. Unfortunately for Napoleon's cause, it seems that the other potentates were resolved

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\* Lord Bexley's *Papers*.

to proceed to immediate extremities,\* even if the British Government had been induced to concur in the establishment of a volcanic system across the Channel.

The conversation at St. Helena with Admiral Sir Pulteney Malcolm † contains a query of the ex-Emperor's as to the reason why we refused his overtures on that occasion. Malcolm promptly reminded him of his own opportunities thrown away at Chatillon, in 1814, to which he made no adequate reply.

The fact appears to have been that at Chatillon he believed his situation in France depended on the non-sacrifice of territory, but that after the humiliations of 1814 they welcomed back the man who, of all others, seemed most likely to restore French power and influence.

Unfortunately for Napoleon and his assumed desire for peace, Murat commenced his attack from Naples upon the Austrians coincidentally with the return from Elba. Accompanied as this event was with a Napoleonic proclamation to the Italians, calling upon them to rise against the hated Tedeschi, there was certainly excellent cause for the general disbelief in the possibility of quiet whilst Napoleon ruled over France.

The Duke of Wellington immediately set out for Belgium, where the nucleus of an English army was already assembled. It was intended, to use Lord Liverpool's words, to draw a military girdle around Napoleon, the circle of which should be constantly lessening in size. England's first thought,

\* Prince Metternich's *Autobiography*.

† *Wellington Despatches*.



however, was for the defence of Belgium and the Low Countries.

Louis XVIII., having retired to Ghent, the government straightway fell into Napoleon's hands, and a levy *en masse* was proposed for the defence of France.

People interested in the question have wondered how, after the decimation of whole *corps d'armee*, which accompanied the campaign of 1812, and the stupendous losses attendant on that of 1813-14, there should yet remain men to start up as if by magic at the Emperor's bidding.

The heart of the French people was, however, so intensely national, if not Napoleonic, that at this crisis of their history they did not dream of holding back, and the materials were to hand in consequence of a general marrying and giving in marriage, which occurred amongst the youth of the country, to avoid the earlier conscriptions of the Directory. The flower of France, young and old, was indeed assembled on the plain of Waterloo.

The British Government, fully prepared for the course of events by information laid before them, were ready with a policy. Lord Castlereagh despatched Lord Harrowby on a two-fold mission. He was to learn from the Duke of Wellington at Brussels his views on the situation, and on returning to see Louis XVIII. at Ghent, and to persuade him to make a royalist demonstration in the south of France, where at least loyalty to the Bourbons was known to exist. The replies of the Duke were satisfactory on all points. He remained confident as to the final result, and had

himself concerted measures with Marshal Blücher for the defence of Belgium, so that together their forces would form the right wing of the great allied armies.

His financial arrangements were as well conceived as were the military dispositions, and throughout the dealings with Mr. Rosenhagen, the financial agent, the Duke's business qualities come prominently forward.

Such were the difficulties of paying in coin other than that of the country, that it was resolved with Louis XVIII.'s consent, to coin French Louis d'Or in London for the purpose.\* This was done at Mr. Rosenhagen's suggestion. The Duke quite concurred, and saw that money would be saved to the State by the operation; talked of the Dutch love of a shilling, and declared that his European financial expenses had led him to look upon the Hanoverians † as closer in money matters than any other nation. Finally His Grace was obliged to consent to feed 150,000 Prussians and set their cost against the subsidy which the English Government had agreed to pay. According to the British accountant the Prussian system of pillage was previously such that it killed the goose with golden eggs, and spread desolation around them.

Practically, therefore, the armies assembled in the Netherlands were in direct British pay.

Moreover, the ‡ Treaty of Concert at Vienna had

\* Rosenhagen's correspondence with the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

† Lord Bexley's *Correspondence*

‡ Lord Bexley's *Papers*.

previously bound us to grant subsidies of five million pounds sterling to the three allied Powers. England was likewise bound to bring herself into the field 150,000 men, or pay for deficiency £20 for each horseman and £30 for each foot soldier ; and these facts are stated here in order that Englishmen reading this book may realise what efforts their country made to gain the long peace of thirty-nine years, the benefit of which most of us have personally received.

Lord Harrowby took Ghent on his return journey, and presented the English project of arousing the southern provinces. Louis XVIII., however, not being of an energetic disposition expressed a decided opinion in favour of remaining quiescent himself. When the opportunity afforded he proposed to throw himself into Dunkirk, where he believed he should be able to maintain his position, and so form the extreme right of the allied army.

The English Government had received news from the south of France which might have justified the King's appearance there, but Lord Harrowby failed to persuade the royal waiter upon Providence.

The peculiar nature of the country between Brussels and the sea allowed the flooding of tracts around the Belgian fortress in such a manner as to render them unapproachable. Thus the obvious project of turning the British right and finally cutting Wellington off from the sea became subject to delay, and was never attempted.

Lord Castlereagh appears always to have gauged this important means of defence, and in his after negotiations,

as he had previously done at Vienna, kept the fortification of the Low Countries prominently before the allies. Napoleon was, therefore, constrained to concentrate his army on the more eastern frontier, although the Duke of Wellington by posting 20,000 men on his extreme right at Hal, prepared for a contingency which was to the last moment possible. By so doing, however, his effective force at Quatre Bras and Waterloo was weakened, inasmuch as the troops at Hal never reached the scene of conflict.

Any detailed account of the Waterloo campaign would be superfluous in face of the ground having been traversed again and again by distinguished authors French and British. But the interest of the drama can never pale.

Lord Bexley's papers contain some letters from Mr. Rosenhagen, comptroller of army accounts with the Duke's army in Belgium. Their contents are all interesting, but the pith of a note sent to England the day after Waterloo is worth recording:—"I cannot help writing two lines telling what I have learned as to yesterday's battle. The Duke's personal exertions were incredible, everybody except himself despaired. One of his aides-de camps told me this morning that he took up a position on a ridge, from which he declared that he would never move, and never did move but in triumph."

Truly personal evidence none the less valuable that its publication has been long delayed. Well might Metternich speak of the British leader's iron resolution. Mr. Rosenhagen goes on to say, "Poor Sir William Delancy, with whom and whose bride I dined

the other day, is mortally wounded.\* The French are enraged beyond belief. A prisoner opposite this house provoked a soldier to bayonet him, by his cries of 'Vive l'Empereur' this morning." The barbarity of the latter action strikes the reader with just horror, and prove how murder may pass unchallenged when under the ægis of war the vilest passions of mankind become unchained.

At this distance of time there is ample scope to pay a just due to the shattered chivalry of France on that awful 18th of June. Death was in many instances sought in preference to a return, defeated and dishonoured, to their homes. Such feelings as these were worthy of the compatriots of Henry IV. No matter that from small fault of the poor soldiers, society had become disorganised, and the genius of Napoleon alone remained able to gather around it the grander elements in each class.

Towards the close of the great battle, when a British regiment had formed square to receive cavalry, a solitary horseman was seen approaching. Shrouded in a military cloak this officer urged his grey horse on to the bayonets of the English, and, after maiming several of his opponents, met the death he sought. His watch was picked up by an officer's servant after the battle, and being of peculiar French make, was preserved as a memento. The name and rank of the

\* In the *Army and Navy Magazine* for February 1881, will be found Lady Delancy's touching account of the circumstances under which she became a widow at the age of 20.

ill-fated warrior were lost to fame in the *melée* that ensued, but the tale was only that of many others who could not bear to face the shame of defeat or witness the troubles of their beloved Emperor.

No subsequent conflict has robbed Waterloo of its interest as having been attended by decisive European results such as never before or since have ensued. Kingdoms and dynastys have depended upon the result of a charge or the defection of a battalion, but on no other occasion did the fate of so many nations rest on one event as when the Prussians struggled through those almost impassable roads to succour Wellington's hard-pressed battalions.

Happy, moreover, the warriors or diplomatists who, after the cessation of war, can look forward to a peace of the duration which then dawned on the world.

The results of Waterloo brought negotiations once more upon the *tapis*. Lord Castlereagh was again despatched to Paris, and kept up communication with his colleagues at home.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer wrote deprecating the idea of France making payment in colonial possessions, because, as a future preventative of war, it was desirable that the nation should have something to lose. He further recommended a money contribution being charged as indemnity to the allies, on the ground that an addition to the French National Debt was on the whole desirable and tended to stability. Napoleon could never have waged war on so immense a scale, and have continued the struggle with Great Britain for so many years, had he not originally begun with a clear

balance sheet. The extracts given from Mr. Vansittart's letters to the Foreign Secretary will convince all observers of the shrewd and statesman-like good sense possessed by one whose inability to speak in public, with force and power, shrouded qualities known and appreciated by his colleagues during many years of official life.

Lord Castlereagh's efforts in Paris were renewed with all their former vigour. He struggled for and obtained promise of slave abolition in the French colonies, whilst with full acquiescence of other plenipotentiaries he demanded of the French Government restitution of pictures and works of art taken during the war.. This, although resisted by Talleyrand, was finally conceded. The bronzed horses returned to St. Mark's, Venice. The Pope received back his priceless statuary, and the "Descent from the Cross" resumed its old position in Antwerp Cathedral.\*

\* By the second Treaty of Paris, signed on November 20th, 1815, Great Britain ceded to France all colonies, fisheries, factories, and establishments, as they were possessed by her on January 1st, 1792, but on the condition that the slave trade was to cease.

The disregard for ethnological considerations which accompanied the delivery of the Lombardo-Venetian territory to Austria, had not, however, even former unbroken traditional possession to recommend its adoption.

From 1748 to 1797, it is true, the Hapsburgs held Lombardy, but not Venetia, over which they never ruled until in 1797, when Buonaparte bestowed a part of that province upon Austria, and annexed the rest to the Cisalpine Republic.

Hence the dissatisfaction which the decision of the Congress of Vienna engendered. We have, however, in extenuation of their

Although the Bourbons returned to the throne, the permanence of Louis XVIII.'s rule was doubted by all who had opportunities of inquiring into the state of French feeling. The love for Napoleon was by no means extirpated, but existed to a great extent amongst the poorer people. The officers of the army were likewise discontented, and if desirous of possessing their honours in peace, desired to enjoy them under a martial government. The Bourbons appear to have had no real hold on the people's hearts, and it certainly does redound considerably to the King's credit that at his death, eight years distant, he should be enabled to bequeath a crown to his successor. The peasantry by no means believed

conduct, but to picture what conditions were probably put forward by Metternich and the Emperor Francis during the ominous pause after Bautzen in 1813.

Amongst them, doubtless, was the restoration of the Italian provinces to Austria, in default of which Napoleon's son-in-law, at the head of 50,000 available men, would have straightway thrown his weight into the scale against the allies, and ultimately have brought to bear a still larger force.

The Austrians, however, continued to incur immediate unpopularity, and so draw attention to the undesirability of the Italian settlement, which, substituting King Log in the person of the Emperor Francis, for King Stork in the person of the Emperor Napoleon I., brought no relief to the national aspirations for independence.

It is likewise a fact that wherever the Austrian army passed, their name became a bye-word for indiscipline, so that distress and misery marked the track both of their advance and retreat.

This, moreover, is fully proved in Lord Bexley's communications with foreign agents in 1814, and explains much after-prejudice, otherwise without apparent foundation.



that Napoleon was lost to them for ever. His absence they thought was but temporary, and that he would most certainly return.\*

He would never, they declared, have been originally overcome by the allies in 1814, but for the base desertion of the Austrian Emperor, whose very name was execrated amongst them

The spectacle of their Emperor a fugitive, parted from his wife and child, was of itself calculated to stir the warm French blood of those who forgave their late ruler all his shortcomings because he had sustained the glory of France.

The English ministry were thus placed in an invidious position when called on to undertake the custody of Napoleon.

It was necessary practically to imprison him, because at forty-seven, in the full vigour of manhood, he was capable, if life had been spared to him, of creating a revolt in France for twenty years to come, and England's ministers thereby incurred the odium consequent on having the custody of this spoiled child of fortune, a reaction in whose favour was certain sooner or later to arise.

A midshipman on board the *Bellerophon* recounted to the writer that famous scene at Plymouth—the crowds of boats and the delusive cheers of the people, calculated as they were to create false hopes in the bosom of the fallen hero.

\* Government information.—Lord Bexley's *Papers*.

So tired did Napoleon get of responding to the frequent calls for a sight of his person, that he accepted the offer of this very young midshipman,\* who straightway arrayed himself in the Imperial dress, top boots and all, and standing on the quarter-deck, sent shoals of people away delighted with the affability of England's great captive.

On the 26th of February 1815, the Emperor Alexander astonished Metternich with a fantastic proposal to affix signatures of the allied monarchs to a document which has become historical.

It purported to bind the sovereigns to regulate their conduct by the principles of religion. Alexander was exceedingly attached to the idea, which had been concerted with a lady of the name of Krudener, who possessed an influence over him. Metternich treated the matter as of small moment, and, both anxious for peace and accustomed to Alexander's eccentricities, persuaded the Emperor Francis to sign. The King of Prussia likewise assented. When, however, the document was brought to Lord Castlereagh, he represented that it was impossible that he could give any such promise for the Prince Regent, who subsequently, however, affirmed his attachment to religious principles as applied to Government, in an independent document.

He remained, therefore, in sympathy with his allies, but the political importance afterwards attached to this famous incident was totally unforeseen.

\* Afterwards Captain McIlwaine.

Such was the origin of the Holy Alliance. Apart from the proved evils into which the combination of nations afterwards drifted, there was nothing in the declaration but what was calculated to strengthen the foundations of all government. The nation which forsakes religion as the mainspring of public action, is but preparing for that inevitable descent in the scale which follows on unrestrained licence, scattering the Atheists' day-dreams in turmoil and social uncertainty.

The Holy Alliance has been urged as a proof of the illiberal and tyrannous nature of the compacts entered into on behalf of Great Britain, and, to a certain extent, this has been the result of party spirit, for although the Whigs, as a whole, manfully supported Lord Liverpool's Government in securing peace, there were not wanting eminent doubters as to the tendency of more than one detail in the several treaties.

This feeling latterly increased, and when the internal state of the country became such that ministers were driven to take strong measures to repress expressions of public feeling which they deemed seditious, there then arose a tendency to confound refusals of reform at home with the maintenance of a like system abroad. Consequently a reaction to a degree set in after so dazzling a success.

To illustrate the manner in which Lord Castlereagh's merits would force themselves to the front, notwithstanding the above-mentioned drawbacks, take the case of Sir George Jackson, a young diplomatist, who started to Chatillon, prejudiced against the Foreign Secretary in consequence of his brother not receiving

diplomatic advancement, which friends believed the young man entitled to. "Beware of the chief's soft tongue," said Mr. F. Jackson to his brother. "It will deceive you." But what was the outcome? Why, that Sir George Jackson was found declaiming that Lord Castlereagh deserved well of Europe and England.\*

These young diplomatic sparks appear to have considered themselves the natural enemies of their official superiors. First it was Lord Harrowby who incurred displeasure when in 1805 he superseded Mr. F. Jackson at Berlin in course of official duty. Then Lord Castlereagh was spoken of with contempt as a minister and distrustfully as a departmental superior, whilst a like measure is meted out for poor Lord Aberdeen, who, if he laid the foundation of his European reputation, failed to satisfy these exigent critics. Look at it from an outside point of view how you will—whether the story comes from friend or foe, political opponent or partisan—the ultimate verdict, provided the writer or thinker had means of knowing, is the same, and in favour of Lord Castlereagh's merits, tact, and skill.

But we must draw the limit at those who know. The stigma, begotten of ignorant and assertive prejudice, has gone forth into divers of the poorer households, carried thither by magazines and popular papers published between 1815 and 1822, the contents of which, to their shame be it spoken, have not received reprobation

\* *Bath Archives*, vol. ii.

from the Edinburgh reviewers, whose teaching has been most in vogue since the Reform Bill. They at least knew the truth, but in their guilty silence have begotten a re-action towards the light of truth, such as the coming historians of nineteenth century facts shall proclaim in terms which none can misunderstand. Lord Grenville knew better, and by his conduct proved as much.



# LORD CASTLEREAGH.

JANUARY 1812 TO AUGUST 1822.

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"Such interference is inconsistent with the fundamental laws of Great Britain. It must lead to a system of continual interference incompatible with European interests and the independence of nations."—*Protest against the assumed right of the Holy Alliance to interfere with the internal affairs of other nations, 1821.*

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## CHAPTER III.

### GUARDING THE PEACE.



THE work of the Congress of Vienna was done so well that, writing in the year 1880, viz. sixty-five years after its dissolution, the general tenour of its provisions remain. One unprovoked act of international illegality has alone been exercised when Austria annexed the republic of Cracow in 1846. In 1831, however, 10,000 Russians had previously violated its neutrality when in pursuit of the defeated Poles, thus setting a precedent which was not followed out to its logical conclusion without Lord Palmerston's protest on behalf of England. •

True it is that the autonomy of Central Poland, as represented by the Duchy of Warsaw, received extinction

when finally absorbed by Russia in 1831, but this action was caused by a sanguinary and well-nigh successful rebellion such as would have tempted, if not justified, any state to annex an already half-subjected and hostile neighbour.

The lesson to be learnt therefrom is, therefore, one of doubt as to the wisdom of self-government in the form of autonomy under the ægis of a great military power, such as the doctrinaires of modern politics have set up in Northern Turkey, and desire to extend unbroken to the very gates of Constantinople.

The kingdom of Piedmont has been merged in that of Italy, so that the much-abused absorption of the Genoese Republic in 1815 has proved an important factor in the accomplishment of Italian independence, inasmuch as it seemed to increase the strength and homogeneity of the King of Piedmont's dominions both in 1848 and 1859. Without such conjuncture Cavour would have possessed no sure ground for his diplomacy, and Italy have remained but a name to this day.

Again, the conjuncture of the Rhenish provinces with Prussia made German unity possible, while the efforts to secure a strong Prussia were denounced by Metternich, and form the one cause of complaint he could find in his autobiography to charge against Lord Castlereagh.

The separation of Holland and Belgium can scarcely be marvelled at by any traveller through the Low Countries, who there meets two totally distinct nationalities. The event was, however, doubtless hastened by the measures of the Dutch king who favoured all men and things appertaining to his own race.

In addition to the above-mentioned deviations from the settlement of 1814-15 France has absorbed Savoy, and herself surrendered Alsace and Lorraine to Germany. Turkey in Europe has shrivelled up and Greece become a kingdom, whilst Austria has lost the leading position in Germany.

But, nevertheless, it would be difficult to instance any other treaty that has left such a permanent influence on the world.

Mr. Brougham (afterwards Lord Brougham) made it a great point of reproach—to the denunciation, moreover, of which he led the Whig party in England—that Ragusa had to the detriment of British commercial interests, and in spite of our traditional alliance with Turkey, been annexed to Austria without the concurrence of the people. It was certainly a strange freak of fortune that sixty-six years afterwards a British Liberal Government should send their fleet to that very harbour for the purpose of enforcing a gratuitous arrangement of precisely similar character upon a neighbouring population. The conduct of Lord Castlereagh on the former occasion would, one can imagine, find warm defenders amongst those brought up to believe that the Congress of Vienna acted on false principles, but one that must surely now be modified when considering the course of more modern events.

But the very disinterestedness of England's conduct has been charged against Lord Castlereagh, for having forsaken her interests when neither was territory nor money claimed for the British. The surrender of Java, for instance, was made to the Dutch by way of increasing



the wealth and power of her kingdom, and so helping to re-establish the due counterpoise on French power which nature has given to the possession of the Low Countries, a policy, be it remembered, favoured by Pitt.

Lord Wellesley strongly affirmed in Parliament that commercial had been unduly subordinated to political considerations, but the urgency of the position must stand as a reasonable excuse for the minister whose mission was to prevent the rekindling of war when the public treasury needed organisation and the nation rest. But the unselfishness of England on this great occasion will, in view of the gigantic efforts she had made, remain the marvel of future generations.

Some unpopularity has, on the other hand, attached to the conjuncture of England with Austria under Metternich, whose later projects were, undoubtedly, contrary to the interests of liberty, and stigmatised as such by Lord Castlereagh. Therefore it is that considerable time must elapse before the Austrian statesman is judged without prejudice. His papers, letters, and memoranda, which make up the autobiography lately published, go to show that he, at least, believed emperors and kings to exist for the sake of their people. Nobody can gainsay this who has read the book. It was the peculiar and heterogeneous condition of Austria which stultified the vague yearnings after constitutional freedom which Metternich undoubtedly once possessed.

But we desire to distinguish between Prince Metternich as the minister of Austria opposing a barrier to

Napoleon's usurpations whilst guarding his country from revolutionary anarchy, and the Metternich of later years (as set forth in the last published part of his papers) who was himself a barrier to that civil and religious liberty, without the possession of which no community can hope for permanent and natural prosperity ; between, that is, the Metternich who induced Austria to join the European alliance after Bautzen in 1813, and the Metternich who desired to supplant Lord Liverpool's authority in England, and substitute for it that of a Government under Lord Londonderry and the Duke of Wellington, either of whom, he believed, would prove more pliant to his will. Wherever Lord Castlereagh had separated himself from the constitutional maxims held by Lord Liverpool, at that point would he have forfeited the confidence of true-minded Englishmen ; but this, as students of Lord Liverpool's letters are aware, never occurred. Fortunately Metternich received a public rebuke from the subject of this memoir, which appears as a heading to the present chapter, even if such subservience to foreign influence was not contrary to every memory that the British minister's friends and relations can recall.

With the great Duke, Metternich had also subsequently to deal officially, and again found that a natural desire to preserve the concert of Europe sank into insignificance when the maintenance of our Parliamentary supremacy as established in 1688 was at stake.

But Lord Castlereagh suffered at home in England from an inability to make deep maxims of foreign policy

popular. Thought out, as they clearly were, after long contemplation, and founded on the maxims of Reform not Revolution at home, and integrity of the Empire abroad, they form a very fount of British conduct. This policy, traced from the outlines indicated by Pitt, has been grandly proclaimed by Canning and acted on by every English minister whose special mission was not—as in Lord Palmerston's case—to strike out a new line for himself while desiring to reach the same goal. It still forms the general guide for national dealing towards neighbouring nations which popular opinion here demands should, on the whole, be retained, no matter whether Whig or Tory be seated on the right of the Speaker's chair.

This biographical notice is avowedly not an historical account of the times in which Lord Castlereagh lived, but simply of the Foreign Secretaryship which he rendered so famous. Therefore it is that the allusions to public events between 1815 and 1822 will be sparse and fragmentary.

The reaction after the war was seen even in 1815, when bread riots took place in London. They were productive of a savage state of public feeling, scarcely, however, political, for outside Lord Grenville's house\* a loaf of bread was impaled with a notice affixed, on which was written, "Bread or Blood."

The National Debt had received an addition between 1793 and 1815 of six hundred millions, taxation being enlarged from seventeen to the alarming amount of seventy-two millions.†. But the population had increased

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\* Camelford House.

† Lord's *Modern Europe*.

in a rat<sup>h</sup>, without which the nation must have sunk under the load of accumulated debt.

Taking the figures supplied at the census of 1801 and 1811 as basis of calculation, the increase since the beginning of the century appears to have been considerably over eight millions. It was destined to advance by rapid strides owing to changing conditions incident on the wants of modern civilisation.

It is an axiom to which all thinkers have adhered, that in the proportion of population exists a relative germ of wealth; that is to say, therein consists the sinews of war wherewith to defend property, and the labour without the exercise of which it could never be acquired. Mr. Disraeli, in more than one thoughtful disquisition, has described the rise of a new class, in the shape of that aristocracy of wealth which the cotton industry more especially created. Itself an incident in increasing population the demand for a share in the government of the kingdom was but a logical result such as Mr. Pitt, in his scheme of public policy, had already anticipated.

That the ancient constitution of England faithfully reflected the interests of those originally participating in its benefits, no inquirer can doubt.

That such beneficent influence was felt even through the domination of the aristocratic families, Whig or Tory, the comparative freedom and happiness of the country attest. But under the fast-changing face of society there was daily increased inconvenience likely to arise, alike from exaggerated and cruel penal laws and a restricted system of Parliamentary elections. That

our statesmen shrank from providing timely relief to these rising needs and desires is now pretty generally admitted. On the other hand, he would be a bold man who presumed to condemn the actions of individuals conspicuous for the exercise of statesman-like qualities, which had saved the State from external attack. That it may one day be the duty of the historian to charge Lord Liverpool's administration with lack of foresight in this matter, it is impossible not to allow, and Lord Russell has declared that they failed to study the policy of their own great leader, Mr. Pitt, when in times of peace he had held power from 1783 until 1801. A child of the new order of things cannot in his turn throw himself fairly into the doubts and fears of sixty years since. Liberty, as we understand the term, seems to a modern Englishman the very breath of national life. It may, however, be permitted to remain open to doubt whether the wisdom and forethought of our rulers might not have led us through gradual and more educated changes to the pinnacle of freedom on which we stand.

That men of Lord Castlereagh's generation—and as we have just seen, younger men also—saw danger as they thought, ahead, in the possible differences between branches of the Legislature, and a probable predominance of the more popular House cannot be denied.

Their objections, unfortunately, cannot even now be declared absolutely unfounded, even if the disregard thereof has, up to a point, resulted in the greatest possible happiness of the many. But such sentiments appeared to the rising classes selfish and uncalled for.

The misfortune, moreover, seems to have been that together with this increasing unpopularity was included the details of a foreign policy on the maintenance of which depended the peace of Europe. Those striving to equalise the natural balance of power were, by some at home, suspected of fostering a tyrannical system abroad.\*

The ideas of Alexander and Metternich were, of course, unconstitutional, in the sense which we understand the term, but the Conservative action in Austria was justified by the peculiar position in which the nation stood, such legitimate conservatism being limited at the unfortunate prevalent desire to repress popular aspiration abroad.

Peace, and peace only, was the panacea desired for Austria by every individual acquainted with the peculiarities of her internal requirements.

The Russian Emperor's vague striving after liberty which he dared not kindle in practice, is absurdly illustrated by the question he asked of Lord Grey in 1814. "If I grant a Constitution to the Russian nation

\* The Duke of Buckingham, after a search through all the available papers of the Grenville family, states, in *Court of England during the Regency*, vol. ii. p. 100, how manifest were the illusions fostered by prejudiced people concerning Lord Castlereagh at the Congress. He was said to have cringed to Russia, but when facts became known it appeared that, on the contrary, he had persistently opposed himself to her Emperor's fanciful schemes. Castlereagh, moreover, made a strong stand for Poland, and a stout, if more successful one, against slavery all over the world.—Duke of Buckingham's *Court of the Regency*.

will you create an Opposition for me?" "If his Imperial Majesty really does desire to institute a Parliament in Russia, an Opposition will soon arise spontaneously," replied the Whig leader.

The year 1816 was one of anxiety for Lord Castlereagh. A reaction from the stupendous and long-sustained national efforts was taking effect alike on the regions of domestic politics, finance, and foreign affairs. The public order in France rested on a slender thread, inasmuch as the Constitution acceded to by the King was but nominal. The people were never really taken into counsel, inasmuch as at a stroke of the pen Louis reduced the number of his Legislative members from 400 to 250, and did so with the hope of securing a Parliament more favourable to his ministry.\*

The Duke of Richelieu, the French Prime Minister, was, however, able to inform the Duke of Wellington that the country was in a better condition than had been hoped for a year ago, and so calmed the fears already prevalent that Europe was about to return to confusion. England, carrying out in action the principles of conduct she professed, employed Lord Exmouth's powerful Mediterranean fleet in an attack on Algiers, whose Dey had imprisoned no less than 1,200 Christian slaves.

At home Lord Castlereagh received a welcome aid in the shape of Canning returning to a Government position when, with his great powers matured and wit chastened by experience, he nobly agreed to let bygones

\* *Wellington Despatches.*

be hygones, and devote unrivalled genius to the cause of his country.

Opposition critics were not slow to fasten a charge of inconsistency on the two men who had differed so manifestly, and specially to taunt Canning with accepting subordinate position under his rival.

In reply, Mr Canning averred that there never had been any impassable barrier placed by events between the Foreign Secretary and himself, who, with a manliness and generosity which he trusted he felt as was deserved, had offered to his acceptance the seals of that office he held. The feelings which had previously separated him from his noble friend were buried for ever. "The very memory of them," said Mr. Canning, "was effaced from both our minds, nor can I compliment the good taste of those who would call them up from oblivion—surely not with the vain hope of exasperating differences anew, but with the purpose of making a reconciliation, now of five years' standing, a subject of suspicion, taunt, and obloquy."

What Mr. Canning would have thought of the rancorous penmanship since devoted to making political capital out of his name as opposed to Lord Castlereagh, let the above sentiments disclose.\*

\* It was in 1816 that Lord Castlereagh was led to make the unpopular remark as to the people's *ignorant impatience of taxation*. The income-tax had been thrown out, and the Government found themselves in financial difficulties from which they had hoped to escape. But admitting Alison's plea as to the truth of Lord Castlereagh's words at the moment they were spoken, we can



The year 1817 was one of discontent at home. Whatever the cause, the fact was undeniable, and the resolution of the Government to suspend the Habeas Corpus Act appears to have been taken most unwillingly but in response to the wish of thinking men throughout the kingdom. Coleridge and Southey, the eminent poets and thinkers, both wrote to Lord Liverpool, representing that the crisis was acute, and although the former fully admitted that in all internal national disturbances consequent on times of unsettlement or war, the contending parties divide truth and falsehood, he opined, however, as a consequence, that if the present was no exception to the general rule, there existed likewise necessity for temperate public measures of restriction.

Lord Wellesley averred, on the other hand, that the neglect of commercial matters in the treaties of 1814-15 had led to an increase of public distress, while other members of the Opposition demanded Parliamentary Reform as the required panacea to heal all evils.

scarcely believe them conceived in the admirable spirit of tact and compromise which characterised his leadership of the Commons.

Rather, we should think, partaking of the hasty imprudence which early in the century had led him to stigmatise the scene of Irish legislative labours—then in process of partial demolition and about to become a banking-house—"as looking like a traitor who had undergone the sentence of the law." To which Curran replied, "A murderer is always afraid of ghosts"—alluding to Lord Castlereagh's efforts towards effecting the Union.

These remarks are taken from Mr. Jennings's *Anecdotal History of the British Parliament*, a work which should be studied by all interested in the minutiae of British legislative history.—*Anecdotal History of the British Parliament*, by G. H. Jennings.

Lord Holland, moreover, opened an attack on the character of Napoleon's treatment at St. Helena, into the details connected with which we have elsewhere entered.\* The heart of loyal England was indeed deeply stirred by the death of the beloved Princess Charlotte, heiress to the throne. Shocked likewise, we may add, the country subsequently became when agitated by the domestic dissensions between the Regent and his Consort, so that the year 1817 passed away in gloom and unsettlement.

In 1818 the armies of occupation were withdrawn from France, where matters continued to improve, notwithstanding that an attempt to assassinate the Duke of Wellington was actually made in Paris. This the result of national hatred for foreigners, did not, however, prevent Messrs. Baring from negotiating a loan for Louis XVIII.

In 1819 Lord John Russell came forward with his scheme of Parliamentary Reform, and did so when the country was in a condition of agitation, when the Sovereign was unpopular, and disturbance threatened all over the country.

It is difficult, at this distance of time, when we see but darkly through the gathering mists of time to conceive adequately the immense difficulties of a ministry charged with the responsibility of order at this stage of history.

No less an authority than Lord Dalling has given an

\* See Bathurst.

opinion in his *Historical Characters*, to the effect that Lord Liverpool's administration in 1819, for the purpose of retaining office, invented a cry of the country in danger, so doing what had been previously the successful practice of other ministries. A glance at the records of the times will, however, convince the inquirer that threatening gatherings of the lower orders were accompanied by burning of hay-ricks, and other silent destruction of property. Moreover, it was never pretended by the Parliamentary excusers of this dangerous spirit that the meetings were legal. Lord Brougham and Lord John Russell looked at once into the law of the matter, and decided not to allege their legality. The fact, however, that there was a specious semblance of Constitutional agitation appended to the proclamations and addresses in question, made men, such as Grey, Erskine, and Lansdowne, hesitate to condemn aspirations for freedom of opinion, such as they themselves had spent a lifetime in asserting. Manhood Suffrage and Annual Parliaments might be out of range of a probable, but not of a possible, political future. A potent section, however, of the Whig party both discerned danger to the State and expressed their fears in Parliament. Plunkett, for instance, saw in sedition and blasphemy disseminated amongst the people signs of a revolutionary project ripe for execution. Lord Grenville, with the warning of the French Revolution before his eyes, believed the distress put forward as an excuse for seditious rioting to be but the instrument of agitation. Again, Lord Wellesley expressed himself unable to fathom the

dangers into which such artificial excitement might carry the nation, and declared his belief that Parliament had met to exercise the first of all the duties and rights of a State, viz. to protect public security. Altogether it is difficult not to believe that, but for the determined attitude assumed by Government, England might have drifted in 1819 into a similar condition of lawlessness such as has afflicted Ireland in 1880 and 1881.

Such a condition of public confusion, according to Mr. Plunkett, Lord Grenville, Lord Wellesley, and Mr. Wilberforce, might have been easily attained had Government, instead of putting its foot firmly down, condescended to angle for popular support at the expense of future good-feeling between class and class.

It seems possible, however, that one of those moments had in 1819 arrived when the advantages of a more extended franchise would have been beneficently felt. It is true that the shifting of the scene which must perforce have ensued, would, in all human probability, have brought with it a change of ministry, and have placed foreign affairs in other hands than those of Lord Castlereagh. That this should have occurred during his lifetime would, one may believe, have been fraught with some danger to the State, and the merits of his successors naturally received public confidence, through the degree in which they followed out his policy.

Popular changes might not, however, have resulted in the anti-reformer Canning filling the post of Foreign Secretary. This would have been little short of a public calamity, because after-events proved to the satisfaction of every moderate imperial-minded politician,

and, despite the prejudice of some contemporary opinion, that the foreign affairs of England, could receive no injury from his guidance.

As we shall show from evidence it were vain to dispute, Canning utilised his high-souled eloquence to popularise Lord Castlereagh's maxims, and deserves well of his country for so doing, when, possibly, he might have gained cheap and unbounded applause by accustoming Englishmen to less profound principles of policy.

While, however, this question of an earlier reform being desirable is matter for speculation and opinion, one mistake Lord Liverpool's Government clearly made. They overworked their Foreign Secretary, when, as subsequently became the case, he undertook Lord Sidmouth's duties at the Home Office. There is nothing more certain than that the avoidance of ordinary rules and precautions, as enjoined by nature, will, sooner or later, sap the energies of man, and the stronger the individual the greater the probability of his not accepting natural warnings when they are vouchsafed him.

It has been suggested in certain quarters, where a desire to discredit Lord Castlereagh's career is still strangely prominent, that Lord Palmerston kept silence in Parliament during the necessary repressive legislation of 1819.

It is left to be inferred that he disapproved the six acts and the general tenour of Government action. If the second volume of Sir Henry Bulwer's *Life of Lord Palmerston* did not contain directly contrary testimony, the following letter would, of itself, prove that the

moderate Liberal of the future saw the necessity for a prompt check being given to rampant sedition.

*“ Lord Palmerston to Lord FitzHarris.*

*“ Stanhope Street, Nov. 1st, 1819.*

“I hope you will be able to make arrangements for coming up the first day of the session, as I can assure you that it is a matter of importance to do so. This is no ordinary moment, and everything depends not merely upon the cold support of the friends of social order, but upon their displaying a zeal and alacrity in some measure corresponding with the activity of those who are endeavouring to overthrow our institutions. You know as well as I do how much more effect you will produce by showing on the first day than by slipping in three or four days afterwards, and you also know how much depends upon effect and first impressions in Parliamentary matters. As you have three weeks before you, it cannot make much difference whether you arrange to come up three days sooner or three days later, and I am sure you had better take the three days off the end than the beginning of your attendance.

“I have no doubt that the Opposition will muster in great force, and we shall probably plunge at once into interesting discussions, and though we may not have a division, yet think how different the effect is which will be produced upon the House and the public by a Government in such a crisis as this sitting with empty or with full benches behind them. The great difficulty which Government have had to contend with

since the peace has been the apparent coldness of its real well-wishers, and if they cannot inspire some feeling of warmth and zeal in a moment like this, they had certainly better give up the reins to the hands of those who may be more fortunate in that respect."\*

It may be clearly seen from the above that no measure proposed by Lord Liverpool's Government on behalf of public order, repelled Lord Palmerston, although it is clear that he thought more vigorous political support might be both claimed by and given to other political leaders.

Be that as it may, when, in 1846, Lord Clarendon was forced, as Lord Lieutenant, to take action against sedition in Ireland, the much abused six acts, for the use of which the Tory Government had been execrated and reviled, were absolutely taken as a model for the Whig Legislation. So much, then, for the domestic measures which riot and sedition made expedient in 1819.

The years 1820 and 1821 passed by in agitation of various descriptions, culminating in ministerial unpopularity, which threatened, even in those days of Parliamentary and borough influence, to overthrow Lord Liverpool's Government. It had been found impossible to defer the evil day longer, and a return to cash payments at the Bank of England was adjudged imperative by Peel, whose difference with the great capitalist, his father, upon the question forms an interesting topic to this day. The statesman looked to

the future; even if temporary unpopularity had of necessity to be encountered.

The Divorce Bill was ultimately abandoned because supported in Parliament by feeble majorities, and the failure was hailed by tumultuous public joy. Lord Castlereagh and Lord Sidmouth could neither of them move out without receiving evidence of the disfavour in which they were held.

The death of good King George III. had indeed loosed the floodgates of passion which, pent up for years, burst fiercely through the first vent afforded. Released as it were from a living tomb, the blind and aged monarch sank to rest, every inch a national king, whose monument remains in the national memory side by side with those of Edward III. and Queen Elizabeth.

The new King George IV. suffered at first from the unpopularity of his ministers, but soon profited by the sudden veering round of opinion. The popular impulse, when the facts became fully circulated, approved action against the Queen, and whenever His Majesty went abroad he found himself greeted by acclamations from every throat. And this but a few short months since the whole nation seemed convulsed with indignation, if not on the verge of revolution. It is, however, small cause of reproach to the generous English people that they embraced the cause of their Queen, whom men like Canning and Brougham deemed oppressed and unfortunate. There was much, moreover, in the original hasty popular verdict which beats in unison with the better instincts of mankind, and should lead the



historian to look regretfully on the woes and mournfully on the death of this unfortunate Queen.

The subsequent justification of ministerial action afforded by the evidence, is the explanation historians give for this rapid change of public opinion, but its story should warn political parties from trusting one hour to the perpetuation of power derived directly from popular inspiration.\*

The coronation of George IV. was celebrated in great pomp, and the year 1822 entered into under better auspices than had existed for some time. True it is that the practised statesman Lord Sidmouth retired from the Home Office, which, although filled by the rising and talented Peel, left the Foreign Secretary with increased work and greater responsibility.

The height of Lord Castlereagh's (then Lord Londonderry) power, was, in Lord Teignmouth's opinion, attained at this moment, when, on accompanying George IV. to Ireland in 1821, he was received with acclamations by the Dublin crowd. The true Hibernian feeling was there elicited, untainted by the whisper of sedition or distorted by the unwholesome counsel of alien and suborned agitation.

No more powerful evidence as to the nobility of Lord

\* It is in keeping with Lord Castlereagh's knowledge of the English that he should have predicted this change of opinion. He gave it as his conviction during the height of popular excitement that the King would become shortly the most popular man in his dominions.

Castlereagh's character exists than that given with heart-felt eagerness by his former friend and colleague Alexander Knox, the Irish theologian and philosopher.

After an absence of twenty-two years, they met at the Castle during the royal visits, and the delight seem to have been mutual.

During the two crucial years 1797 and 1798, Knox had acted as private secretary to Lord Castlereagh, and witnessed the events connected with the Rebellion, although he appears to have been rather the thinker of the closet than the combatter with the disturbance and turmoil of active political excitement. For Lord Castlereagh he entertained respect and love unbounded, declaring him to possess the highest statesman-like qualities, combined with honesty and humanity.\*

Lord Castlereagh, who had become Marquis of Londonderry was, towards the close of his life, rendered anxious for the carefully-arranged balance of European power, over which he watched.†

A disposition had crept into vogue amongst the Continental Sovereigns which, as the British Foreign Minister declared at Laybach, was one diametrically opposed to the fundamental laws of Great-Britain. Whether they were prompted or not by the so-called Holy Alliance, it is an undoubted historical fact that Lord Londonderry opposed himself to the new principles attempted to be foisted on Europe, and that when he

\* Lord Teignmouth's *Reminiscences*, vol. i. p. 186.

† In 1820 died George III. and in 1821 the Emperor Napoleon.

died in 1822 he left a memorandum, carefully pointing out where English interests and principles prompted her to ~~separate~~ from other European Powers. This memorandum was followed faithfully by Mr. Canning, when at the Foreign Office, and his famous policy was that marked out by his predecessor.

For this fact there is the undoubted testimony of a leading colleague, who showed the document alluded to above to his son (himself a Parliamentary supporter of the ministers), who has communicated the fact to the author.

Lord Londonderry was about to proceed to Verona for the coming congress, where the civil war in Spain, the impending quarrel between Russia and Turkey, and other anxious matters were to be discussed. At this moment his lordship's mind showed ominous signs of giving way, and before proper precautions could be placed in train he destroyed his own life. Lord Londonderry had a place at North Cray in the rich low woodland country lying below Shooter's Hill. Thither he had retired by medical advice, in order that in the quiet of this beautiful retreat he might recuperate his over-strained faculties. But the complaint had taken too strong a hold on his once powerful constitution, and the catastrophe occurred in spite of all endeavours to avert it.

As Sir Archibald Alison has declared in terms of eloquence, worthy of Macaulay or McIntosh, the deceased minister was essentially a man of the old times. He could not enter into the feelings of those who yearned for the general expansion of thought which Mr. Matthew Arnold has declared characteristic of modern Liberalism.

But his career none the less for that fills a niche in history, without the occupation of which our present position would neither have been free nor powerful.

It was filled by so noble a character, and the work celebrated performed so effectively, that praise will be the more superfluous as ages roll by.

But a great contemporary and opponent (Lord Brougham) took a lower view of Lord Castlereagh's talents and actions than political Englishmen of his times. Thus it is that their recorded opinions as to his worth remain.

The second Lord Londonderry published the life of his brother and such correspondence as existed, adding a few expressions showing in what high regard those best enabled to judge held the late Foreign Secretary.

Sir Robert Peel bore witness to his "rare union of high and general feelings, courteous and prepossessing manner, a warm heart and a cool head, great temper, industry, fortitude, courage moral and personal, that command and influence which makes other men willing instruments, combined with spotless integrity."

Lord Wellesley wrote of Lord Castlereagh's perfect discretion and temper in the conduct of arduous public affairs; and with regard to India, says that he at once saw the objects of policy contemplated, and never interfered in the exercise of Indian patronage.\*

\* The testimony of Mr David Morier should most certainly not be omitted.

He was a diplomatist of repute who, trained at Constantinople

In Lord Wellesley's opinion truth and justice demanded the highest tribute to the memory of one whose loss to the Empire he believed to be very great.

In a like spirit spoke Lord Aberdeen, and the first Lord Ripon, who, as he said, owed his official success to Lord Castlereagh.

Again, we have the testimony of an eloquent political rival, Mr. Plunkett, speaking of the wisdom and liberality of all his public objects and opinions, attested to, moreover, as the writer said, with perfect knowledge of its absolute truth. Such evidence has to be weighed against vague accusations of illiberality, founded on alleged sympathy with Austria and her system of domestic interference abroad, notwithstanding that in public Lord Castlereagh had reprobated England being committed to any such schemes. When the respectable authority of Walpole's *History of England* is brought

by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, became British Minister at Berne and Consul-General at Paris. In his ninety-second year he wrote to Lord Teignmouth to the following effect :—

"I have not forgotten your query about my Lord Castlereagh. I can only say that as far as I can judge from my long and intimate intercourse with him in all the negotiations at Paris, Chatillon, Vienna Congress, and at home in the Foreign Office, he was the most upright statesman we ever had. No man was ever more misrepresented and misunderstood than he."

The same opinions are echoed again and again by those who came in contact with Lord Castlereagh, and his noble character is alone denied by those Irishmen who would repudiate Union with Great Britain, and by Englishmen who think that riot and sedition should have been allowed full swing because bread was dear in 1819 and 1820.

forward to sustain such charges,\* it is, indeed, time that men like Lord Plunkett should be brought to speak for the liberality and wisdom of one whose conduct has been subjected to so strained an interpretation.†

Without entering into minute details such as would weary a reader's patience, it may fairly be admitted that Lord Londonderry did express preference for the single interference of Austria in Naples to the lighting of a revolutionary torch in Europe, when the many desperate children of fortune were still at large, whose existence, as such, was the outcome of the Napoleonic wars.

In fact, he stated that he did not desire to see the work of 1814-15 destroyed and a new reign of disorder substituted.

More than this it is impossible to sustain, and at the risk of being considered tedious the following letter is given at length, which we beseech our readers to peruse

\* Walpole's *History of England*, vol. ii. p. 320-21.

† Lord Castlereagh thus expresses to his brother the sentiments on which detractors rely :—

“ I very much agree with a Court as to the (Neapolitan) King's position and the inexpediency of returning now to the old system after all that has passed.

“ I still think Metternich has specially weakened his position by making it (the Neapolitan) an European instead of an Austrian question. He might have had the same European countenance upon a much more intelligible case. He would have carried public opinion, especially in this country, with him, had he stood simply upon the *offensive* character of a Carbonari Government, rather than embarking himself on the boundless ocean on which he has prepared to sail.”—Lord Castlereagh to Lord Stewart, January 5th, 1821, Castlereagh's *Correspondence*, vol. xii.

as displaying the real spirit in which the minister acted.

“I wish you distinctly to understand that in proportion as events at Paris and here give to our general position a more serious character, our allies may expect to see us more determinedly wedded to the position upon which alone we feel the smallest hope of rallying the national sentiment, if necessary, to exertion. Pitt in the early years of the late war, neglected the necessary caution in this respect. He was thereby weakened for the first ten years of the war by a decided schism of national opinion, whether the war was of necessity or brought on by bad management. In all the latter years of the war, profiting by experience, we never exposed ourselves to a question of this nature, and we were supported in the war, under all its accumulated burdens, by the whole energy and power of the nation.

“This is our compass, and by this we must steer, and our allies on the Continent may be assured that they will deceive themselves if they suppose that we could for six months act with them unless the mind of the nation was in the cause. They must not, therefore, press us to place ourselves on any ground John Bull will not maintain.”—*Lord Castlereagh to Lord Stewart, February 24th, 1820.*

It was surely allowable for Lord Castlereagh to express private regret at the Neapolitan troops making common cause with the Carbonari in 1820, and to deprecate public confusion in Europe, while at the same time he uplifted his voice against an organised attempt

of the Holy Alliance to abolish Constitutional Government, and interfere with the domestic concerns of other nations. Moreover, respect for Parliamentary opinion at home was the very corner-stone of his policy. So determined, however, is the author of Walpole's history to contrast Lord Castlereagh's policy unfavourably with that of Canning, that, after admitting the English Government to have separated itself from these reprehensible actions on the part of Russia, Austria, France, and Prussia so early as 1820, he yet fixes a farther stigma on Lord Castlereagh for non-encouragement of the Greek insurrection when it first commenced. And yet that very attitude was taken up by Canning himself, who, as Mr. Stapleton tells us,\* considered that Great Britain was bound in political justice to respect in the case of Turkey that national independence which, in the event of civil commotion, she would look to have respected in her own.

The duration and magnitude of the contest alone changed this resolve.

The question at issue simply seems to be, Is an English minister justified in nurturing incipient revolutionary schemes abroad, † apart from questions of

\* *Political Life of Canning*, vol. iii. p. 254.

† As it is likewise desirable to place on record what Lord Castlereagh's views on the Greek question really were, we subjoin a part of the instructions given by him to the Duke of Wellington in 1821 before leaving for the Congress of Vienna.

After exjoining the promotion of concord between Turkey and Russia, Lord Castlereagh says :—

“ Now Greece has gained of late so much in the contest that it



policy which have not at the moment received discussion? As this is the sum and front of Lord

is not easy to avoid dealing with the Government which she has set up as with a Government *de facto*. Still you will, as British plenipotentiary, be cautious to act with great circumspection in the matter, and, above all, stand aloof from any engagement with the allies, either to accept the Greek Government as that of an independent State, or to compel the submission of Greece herself to the Porte by force of arms."—*Life of Castlereagh and Sir C. Stewart Alison*, vol. iii. p. 170.

This will be seen to be the identical policy afterwards persisted in by Canning himself, who transferred the letter of instruction to the Duke without the alteration of a word.

The impressions of a political opponent, Sir James Graham, after perusing the *Castlereagh Correspondence*, were totally different to those of Mr. Walpole. Sir James writes in 1853 to Lord Castlereagh's brother as follows:—

"MY DEAR LORD LONDONDERRY,

"I was always desirous that you should give to the world the correspondence of your brother with the greatest statesmen and commanders at the most eventful period of modern history. The result has not disappointed my expectations. You have enabled the present generation to form an accurate judgment of the services rendered to Europe by those who overthrew Napoleon, and who established peace on a basis which has lasted forty years, and you have done justice to the memory of your brother, whose character and merits will be most highly appreciated when they are best known and most closely scrutinised. He has nothing to fear from posterity or the historian, his fair fame has been well sustained by his friend and brother, whom he loved so well, and the materials are his private thoughts and secret correspondence. You judged rightly when you decided that Lord Castlereagh's reputation would be exalted with this proof, and I cordially and sincerely congratulate you on the result.

"I am, my dear Lord,

"Yours faithfully,

"JAMES GRAHAM."

Castlereagh's offending, it is well that a jealous friend of Constitutional liberty, such as Mr. Plunkett was, should have previously come forward and testified to the genuine liberality of his political opponents' objects and opinions.

Moreover Sir James Graham spoke of Lord Castlereagh as not the first great man over whose tomb has been written *Ingrata Patria*.

The love and devotion of colleagues such as Lord Liverpool, Lord Eldon, and Lord Harrowby, knew no bounds, and the Duke of Wellington's confidence never wavered. Moreover, Sir Walter Scott and other distinguished Britons have joined in expressions of praise and admiration in Lord Londonderry's book. *Ingrata Patria* need never be written on the grave of him who, resting next to Mr. Pitt in Westminster Abbey, has for his monument that forty years of peace which English historians will ever describe with pride.

The Unity of Europe, bound together by a common trust in England, was gradually dissolving before Lord Londonderry's death, and, as has been shown above, he was the first man to mark out the paths which Britain must never traverse.

As an orator Lord Castlereagh cannot aspire to the highest rank. Opinions differ greatly as to the merits and quality of his speaking, but those who have sat in the House of Commons with him say that he occasionally became involved when the argument was close and the subject intricate. Again, it is said by other contemporaries that his style was refined and in the best taste. Mr. Wilberforce remarks on one occasion on his excellent

speech made at a time when, according to the same authority, Canning had just addressed the House with less effect.\*

On one point, however, there can be no cavil: as a leader of the House, possessing thorough knowledge of its forms and tact in management of its debates, Castlereagh will rank with Walpole, North, Pitt, Perceval, Peel, Palmerston, and Disraeli.

The present Lord Harrowby, who has himself been under the enchanter's wand, tells how the party could always rely on the wisdom of their leader's conclusions. He seldom or ever led them wrong.

Merit of the latter description depends on tradition for its future acknowledgment. It is otherwise with accomplished facts. For the depths of time many a considerable name may sink into oblivion, but never that of the minister who both consolidated union between England and Ireland, and represented Great Britain at Vienna in 1814.

Since the above was penned Professor Montague Burrows has published a volume of surpassing interest. In a limited space he has succeeded in gathering together the germs and objects of the various schemes of foreign policy adopted by England during the last two centuries. It is not too much to say that

\* Mr. Wilberforce on another occasion spoke of Lord Castlereagh's oratory as follows:—

"In ordinary mood he was tiresome, slow, and heavy, yet when thoroughly warmed and excited, he was often very fine, very statesman-like, and seemed to rise quite into another man."—*Life of Wilberforce*, vol. v. p. 259.

*Imperial England* may be taken as a starting-point for anyone desiring to learn the causes and general tendency of our national actions. Deep as the book goes into the matter it is yet intelligible to the ordinary reader, and imparts a fascination to the study which those who have read alone can understand. But in a matter of detail it seems to us that Professor Burrows has failed to do justice to several individuals. In estimating the pre-eminent influences during the revolutionary and Napoleonic war, he allows to Pitt, Canning, Wellington, and justly we think to Cornwallis, the leading positions they earned, relegating, however, Castlereagh to the secondary position of a mere agent, in the establishment of the Union with Ireland, as in the settlement of Vienna, while omitting Wellesley and Grenville altogether. In the first place Professor Burrows considers Castlereagh to have registered Cornwallis's conclusions, and in the second to have had behind him the person of the great Duke, who for some time had decided British policy. Lord Cornwallis certainly held a contrary view concerning the Union, for in the third volume and page 224 of his *Correspondence*, he speaks of the extraordinary talents displayed and good services rendered by Lord Castlereagh, *to whom the success of this great and most difficult undertaking ought in justice to be principally attributed.*

A further research into this work will show that Lord Cornwallis was not speaking of mere detail, but the mental invention and arrangement of a complete scheme to which alone we owe the unity of our Empire. We have previously, moreover, made allusion to the

permanent salary, which, in the opinion of the then Prime Minister, Mr. Addington, and of Mr. C. Abbot, the well-known 'speaker,' would have been but an inadequate return for Lord Castlereagh's services in promoting the Union.

With regard to the restoration of peace in 1814, within a month of the signature of the Treaty of Paris, the Duke of Wellington remained with his army at Toulouse. The Wellington despatches will show that the Duke as became a soldier in command hazarded no political advice at this period, and that on June 2nd, 1814, he first received, from Sir C. Stewart, the provisions of the peace negotiated for England by Lord Castlereagh.

Again, a reference to the ninth volume of the *Wellington Despatches*, page 596, shows how Lord Castlereagh found it incompatible with the interest of peace and of England to either surrender his position at Vienna straight off to the Duke of Wellington, or disclose his reasons for such refusal. The confidence asked for from ministers at home, anxious for his return and help in guiding Parliament, as also from the great Duke himself, goes to show how completely the scheme of the Vienna Treaty was the product of joint ministerial decision, but carried into effect, as it alone could have been, by the extraordinary qualities of their plenipotentiary.

Lord Liverpool's letters, as collected and commented on by Mr. C. D. Yonge, go to show that the Prime Minister never for a moment dropped the reins of government or allowed a detail foreign or domestic to

escape his notice. Therefore, ministerial wisdom was not absent in this great pacification of the world.

But Prince Metternich has left powerful evidence of the value of Lord Castlereagh's work, far outside and above any that has elsewhere been collected.

When, at last, the scheme of settlement being complete, Lord Castlereagh returned to his Parliamentary duties, and was succeeded by the Iron Duke, the latter, as the embodiment of wisdom, observed a discreet silence during the remaining discussions, which, as reference to the ninth volume of his *Despatches* will show, related to matters, comparatively speaking, unimportant.

Lord Cornwallis is shown (by Professor Burrows) to have deserved prominence in consequence of his Eastern administration; but granting it to have been wise and adapted to the times, why should we not yield the supremacy to Lord Wellesley which all Indian historians have claimed for him?

But if the Professor of Modern History at Oxford is chary of giving to Lord Castlereagh the position amidst these great events which it seems to us that the facts of history demand, he at least bears potent witness for the eternal principles which lay at the root of his policy.

The wisdom of the Vienna settlement as a whole is allowed. The stilted criticisms of the *Edinburgh Review* school of politicians are brushed aside — criticism, couched as if it had been possible to draw a laboured distinction between sovereigns and their people when every man's hand was on his sword, and liberty depended on the inauguration of a reign of peace.

It is clearly shown that an abnegation in Europe of the balance of power, notwithstanding all that has been written to the contrary, must lead to oppression and ultimately to war on a vast scale.

The reaction from unreal and dangerous views on foreign politics is doubtless genuine, and deeply seated in the national mind, but it seems clear that such a reawakening should include the free rendering of justice to our much-maligned rulers. Pre-eminent amongst the last, who, as Sir Archibald Alison has said, really governed, was Robert Stewart, Viscount Castlereagh.

Lord Castlereagh owed some of his success at Paris and Vienna to the facility with which he spoke French, which, delivered with a slow and measured accent, rendered his remarks intelligible to all around him. The possession of this accomplishment, which, in Lord Castlereagh's case, was supplemented by thorough knowledge of German, was, early in the present century, by no means common to every diplomatist. It is strange to learn that the first Foreign Secretary who is known to have been familiar with the German tongue was Lord Shelbourne, who filled the office in Lord Rockingham's administration in 1782.

The noble appearance of Lord Castlereagh will be conveyed to our readers' minds by the picture which accompanies this memoir.

It is easy to understand how, at the coronation of George IV., the Foreign Secretary's bearing in the ribbon of the Garter and Peer's robes was remarked on for its grandeur.

Nor was this natural dignity and benevolence of

the statesman's appearance belied by his private actions.

The officials and clerks who had to do with Lord Castlereagh, either in connection with permanent or diplomatic duties of a temporary nature, were united in a general profession of affection for the noble exponent of England's relationship with other countries. They simply adored their chief, and the same sentiment communicated itself to the dependants of his household, not one of whom, down to the lowest helper in his stable, was found to be forgotten when the disposition of his property was disclosed.

Perfect in the relations of private life, he had a ready ear to distress, and never refused aid and sympathy to a struggling Irishman whom he thought required it. And this was the statesman who underwent for years a perpetual fire of accusation and abuse from hundreds of popular publications.

The poison thus diffused throughout Great Britain was scattered by those who, helpless in their ignorance of the truth, and lack of education, fell into the snare set for them. But the chorus was taken up by writers who could have learned the truth had they chosen to study the aims and objects of the man it was so easy and popular to revile.

Connected as this widespread and malignant prejudice was with the ancient slur before alluded to, and which had been scattered over Great Britain through the hostility of a few aristocratic Irish families (who deprecated both the Union and its results), the name of Castlereagh could alone be freed from unjust aspersions



by the influence of time and its attendant enlightenment.

Such an awakening has undoubtedly commenced to shine, and prejudice against Lord Castlereagh will scarcely survive the general education which sooner or later leads people to read for themselves at the fountain-head of historic truth.

Caulaincourt said of Lord Castlereagh that he was just and passionless. He did undoubtedly scatter the malefactors of 1819-20, who, by an assassination of fifteen cabinet ministers at Lord Harrowby's house, desired to associate England in sanguinary brotherhood with the conspirators of the Continent who, moreover, had planned an identical overthrow of authority in various quarters of Europe.\* The suspension of the Habeas Corpus was, it is true, the Parliamentary reply to their threats and machinations.

This uprising should, however, be separated in men's minds from the later Constitutional agitation leading to Parliamentary Reform, which, with all its attendant dangers and excesses, was but a natural development of our national expansion both as regards increasing population and intelligence.

The difference cannot be better described than by Mr. Canning. "Who," asked that fascinating and

\* See Sir A. Alison, vol. iii. It is, however, fair to state that absolute connection between the Cato Street conspirators and the instigators of general revolt against authority was never proved. The former remained, however a noxious and inevitable result of the principles so generally disseminated in 1819.

eloquent contemporary, "are the noble Lord's accusers?"

The reply comes from those whose violation of their country's laws has placed them beyond the pale of that society they desired to overturn.

The procession which, nominally in private, bore to a fitting resting place the remains of Lord Londonderry was followed from St. James' Square by silent and respectful crowds, whilst all the way to Westminster Abbey the streets were lined with a sympathetic multitude, intuitively aware that the dust of one was to be committed to the earth who worked and died in England's service. As the coffin left the hearse, a cry of delight broke forth, such as was described by those present as having been raised by a mere section amongst the surging crowd; and this dissentient note has been magnified into one of execration, and as such received grave comment from pens of power and influence.

Leave must here be taken of him who with pride we designate our hero—one leaving behind him a name such as stirs each Irish Stewart's heart when Castlereagh is mentioned; so that all his relations—whatever their predilections or opinions—express but one view as to the magnanimity and nobility of their great kinsman's nature. With every desire to enlighten the inquirer into the political conduct of Lord Castlereagh, the family archives have been previously placed so thoroughly at Sir Archibald Alison's disposal, that there remains little matter of public interest undisclosed and that cannot be met with in the pages of the above-mentioned fascinating writer.

Our task has been, therefore, chiefly confined to placing in a concise form the knowledge collected by others.

The additional evidence that, from Lord Bexley's papers and other sources, we have been enabled to disclose, confirms all before told of Lord Castlereagh's matchless tact and never failing intrepidity, the latter being a quality specially valued by Englishmen. Of him it might be said in Shakespeare's words—

" 'Tis much he dares ;  
And to that dauntless temper of his mind  
He hath a wisdom that doth guide his valour  
To act in safety."



## GEORGE CANNING. (II.)

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• SEPTEMBER 1822 TO MARCH 1827.



LOUDS were gathering over Europe when George IV. consented to deliver the Foreign Office a second time over to Canning. The Duke of Wellington himself urged the expediency of the action, which was adopted as an alternative proposition to one designing to place the Duke himself in the post until the perilous times were past, when Lord Clancarty, the King's ambassador at the Hague, should permanently direct foreign affairs. But Lord Liverpool's Government required strength in Parliament—eloquence that should proclaim the policy laid down by the skilled and practised statesman Lord Londonderry, whose loss threatened England with a failure of influence abroad and weakened counsels at home.

The eyes of all involuntarily turned towards George Canning—he who, with all his love of supremacy in

the senate, had yielded it to undertake thankless duties on a distant shore. After remaining in England long enough to show his freedom from personal and party feelings, and to give substantial support to the Regent's Government, he accepted the embassy at Lisbon, and there strove hard to prevail on the Portuguese to take their share in the final deliverance of Europe. Not even successful in this object, he still worked on at duties minutely and conscientiously performed, but not commensurate in importance to the intellect and mind concentrated thereon. Neither when the time came did Canning hesitate to undertake subordinate work at home, as his previous acceptance of office in 1816 had proved.

And it was no bed of roses that the famous statesman was called on to occupy. It had been during the earlier period of the Continental struggle that Canning had contributed so largely towards the future liberties of the world. But for his eloquent support given to the Spanish and Portuguese patriots, Britain's part might never have become accomplished in that mighty drama. He had not failed to watch each phase of the conflict, and returned to England to rejoice over peace accomplished and liberty re-established, as men hoped, over Europe. But the system of Government that had gained in prestige and power was not the one of popular origin which made the war of 1813 successful. It was the re-established authority of the united European sovereigns accepted as allies by England in preference to war, anarchy, and revolution, but so long and no longer as by their joint endeavours they did not scheme

to sap the tree of Freedom and lay waste the fair valley of Liberty.

In Naples after the overthrow of Murat, in 1815, Ferdinand, the Bourbon, came back and deliberately elected to rule by mediæval means, to re-enact the Government by chain, sword, and dungeon, which had originally been imported from Spain, the establishment of which strangles the liberty of a nation, stints its growth, and demoralises its population. Against his mode of government was arrayed that of the Carbonari, or secret society of Italy, which with all its extreme doctrines enlisted the sympathy of the majority of Neapolitans. Nothing remained then for Ferdinand but to call in the Austrians, who, fearful of the result of an Italian uprising in their own contiguous provinces, gladly undertook the task. This interference was, moreover, accompanied by a gross breach of faith on the part of the Bourbon Prince, who withdrew every political concession, previously wrung from him, immediately that the Austrians had accomplished their object.

But when at the Congress at Laybach, this transaction came formally before the nations, England spoke as follows, through the medium of a despatch of Lord Castlereagh's:—"Such interference, if intended to lead to reciprocity of action, was inconsistent with the fundamental laws of Great Britain. Anyhow it must lead to a system of continual interference, incompatible with European interests and the independence of nations."

Great Britain could have no part and lot with those whose public measures tended towards the dissemination

of principles against which her own history had been one long continual protest, even if that interference was designed on behalf of a dynasty which acted the part of our faithful ally during the long war with France.

Now at the moment that Canning accepted the Foreign Office, in 1822, precisely the same drama was in process of enactment in Spain. There another Ferdinand after his restoration had striven to rule by tyrannical means, and found himself opposed by extreme revolutionists, whose success must have in turn ended in renewed anarchy. The Cortez as Ferdinand found it, the Cortez after he had dissolved it, would have none of him; they proclaimed war equally against their king and against the revolutionary chiefs who dominated parts of the country.

Thus it came to pass that rival parties were contending for mastery in the kingdom so lately delivered by British arms.

Worse than all for the hopes of peace, Louis XVIII. and his ministers were bent on following the Austrian example in Naples, and meditated interference for the purpose of re-establishing Ferdinand, together with the Inquisition and all concomitant iniquities, upon poor faction-torn Spain.

Well might Castlereagh, scenting such a spirit abroad, have left well-defined counsel behind him, so that no English minister might be led to declare for hollow subserviency with that which the nation would straightway desire them to cast off.

And Canning was not the man to embroil England in a manner contrary to her principles. In his hands the

severance from such schemes became certain and assured, whilst he chafed sadly under the obligation of neutrality which circumstances enjoined.

It has been said that Canning's policy was foiled when, in 1823, France at last let slip the dogs of war, and invaded Spain. There is, however, no evidence that he ever meditated a direct interference, one, moreover, that would have been against the judgment of his leader, Lord Liverpool, who foresaw that such action must merge into hostility between England and France, and to a renewed European conflict. Still all that diplomatic skill could do was effected.

When the Duke of Wellington, in 1823, went to Verona as British plenipotentiary, this Spanish trouble was on the *tapis*. The Eastern Question had likewise given ominous signs of life, and the great Colossus of the North a corresponding disposition to be restless and aggressive.

Alexander was prepared to send troops to Spain, as he was most certainly inclined to quarrel with Turkey, who, by sweeping the Greeks off the Black Sea, had injured his trade, wont, as it was, to be carried on in their ships and those of other nationalities,

The question, as it arose in 1822-23, was one of gain, not one of mere policy, and so evidenced the many-sidedness of the famous Eastern difficulties.

But for the aforesaid many-sidedness the Eastern Question would surely, long ago, have reached the solution generally desired for it but in one quarter. Mr. Canning had to cope with a special phase, which has probably led Russia to be altogether unanimous in



favour of predominance on the Black Sea and ultimate enthronement in Constantinople.

Mere speculative desire for conquest might have fired the few with future hopes of Mediterranean or even Eastern sway, but the interests of trade, and, through it, the desire for gain and wealth, has caused each Muscovite to look towards the subjugation of Turkey as a consummation devoutly to be desired.

It was clearly impossible that matters could remain on the footing they occupied at the time of the question being mooted at the Congress of Verona. Pitt's foresight had, in 1792, pointed to Oczagow as a mere *pic de terre*, seized for the purpose of securing a hold on the Black Sea, admission to the sacred precincts of which Catherine's advance to the Crimea elsewhere secured. But when Russian trade had once found an outlet in this quarter, no matter under what pretence or under what circumstances, the Czar and his advisers were certain to shape their policy so as retain that benefit even if it landed them in a premature war with their natural enemy.

Europe, moreover, approached this question in a totally different spirit to that which in late years animated their successors.

The Emperor Alexander's share in the events of 1814-15 gave him a title to gratitude such as those who had benefited thereby were not willing—even if their interests prompted them—entirely to forget; and this feeling not only extended during the war of 1828, but it may be open to question if such influence was entirely absent twenty-five years after, when Alexander's

successor made, during 1853, a second attempt to advance towards Constantinople.

It appears, therefore, neither surprising nor unfitting that the Congress of Verona inclined towards the Russian Emperor as regarded the Black Sea navigation, and that although the re-establishment of general commerce might indirectly assist the Greek insurgents, Canning should have supported the Muscovite claims, and induced Turkey to hold her clear legal right over the Black Sea navigation in politic abeyance. The weakness of Turkey has always consisted in the apparent plausibility of the Russian demands when first mooted, and this commercial question naturally enlisted general sympathy on behalf of a less restricted system.

But, as the Muscovites knew, a far more complicated difficulty remained behind and was shirked by the assembled diplomatists. The Greeks, after long preparation, had risen against the Turks, and it was known that nothing short of submission would satisfy the Moslem, whilst national independence was the only goal acknowledged by the Greek Christians, who, sure of the sympathy of their religious brethren in Russia, and of a large body in England and France, were resolved to fight unto the death.

Scarcely could it be marvelled, therefore, that the Russian Government availed themselves of this chance to advance long-cherished claims for the protection of Greek subjects—claims, moreover, the validity of which, as conferred by the Treaty of Kainardji, in 1774, have been variously interpreted. But for the Emperor Alexander the wedge would there and then have been

driven into European Turkey, which was again and again to be inserted, until the Turkish Empire shrivelled into its present attenuated size.

The silence of Europe in Congress on this grave and rising difficulty has been commented on severely by a modern author of research and reputation.\* And at this distance of time it does appear as if a mistake was made when the efforts of diplomacy were withheld from effecting the cessation of a conflict which not only proved barbarously bloody, but culminated in Navarino and a serious Russo-Turkish war.

To the eye of the thoughtful inquirer the independence of Greece could be but a question of time; but the difficulties in the way of such solution were enormous.

The Duke of Wellington went to the Verona Congress in 1823 fortified by the mandate of a united nation. The Sovereign, Parliament, Ministers, and the people were at one as to the desirability of non-interference with the internal affairs of other nations.

The Duke played his part admirably. He succeeded in urging the Czar to desist from his scheme of sending 150,000 men beyond the Pyrenees in immediate aid of Louis XVIII. On the other hand, he failed to prevent a circular proceeding from France, Russia, Prussia, and Austria, signifying their intention to proceed by force in Spain if their views were not acceded to.

When this decision had been registered, the British plenipotentiary, finding himself out of all sympathy

\* Mr. Evelyn Ashley, M.P., *Lecture on Greece*.

with the Powers, withdrew from Verona, not, however, before he had conveyed to that assembly the intention of the British Government to acknowledge the Spanish American colonies as independent of the mother country—a resolve received with the greatest disapproval by the Holy Alliance, as a manifest withdrawal from their extreme view of legitimate right.

History, taking its views from the people's instinctive impression, has fixed upon George Canning the chief credit of that momentous decision. Judging from the information Government possessed of the grinding and desolating nature of the Spanish rule when in its zenith, as in its later days of decay, one can conceive how a desire to give freedom to so many human souls would naturally have animated Canning's heart. Anyhow, the measure has been indelibly stamped with the approval of his eloquence when proclaiming that he had called in the New World to redress the wrongs of the Old.

Practically, the Spanish American colonies had seceded for some time. The periods at which they formally ceased to acknowledge their allegiance to Ferdinand VII. were as follow:—Mexico, 18th May, 1822; Columbia (in which, for a long time, the king had adherents), 30th August 1821; Venezuela, 5th July 1811; New Grenada, 17th December 1819; Buenos Ayres, 19th July 1816; Chili, 1st January 1818; Peru, 15th July 1821. The causes of difference were various and irreconcilable. The President of New Grenada, writing to the Mr. Vansittart in 1810, tells the then Chancellor of the Exchequer that the resolve in his country to throw over the Spanish yoke was a determined one.

Sooner than submit to a rule, the misery of which was as insufferable as degrading, the inhabitants were determined to reduce the country to its primeval condition.

The fact appears to have been that, without the advantages of Spanish subjects, colonists were expected to contribute towards the public exchequer.

The practical consequence of this state of things came to be a condition of piracy which arose throughout the West Indies. Armed vessels appeared sailing under the Spanish flag, and pillaged the commerce of neutrals.

Redress was only to be sought at Madrid where the sovereignty was but nominal, and it became, therefore, a matter of policy to legalise the local governments, and execute treaties with them for the protection of trade.

This course was pursued first by the United States and afterwards by England.

France had long had her eye upon these erring children, whilst Napoleon's original interference in Spain was not commenced without a design of attracting the South American colonies to himself. He fully intended to have acknowledged them whenever a hold could be fairly fixed on the Spanish main. Louis XVIII. was believed to cherish similar schemes, and Lord Liverpool received private information which led him to suspect some such scheme to be at the root of French policy.

- In the event of the French designs ending in failure, it is clear that procrastination would have thrown the revolted Spanish American colonies entirely into the

hands of the United States, who had but to wait until the insurgents threw themselves into their arms.

In England the King and the Duke of Wellington, together with an influential minority, were adverse to the measure, as savouring too much of an attack on the principle of legitimate sovereignty.

They held that without the Spanish King renouncing his rights, the severance between Spain and her colonies could but be half completed.

Canning was, however, loyally supported in this matter by the sagacity of Lord Liverpool, who fully gauged the importance of immediate action in the matter.\*

After-experience has not led one to think that a conspicuous success has attended the states themselves, two of whom have been lately engaged in an exhausting war.

No real settlement of society has ever been known in Mexico, and the bad faith of its Government has become proverbial in financial circles.

But, inhabiting some of the fairest regions the earth

\* Lord Castlereagh held the following opinion on the recognition of the American colonies. It is stated in his last State-paper as delivered to the Duke of Wellington in 1823, as part of his instructions when proceeding to Verona :—

“As to the form of government (absolute) which she has of late established for herself in Europe, that is a matter with which, in the opinion of the English Cabinet, no Foreign Power has the smallest right to interfere. . . . But the case of the revolted colonies is different. It is evident, from the course which events have taken, that their recognition as independent states has become merely a question of time.”—*Life of Lord Castlereagh*, by Sir C. Stewart Alison, vol. iii. p. 177.

can boast, these free republics should yet have before them a bright future, and convey to coming generations the name of their great benefactor George Canning.

The independence of these colonies had not been attained without the predominance of a master spirit amongst themselves, and Bolivar was the individual who, by an enthusiasm for the cause, brought other men to adopt his leadership.

He was a bitter foe to slavery, and as such attracted the attention of Canning and the British Government, whose recognition was doubtless hastened thereby. He rose to be President of the Peruvian Republic.

When the time for coping with these difficulties arrived, Canning's great powers had probably reached their full maturity.

The irresistible promptings of genius had, in 1821, led to the acceptance of an almost imperial exile in India, there to emulate the success of Hastings,\* Wellesley, and Cornwallis. On such a stage there was at least scope for the schemes of statesmanship, such as it came natural for Canning to project, even if the magnificent flights of oratory soon to astonish the British nation would have been lost to the fortunate hearers, and received no record wherewith to delight posterity. Peace was sorely desired in India. One of those seasons of imperative rest had ensued, during which it must ever be necessary to husband resources on behalf of future necessities. But into such a desired haven

\* At the Board of Control Canning had indirectly watched over the destinies of our Eastern empire.

the good ship could only be steered by the guiding of a master-mind. The shoals whereon rash devisers of a hollow truce might wreck England's eastern fortunes, were many and manifold in the quarter of the globe where pusillanimity is sooner detected by the people than elsewhere.

It was surely a great opportunity for Canning's lawful and natural ambition, once again to forsake the mere pedantry of politics and stand upon a stage fitly guided only by a born ruler of men. But the death of Lord Londonderry, in 1822, changed all. There was open to Canning that direction of foreign affairs which had before proved statesman-like in its inception, and had since been accepted as such by the nation.

It is not too much to say that but for Canning's Parliamentary advocacy of England's early action in Spain, that arduous Peninsula contest could never have been fought out. It required a similar lucid and eloquent exposition of policy in 1822 to reconcile Great Britain and her legislature to that gradual but marked separation from Continental action which the late Lord Londonderry had laid such stress on, and a public expression of which his successor was clearly the man to make. Nothing is more certain than that the English nation requires to be led by her rulers, and that individual statesman who in clear succinct and sounding terms can convey a national resolve to the world, will succeed where equally well furnished minds conspicuously fail.

It is, indeed, difficult at this distance of time to discern the absolute cause which generated official



distrust in Canning; a feeling which led Prince Metternich to parody his policy and distrust his aims (*Autobiography of Metternich*, vol. iv.); which not only subsequently induced Grey to hold aloof in almost contemptuous, but by no means silent, opposition, but generated in the Great Duke of Wellington's mind a doubt which led to his own temporary retirement from office. Such unsympathetic withdrawal can scarcely have been prompted by personal motives, since we find it not only participated in by the above statesmen themselves differing strongly on public affairs, but shared alike by the contemplative Peel and the impressionable Ellenborough. And this phase of official feeling is the more remarkable, inasmuch as the views of Lord Londonderry and Mr. Canning, despite occasional divergence, had never differed in the main. It is, therefore, only possible to account for the above-mentioned distrust, by doubt generally felt amongst those responsible for public conduct as to the desirability of stirring popular appeals being made independently of traditional forms, and addressed in effect to that same class of society which the speaker unreservedly declined to enfranchise.

The Duke of Wellington when returning from Verona passed through Paris, and saw both Louis XVIII. and his minister Count Villele. He informed them as to the views of Lord Liverpool's Government, and urged the advantage to France of faithful adhesion to the British alliance. But it was in vain. French counsels had been deliberated over and their course decided on. A so-called corps of observation was stationed close to the

Pyrenees with the full and settled intention of advancing into Spain at an early opportunity and carrying succour to the Spanish King; and sadly did Ferdinand need the benefit of all the help that could be given him. He had finally succumbed to the superior generalship of the revolutionary leaders, and although the fair land of Spain was still all ablaze with revolt and rapine, the cause of legitimacy was lost unless it obtained external aid.

The King was a prisoner. His general had crossed the frontier into France, and it could but be a depressing state of things for an Englishman to contemplate the condition of that realm, for the welfare of which his country had but a few short years ago sacrificed so much. But the political position was to take a less satisfactory phase as contemplated from the point of view of any freedom-loving community. A French army under the Duke d'Angouleme crossed the frontier on the 7th of April 1823, and met with no opposition worthy of the name. They came, as the French King declared, invoking the God of St. Louis to preserve the throne of Spain to a descendant of Henry IV. to save that kingdom from ruin and to reconcile it to Europe.

In Paris, reasons totally differing had freely and openly been advanced; reasons which rested solely on expediency, and were adopted for the purpose of palliating permanent and notorious dynastic difficulties. Marshal Victor, the Minister of War, boldly avowed that the army, tired of the barrack and parade-ground, pined for active service, which it was desirable to secure at all hazards. No opposition worthy the name

was offered to the French, who swept the country up to the gates of Seville and liberated Ferdinand from his captivity. So void of all honour, however, was the Spanish monarch that he, there and then broke the promises which he had given to the Cortez. A violated amnesty was too much for the French Prince, who in disgust returned to Paris, leaving, however, the resources of Spain prostrate before France, the fortresses occupied by her soldiers, and the practical conjuncture of France and Spain effected, which it had been the object of British policy for at least a century to avert. It can be imagined that the Opposition in England were not slow to comment on this palpable failure of policy. Canning and Lord Liverpool had clearly been unable to secure Spain from foreign intervention and invasion.

If Lord Grey's advice had been taken, war would have, at least, been risked to avert it. But Canning convinced the House of Commons of the wisdom of a waiting policy in this case. "The circumstances in 1823 were entirely different to those existing in 1808. There was a previous state of war with France at the latter period, and our landing in the Peninsula to succour the patriots was but a military appearance on a new and advantageous stage. If we took the field afresh in 1823 it would probably be the signal for general European hostility towards the interests of England, and possibly the kindling of a general war."

Wise words, as the sequel proved, for it was not long before the French wished themselves out of Spain, notwithstanding that, on the whole, their reception

from the Spanish people had been friendly, and in some cases enthusiastic.

In France the war was held contemptible amongst military men, and unpopular with the lower orders, inasmuch as the Royalists alone rejoiced that a lance should be publicly broken on behalf of the right divine of kings.

Mr. Canning could scarcely have hoped for success in restraining France on this occasion, and his failure so to do was certainly not unanticipated. But, on the other hand, never was the orator's influence over Parliament so paramount, nor the beauty of his diction more apparent than during the year 1823.

In the autumn he evolved that celebrated piece of oratory which, in company with other choicer flights, have descended to become household words amongst future generations.

Speaking at Plymouth, he said: "Our ultimate object is the peace of the world; but let it not be said that we cultivate peace either because we fear, or because we are not prepared for war. The resources created by peace are the means of war. In cherishing these resources we but accumulate those means. Our present repose is no more a proof of our inability to act, than the state of inertness and inactivity in which I have seen those mighty masses that float in the waters above your town is a proof they are devoid of strength and incapable of being fitted for action. You well know how one of those stupendous masses now reposing on their shadows in perfect stillness, how soon, upon any call of patriotism or necessity, it would assume the

likeness of an animated thing, instinct with life and motion; how soon it would ruffle, as it were, its swelling plumage; how quickly it would put forth all its beauty and its bravery, collect its scattered elements of strength, and awake its dormant thunders. Such as is one of these magnificent machines when springing from inaction into a display of its strength, such is England herself, while apparently passive and motionless she silently causes power to be put forth on an adequate occasion."

The quotation has been given at length on account of its great beauty. Future narrations of oratorical perfection may contain passages of equal merit, when the records of a period which has produced a Bright have been treasured up; but nothing superior to the above quotation will ever meet the eye accustomed to revel amidst the choicest flowers of oratory, culled may be from the rich diction of Burke, the noble periods of Pitt and Fox, or the lofty eloquence of Chatham.

The year 1824 did not pass by without the Foreign Secretary's eloquent voice being uplifted on behalf of the poor slaves in British colonies, who still grovelled on in their servitude, notwithstanding all the interest taken in their cause at home. Abolition had, indeed, been proved to be a totally different thing from emancipation, as, at an early stage of discussion, Lord Sidmouth had forecasted. At Canning's instance and as the result of his proposition in the House of Commons, the traffic in slaves was denounced as piratical, the question thus reaching a distinct stage, which rendered anyone engaging in the trade liable to transportation.

In Greece the conflict between Turkey and her revolted

provinces was arousing the interest and sympathy of the civilised world. There can be no doubt that the action of England in South America, and the Antilles, re-animated hopes in Greece, which sympathy with freedom all over the world would naturally inspire. If slavery were worthy the condemnation and bitter hostility it engendered in a British breast, surely the events which were proved to have occurred in Greece and the Morea were calculated to appeal alike to the instincts of humanity.

News travelled but slowly in those days, and it was long before the fact became generally known that during the first year of the Greek insurrection, the island of Scio had, in April 1822, been nearly depopulated by the savagery of the incensed Moslems.

Even now few men realise that in an island where Christianity, civilisation, and education were slowly spreading through the population, 10,000 were only left out of a former total of 50,000 souls. That the reprisals were on a like scale, and equally hideous in their barbarity, brought no alleviation to the statesman's task.

The death of England's greatest modern poet, Lord Byron, at Missolonghi, where he had been preparing to draw his sword for the Greeks he had already encouraged by his presence and cheered by the sweetest song, increased the excitement, consequent on these revelations. Like the poet Körner,\* his death aroused latent

\* Körner died of his wounds near Mecklenburgh in 1813, fighting in the citizen army of Prussia; Byron, at Missolonghi, of fever caught in prosecution of his designs, April 19th, 1824.

sympathies for the cause on behalf of which he died.

- The imaginations of those to whom the former traditions of Grecian empire were familiar, became stirred to the very depths. Songs breathing most passionate enthusiasm, and at the same time the sweetest and tenderest emotion, had issued from the pen of the dead poet. He had himself given up all for the struggle, and then straightway arose a wave of irresistible opinion which no Government could disregard.

This was the genuine outpouring of revived national feeling—religion, life, and existence seemed at stake.

The eyes of those animated by these exalting ideas, were instinctively turned towards George Canning.

But he of all men knew best how this was a statesman's question, and that the shadow of war rested once more over Europe, and halted before the spectre of that war of opinions which he dreaded.

As Thiers has said of the Eastern Question, they are foolish and insane who pretend to divine it, and on this occasion England's minister was confronted with the most perplexing phase of that unfathomable diplomatic maze which Europe has ever been called on to unravel.

On the one hand was a desolating and apparently endless struggle, which humanity loudly called for a cessation of, a consummation only to be attained by the humiliation of one of the contending parties.

- If Turkey was to be considered as an independent nation, her right to the allegiance of her subjects was undoubted, and with the threatened overthrow of Sultan

Mahmoud's rule by Russia, there could only follow one possible issue, utterly and irretrievably disastrous to the interests of England.

It was, moreover, obviously imposing too flagrantly on the credibility of benevolent humanity to ask them to believe that the same Russian power desirous of crushing nascent liberties at the point of the bayonet in Spain, and ignoring them in South America, was fired with a disinterested love of liberty in the Morea.

In September 1824, died Louis XVIII. of France, a prince who had established his Government on a stable basis beyond all the expectations of those most competent to judge.

In the midst of national prosperity at home, and high commercial credit abroad, the year 1825 burst on England clouded, but by the unsettled condition of Spain and the east of Europe. So long as the French remained in the Peninsula, peace could not be assured any more than could a statesman look hopefully upon the unfathomable difficulties arising in European Turkey.

Lord Liverpool's Government continued to retain the support of a vast majority in either House of Parliament, the countenance of the Sovereign, and general acquiescence of the nation; in their policy at home and abroad.

How far such success was attributable to Mr. Canning's popularity it is difficult to decide; but no one who studies the Parliamentary debates will fail to recognise the power and talents which lent such strength to the Executive, and enticed others to render a support not strictly in unison with the lines of party.



The whole rank and file of the Grenville connection appear about this time to have adhered to Government. Lord Grenville, it is true, stood aloof in a kind of benevolent neutrality; but as the Duke of Buckingham observes, in his *History of the Regency*, "nothing but later traditional connection with the Whigs kept Pitt's old colleague from resuming his former politics."

Late in 1825 a panic overshadowed the money market in London. Never before or since has its like been seen, or such highly trusted financial establishments been overwhelmed without due warning. The causes of such unprecedented disasters are not within the province of this volume, but the acuteness of the crisis was such as to throw all others into the shade.

The Emperor Alexander I. of Russia about the same time laid down his life when on a journey of inspection at Taganrog.

Alexander I.'s character has been variously descanted on, and but sparsely understood. He was certainly at times in his career subject to fits of ambition, and once after the battle of Friedland Napoleon obtained an influence over him, which but for England and Canning's resolute opposition, might have proved fatal to European liberty. Afterwards when he gauged the true nature of the domination sought to be erected in Europe, and found that he was expected to act the part of a mere catspaw to Napoleon, his whole being revolted against such ignominy.

Although his policy was afterwards tinged with a desire to suppress rising freedom in Naples and Spain,

he promulgated measures at home for the relief of his serfs, and displayed from time to time a longing for constitutional government. Abroad the interests of Russia were never forgotten, and his conduct in the East, although non-aggressive as compared with his successors, necessarily led to that clashing of British and Russian interests which the circumstances rendered inevitable.

Still his memory will on the whole be connected in Great Britain with the great war of 1813, and his visit to the Prince Regent the following year remains an interesting event in our annals.

The year 1826 was one of anxiety for the British Government. Measures had to be taken to cope with the financial distresses of the preceding year.

Lord Liverpool and Canning, moreover, made another effort to inform the British West Indian colonists that the days of slavery in any form were doomed amongst us, and that all measures were to be directed towards a speedy manumission of slaves.

The improvement in treatment had already been very great, but the planter was to henceforth accustom his mind to the idea that the institution was to receive its death-blow whenever the Home Government saw its way to effecting the good purpose.

Towards the end of 1826 Portugal began to be in a disturbed condition. King John VI. had banished a younger son, Don Miguel, from his dominions; and the King dying when his heir, Don Pedro, was in the Brazils, a civil war sprang up as if over a disputed succession. By the laws of Portugal the retention of

the Brazilian kingdom (which he had decided on) disqualified Don Pedro from succeeding to the throne.

Pedro, however, straightway appointed a Regency under his daughter, Isabella Maria, and hoped thereby to preserve peace.

He also caused a Constitution to be proclaimed, which, accepted by the Infanta Isabella's advisers, was repudiated by a portion of the army, who broke out into open rebellion, finally crossing over the Spanish frontier, where they received sympathy and protection. The crisis was the more grave, inasmuch as more than one treaty bound England to defend Portugal from foreign attack.

At first it was proposed to send Lord Beresford out to take command of the Portuguese armies, and by his presence to instil confidence, and so prevent any actual invasion of the country.

But the French armies were still in Spain, and it was known that a party existed in favour of war with England. Such, however, Canning knew from the result of personal contact, was not the view of Count Villele, the French Minister, or, indeed, of Charles X., both of whom desired to get their armies out of Spain, and fish no more in those troubled waters.

But the crisis hourly grew more acute, and towards the end of the year it became evident that Spain at any rate was disposed to provoke a conflict with Portugal, for the purpose of destroying the Constitution and setting Don Miguel on the throne.

Two separate organised invasions of Portuguese territory took place, and the Lisbon Government

appealed to England for the help we were by treaty bound to afford.

Notwithstanding that neither Lord Liverpool nor Canning were well enough to be in town, when the necessity for action arose they promptly called the cabinet together, and in a fortnight's time a British force 6,000 strong, under Sir William Clinton, was on the seas bound for Lisbon.

Messages were sent down by the King to both Houses of Parliament announcing the event, whilst the justification thereof was left to the ever-eloquent Foreign Secretary. Once more was that grand voice heard appealing to the hearts of his hearers.

Never since Pitt and Fox had ceased to delight and instruct their countrymen had such oratory been heard in the British Senate. The doubters, if doubters there were, received fresh impulse. Taking his stand upon the sacred rights of treaties, Canning claimed for his country the highest position from the consciousness of her strength, but above all from her resolve to use it, if at all, for the benefit of humanity.

"It is one thing," he declared, "to have a giant's strength, but another to use it like a giant."

"Let us fly then," he said, "to the aid of Portugal, by whomsoever attacked, because it is our duty to do so; and let us cease our interference where that duty ends. We go to Portugal (in 1826) but to defend and preserve the independence of an ally.

"We go to plant the standard of England on the well-known heights of Lisbon. Where that standard is planted foreign dominion shall not come."

This policy proved thoroughly and entirely successful. Not a shot was fired, and Portugal was saved from the impending Spanish attack; the whole circumstance demonstrating the value of ready counsel in times of danger.

Canning was above all things the minister of action, and as such will ever be remembered amongst us.

But the anxieties of a British minister had by no means been confined to the Peninsula. Events in the east of Europe simply tended towards the disappearance of the Ottoman rule in general fury and disorder.

The new Emperor Nicholas of Russia was an avowed foe to Turkey, and gladly prepared to carry out the views of Peter the Great and Catherine. Not himself the elder son, he profited by his brother Constantine's renunciation of the succession. His coronation in 1825 was not, however, consummated without an insurrection of troops at Moscow, so that an additional reason existed for offering the distractions of foreign service to a numerous and dangerous soldiery. Ample excuse for interference, moreover, existed in the continued horrors perpetrated throughout the Greek provinces.

Events at Constantinople had likewise conspired to weaken the Sultan's defensive power. Sultan Mahmoud who was then the reigning sovereign, had seen clearly that his empire was in danger of disintegration, and conceived the idea that by the diffusing of European civilisation and a general reform of her institutions, civil and military, Turkey could alone be saved. This consummation he proceeded to carry out by vigorous measures, and, whilst in process of creating a new army, destroyed, during June 1826, the power of the

janissaries, or old infantry of Turkey, who arose in insurrection against him.

Mahmoud being made aware of the intentions of Russia, stoutly refused to yield to the Greeks or voluntarily agree to the severance of an ~~acre~~ <sup>acre</sup> from his dominions. Looking, as he certainly did, with kindly eye on his Christian subjects, he yet savagely declined to treat with Greece as an incipient power.

The struggle was fast drifting into one between Christian and Moslem, in which the former element must have straightway prevailed but for the succour sent to Mahmoud by his nominal vassal the famous Mehemet Ali, whose son, Ibrahim, developed military talents, and with them a barbarity which served his master's cause but ill.

When it came to be proclaimed that religion was at stake, and that Europe generally was in league against the Turkish nation, a general uprising took place at Constantinople, in August 1826, 6,000 houses were burned, and a massacre of Christians ensued. It has been calculated by Sir Archibald Alison, that one way and another during the Greek struggle for independence, the Christians who fell did not fall short of a hundred thousand.

The last months of Lord Liverpool's Government, passed in anxiety and uncertainty, which it was found impossible to allay by diplomatic arts; and although these dark clouds on the horizon were tempered by the brighter vision of secured peace nearer home, George Canning was destined to close the era of his second Foreign Secretaryship without finding a solution of the

statesman's spectre, that much dreaded and never ending Eastern Question. But he established a reputation for singular diplomatic address.

England's object, to use the Prime Minister's own words, was to let the Porte down easily in the matter of Greece, where concession must sooner or later have ensued. Canning, moreover, resolved to do so in such a manner that Russia's excuse to attack Turkey should be removed.

He induced surrender in the matter of Black Sea trade and the recognition of the Danubian Principalities.

These advantages were gained for Russia by Treaty at Akerman in September 1826. On that occasion the Muscovite plenipotentiaries positively secured the acceptance of the convention in question by secretly engaging not to interfere in the affairs of Greece.

Judge then the astonishment of Sultan Mahmoud, when he afterwards discovered that by a pre-engagement with France and England, entered into by the Duke of Wellington for Great Britain at St. Petersburg, and dated April 1826, the principle of such interference had already been affirmed, and the independence of Greece thereby assured. (This engagement is known in modern history as the Protocol of St. Petersburg). Without denying that the horror of the conflict demanded its cessation, the perfidious conduct of Russia should stand as a warning to all engaged in negotiations with her concerning Turkey and the East.

The ultimate outcome was so disastrous to England, that the action of Canning in the matter should be the

closer scanned to show how he at least, with all his scholarly sympathy for Greece, and hatred of barbarity, never lost sight of British interests until, alas, the magician's wand was wrested from his hands by death, and amongst his friends none remained able to wield it.

In the first place so skilful and patient was Canning's diplomacy, that after much delay France and Russia threw the framing of a protocol into British hands, and so gained diplomatic recognition of Greek belligerent rights. His secretary, Mr. A. G. Stapleton, tells us how, in the earlier stages of the Greek contest, Mr. Canning respected Turkish independence, but that when Ibrahim Pacha's scheme for devastating the Morea became known, English mediation was offered.\* Canning justified such interference only on the ground of preventing a Christian people from extermination, and devised the Treaty of London with full assurance of its operating so as to estop Russian territorial aggrandisement. This having been specially set forth by the diplomatic documents, which led to the protocol of St. Petersburg, was endorsed by the Duke of Wellington, when negotiating that instrument, upon which the famous treaty of London was founded in July 1827.

The Duke distinctly says, Mr. Canning and the British Government, did not intend there should be a battle; †

\* *Quarterly Review*, vol. liii. p. 286.

† *Political Life of Canning*, vol. iii. p. 254.

‡ *Wellington Supplementary Despatches*, vol. vii. p. 71.



and Lord Dudley (who as Foreign Secretary at the time knew best of anyone) subsequently told Lord Ellenborough that Canning never suggested force for the purpose of carrying out the Treaty of London, but that it had been rendered difficult to publicly fix that stigma upon those who certainly brought it about, viz. the Russians.\*

The Russian correspondence has since proved that Nicholas desired war, and, as the Duke of Wellington believed, the destruction of the Turkish fleet, and at a moment when he had authorised the Duke to tell the Turks that he would never make war for the Greeks if they made the other concession he demanded.

The Turkish Government, on their part, were guilty of a gross breach of faith, which has gone far towards placing them on a moral level with their foe, when they positively admitted, as they subsequently did, that the Treaty of Akerman had only been signed by them to gain time, and with a secret determination to repudiate obnoxious clauses.

Conduct such as this helped to play Russia's game, one equally disingenuous, it is true, but not so avowed to be. As Sir Archibald Alison remarks, such acts of perfidy are, unfortunately, to be found in European history, but never before openly acknowledged by the party signing a treaty.

Knowledge of the double game played by Russia at Akerman, and subsequently to that treaty, cannot excuse

\* Lord Ellenborough's *Diary*, vol. i. p. 28.

Sultan Mahmoud and his advisers for conduct which has gone far to alienate western opinion from the gallant compatriots who afterwards died at Silistria and Plevna.

We, however, are here chiefly interested in the fact that the British ministers, by combining England, France and Russia in the original protocol, forced Russia to observe a moderation as regards Greece when signing the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829. But for Canning's foresight in this matter the dismemberment of Turkey might have been proceeded with, and a general European war have ensued, such as, from the nature of circumstances, is likely to occur whenever the possession of Constantinople is in dispute.

So far as Metternich was concerned, one of the wisest things he ever did, in the Duke of Wellington's opinion, was to arm his country before the war commenced, and so protect the German and Danubian interests, which most undoubtedly would have suffered at the hands of a youthful emperor, flushed with victory and at the head of a million of men.

The verdict of history has, on the whole, been just to the second foreign administration of George Canning. His resolute love of freedom found natural expression in the fulfilment of his colleagues' preconceived resolutions. And this fact should not, in justice to all, be lost sight of whilst extolling the courage and genius of the popular minister himself—for popular in the best sense of the term he surely was when, on the resignation of his honoured chief, Lord Liverpool, in February 1827, he at last attained to the highest point of a

subject's ambition, and became Prime Minister of England. But the honours came too late. At the Duke of York's funeral in January 1827, Mr. Canning had caught a cold from the effects of which never he really recovered. The weather was exceedingly cold, and with characteristic unselfishness the Foreign Secretary placed the only available footstool so that old Lord Eldon should have the use of it. In so doing, it followed that he had himself to stand on the cold stones of St. George's Chapel. Even previous to this *contemps*, Canning had evinced delicacy of constitution, and Sir Henry Holland attended him at Brighton during a temporary rest from the duties of office.

The malady to which he became liable was a rheumatic affection, for which quiet of mind and body was desirable, and in this state of public affairs an impossibility. When, therefore, at the retirement of Lord Liverpool, valued colleagues were seen deserting the new Prime Minister and he found himself, as he believed, unjustly judged by those from whom he had reason to expect support and confidence, the vexation of the situation half overwhelmed him. Although outwardly he stood to his work without shrinking, the iron had, indeed, entered into that too sensitive soul.

The subjoined letter from Mr. Canning to Lord Bexley was written during the formation of the Administration of the former statesman. Lord Bexley had consented to join on the understanding that Government was carried on on similar principles to those which guided Lord Liverpool :—

"F. O.,

"April 15th, 1827.

"DEAR LORD BEXLEY,

"I cannot deny myself the pleasure of letting you know that I have submitted to the King your letter of yesterday, and that His Majesty expressed the greatest satisfaction at your prompt and frank acquiescence in the proposition which I am commanded to make to you.

"His Majesty particularly desires me to say to you that if *all* the elements of Lord Liverpool's Administration are not kept together, it is no fault of His Majesty, nor of mine. His Majesty still trusts that this will be the result, but His Majesty felt the directness of your letter the more sensibly from my having to lay before His Majesty at the same time with yours, one or two answers of a less decided and explicit character.

"Believe me ever, dear Lord Bexley,

"Most sincerely yours,

"GEORGE CANNING.

"I shall be very glad to see you, but we shall meet at Wynne's to-day at dinner."

The writer has seen the whole correspondence between Mr. Canning and Lord Bexley on this occasion, which, telling as it does the story of the minister's difficulties, has an interest no lover of history will gainsay. After the above letter had been written Lord Bexley saw prominent opponents of Catholic Emancipation deserting Canning, and for a moment seemed appalled at the prospect of being left alone as what was in those days termed a Protestant amongst colleagues unlikely to agree to the question remaining open, as it was in the cabinet

of Lord Liverpool. But King George IV.—notwithstanding his well-known Protestant opinions—loyally supported Canning, and induced Lord Bexley to remain in the new Government. During these difficulties Mr. Canning's perplexity is plainly visible, as may be seen from the correspondence now in the possession of Mr. John Thornton, of 7, Ondon Gardens (Lord Bexley's representative), through whose kindness the author has been allowed to lithograph the two letters of Lord Castlereagh and Mr. Canning.

In one letter the worried minister tells us of the partial success of his negotiations with the ~~W~~ings and the consequent adhesion of the Duke of Devonshire. In another he speaks of his despair of finding a Home Secretary, first arranging that Lord Bexley should temporarily hold the seals, which finally were taken by Mr. Sturges Bourne. The letter given at length above best characterises the spirit in which both the King and his illustrious Prime Minister acted. and it is impossible not to arise from contemplation thereof without profound sympathy for the harassed man of genius, and an improved opinion of his well-abused Sovereign.

The disturbing character of the deliberations in question is manifest even in the very handwriting in which the above letter is penned, and doubtless justified the anxiety which Lord Teignmouth saw written in Canning's countenance when, to use that nobleman's words, he had assumed the thorny crown which cost him his life, and was in a carriage on his way to Windsor, looking, indeed, as if the shadow of death had passed over him.

Lord Teignmouth is a great observer of all the scenes

through which he has passed, and his *Reminiscences* contain passages of varied interest. His opinion of Mr. Canning's eloquence was very high. Speaking of its classic beauty of elocution and gracefulness of manner, he instances a passage in a speech made at the close of the great war, as having appealed most to his own feelings and fastened itself on the recollection: — "The subsidence of the deluge, and the consequent re-appearance of spires and pinnacles of ancient establishments, which towered once more above the waters," was the subject out of which the orator's art wrought such mystical memories.

Thrown by force of necessity half into the rival camp, it became, in 1827, necessary to recruit Government ranks with the more moderate members of the Whig party, whose talents marked them out as fit for the purpose. But of English politicians the more famous of either party were unfriendly to Mr. Canning's Premiership. That they misunderstood the general scope of his policy few will now doubt.

But our brilliant orator had never been able to restrain his ready wit, and hidden behind the most sparkling epigram might often be found a sting—such as left its mark behind. For instance, at an early part of the great statesman's career, when he desired Pitt to replace Addington, he remarked: "Pitt is to Addington as London to Paddington," a terse but effective summing-up of the matter at issue, which must have wounded in a quarter where, in after years, the witty politician himself learned to respect. Again, when in the *Anti-Jacobin* he gave rein to his feeling against the proverbial "candid

friend," it is difficult to believe that some individual delinquent was not writhing under the covert sarcasm of his brilliant foe.

"Much may be said on both sides; hark! I hear  
A well-known voice that murmurs in my ear:  
The voice of Candour. Hail! most solemn sage,  
Thou drivelling virtue of the moral age."

"Too nice to praise by wholesale or to blame,  
Convinced that all men's motives are the same,  
And finds, with keen discriminating sight,  
Black's not so black, nor white so very white."

"Give me th' avowed, th' erect, the manly foe.  
Bold I can meet, perhaps may turn his blow:  
But of all plagues, good Heaven, thy wrath can send,  
Save, save, oh save me from the candid friend."

It is told of Canning that a clergyman desiring to flatter, shortened his sermon in order to indulge an assumed dislike for lengthy discourses.

"I took care to avoid being long and dull," remarked the parson after service. "You were not *long*," was the only vouchsafed reply, as, with a twinkle in his eye, the statesman left his friend to ponder over the implied rebuke, meant, doubtless, as a protest against distinction of persons in the house of God.

In the same way, many a witticism levelled in the heat of debate had conveyed the orator's rebuke to an opponent, and rankled as such well-directed shafts are wont to do.

The most powerful invective, with all its immediate

and striking effect, leaves no such permanent sear on the memory, and, therefore, creates the less enmity.

That Canning suffered the lot of all who both possess and use this fatal charm of sarcasm, history brings the reader clearly to perceive.

When the debates in Parliament proved the existence of virulent personal feeling against himself, he had neither the stolidity of disposition enabling him to disregard such matters, nor the strength to bear the consequent vexation.

He retired to Chiswick a worried and harassed man, and, overtaken by an acute attack of his former ailment, succumbed on August 8th, 1827.

Deep was the national grief, for all could see that a great mind had gone from amongst them—one who, if not free from natural weaknesses, was yet supremely gifted. Prominent amongst English orators stood his name. Famous alike had been his wisdom in directing British counsels, and with them the fate of Europe and the world.

Through his ready action the conspiracy of Tilsit was deprived of its sting, and liberty allowed to occupy a portion of the stage on which he afterwards encouraged her action.

Such was the man who, under the same roof where Fox's last breath had been drawn, sank to the rest denied him on earth.\*

Canning's temperament cannot be described as a

~ August 1827.



happy one. A kind of restless impatience impelled him to intrigue in politics. He felt his power, and could not bear for a moment to be surpassed in the race; he would sooner cease to be a competitor altogether. Unfriendly critics termed this weakness of temperament, vanity.

Without for a moment endorsing ~~ing~~ such judgment, it is impossible not to allow that Canning failed to conciliate where others of inferior genius had succeeded—succeeded, that is, in reconciling the same men steeped in similar prejudices, who, in his case, refused to listen to the eloquent voice of the charmer.

It is curious to contemplate that of the three greater English intellects who were engaged in the service of England in 1827, two, viz. Lord Wellesley and Mr. Canning, were subject to this constitutional sensitiveness, whilst a third, the great Duke of Wellington, was of sturdier stuff, caring little what men might say or think, so long as his own conscience was satisfied.

The time has arrived when we should garner in all that can be told us of this great minister, for during 1880 two voices have become silent, either of which could have enlightened us with many an interesting detail. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe and Mr. A. G. Stapleton have both passed away. The first, the playmate and early friend, probably knew Canning's diplomatic aims. As his confidential secretary and political biographer, Mr. Stapleton must have possessed secrets scarcely less valuable.

The English nation's loss through Canning's premature death can scarcely be gauged correctly, but his

latter union with moderate Whig opinion must presumably have led to gradual reform in our institutions.

True it is, that not only he but several prominent colleagues were hostile to a reduction of the franchise, but undoubtedly the fast-changing times would have led to corresponding modifications of opinion. We know that when taken to a dinner for the purpose of tasting a new champagne, Canning declared that the man who said he liked it dry would say anything. But we believe that as if not his taste, at least his opinion in this matter, would have become modified, so would the Conservative feeling in favour of a restricted franchise have yielded to the wholesome and moderate influence of colleagues such as Palmerston and Harrowby.

It is well-known that his advent to power made Catholic emancipation certain to take early effect. It is reasonable, therefore, to believe that he would have exerted himself to fulfil other unfinished parts of Pitt's Constitutional programme.

The Constitution might thus have been spared the rough wrench it received in 1832.

More than one instance has been given in these pages of the matchless imagery by means of which Canning was wont to fix his speeches on the human memory. By means of these flowers of oratory it happens that we know phrases of George Canning's and have little by which to remember men at least his equal in the Senate. Brougham, for instance, never was surpassed in hostile debate by any man before or since, but the oratorical charm, appealing to the commonest understanding, has not in his case communicated itself so markedly to posterity.

When Canning desired to impress upon the House of Commons the undesirability and absurdity of sustaining disabilities against the Roman Catholics, he drew a picture of the Duke of Norfolk performing his duties as Earl Marshal of England at George IV.'s coronation, then just concluded :—

“Do you imagine,” said he, “it never occurred to the representatives of Europe, that, contemplating this imposing spectacle, it never likewise occurred to the ambassadors of Catholic Austria, of Catholic France, or of states more bigoted—if any there be—to the Catholic religion, to reflect that the moment this solemn ceremony was over, the Duke of Norfolk would become deprived of his privileges amongst his fellow-peers, stripped of his robes of office, which were to be laid aside until the distant—be it a very distant—day when the coronation of a successor to the present gracious Sovereign should again call him forth to assist at a similar solemnisation. Thus, after being exhibited to the peers and people of England, to the representatives of princes and nations of the world, the Duke of Norfolk—highest in rank amongst the peers—the Lord Clifford, and others like him, representing a long line of illustrious and heroic ancestors, appeared as if they had been called forth and furnished for the occasion, like the lustres and banners which glittered and flamed in the scene. But with the pageantry of the hour their importance faded away, and he who headed the procession to-day could not sit among them as their equal to-morrow.”

A Bill was passed through Parliament allowing the Catholic Duke of Norfolk to perform the duties of Earl

Marshal of England, but left his political status otherwise untouched. Mr. Canning's forcible and glowing language depicts the case in all its naked injustice and absurdity, without venturing on extreme or highly-coloured statement.

Moreover, his almost Tory love for the heraldic ceremonial appertaining to those who inherited such customs from mediæval times, displays in Mr. Canning's mind a strong passion for what Bacon terms "the true antiquity of time."

We may be quite sure he would not have been found endeavouring to deprive us of the pomp and lustre of our national ceremonies, or an advocate of a Lord Mayor's Show degraded to such a commonplace level that the good citizens of London do not care to walk across the street to behold what is fast becoming the shadow of its former splendour.

No life of Mr. Canning, be it either short or long, is complete without a frank admission that towards the close of his life officialism at home and abroad looked askance at an undisputed pre-eminence, and dreaded the results of counsel misjudged, may be, from the very sway of its eloquence. This is specially made evident in the later political biographies dealing with the period during which he was at the Foreign Office as afterwards at the Treasury.

The reason for such confidence being wanting in quarters where every opportunity of observing had been enjoyed, need not be sought for in vain.

Mr. Canning's friends latterly claimed for him a position entirely independent of that official society

amongst the members of which the great orator's life had been mainly passed. It was as the leader of the remnant who learnt their traditions under Pitt that Canning climbed to the position of Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister. Therefore, when former colleagues heard the name of Canning used out of doors as a rallying-point for revolutionary doctrines such as the minister's whole former life had been spent in endeavouring to controvert, and which he would have at all times repudiated, they were not slow to resent a monopoly of true Liberal principles which we are confident Mr. Canning never presumed to claim. Beyond the lessons which he had himself learned from Pitt, Canning never desired himself to move or to impel others.

His assumption of Lord Castlereagh's maxims of foreign policy proved this, and there is no more exploded theory in modern history than that of the new departure which was supposed to have been made after Lord Castlereagh's death.

On the other hand Mr. Canning undoubtedly did see that the times in which he lived were fast changing, and that appeals to the mind and intelligence of mankind alone could consolidate maxims of wisdom and forethought which were not the outcome of one mind alone, but had descended from Pitt himself, and received the passing emphasis from Canning which extraordinary powers allowed him to disseminate. His immediate object, as expressed to Sir W. Knighton, in 1827, was to make George IV. the head of Europe, instead of being reckoned fifth in a great confederacy. Herein, indeed, was the spirit of Pitt displayed.

The people, then, who relied with enthusiastic and un-reasoning belief on the genius of Canning to inaugurate a new era amongst them, must be forgiven their natural admiration of the talents of one who could, however, never be severed entirely from the old school which had Pitt in life and Pitt's memory after death as the guiding star of action. It was, then, but in accordance with the ordinary dictates of human nature that Wellington, Peel, and Ellenborough should hesitate to follow after what they believed to be but a political Will-o'-the-wisp, as to the precise direction of whose course no security could be taken, little opining that, as events proved, this great contemporary was really a man seeing beyond his own times. On the other hand, Lord Grey beheld popular opinion swayed by one whose maxims of domestic policy he had ever opposed as restrictive, and against whose foreign policy the Whig Earl's conduct had been one long protest.

One has but to read Lord Malmesbury's *Diaries* and learn the manner in which Canning's policy was bound up with the ideas of older times, to realise moreover (notwithstanding his popular sympathies) how thoroughly the earlier part of the nineteenth century must claim George Canning as its own. The minister who, as Sir George Jackson tells us, in 1808, desired to place around his political standard names which might show his was no parvenu's rule, can scarcely claim sympathy with the fierce democracy which forced the doubting hands of Grey and Brougham, landing us, doubtless, on our present vantage ground, whence, however, impelled to move by a power we may not, cannot control, some of us

yet dread a compulsory advance into regions of darkness, whose secrets are hidden but in the abyss of time.

The decline of Mr. Canning's health and his subsequent death have been pathetically described by his physician, Sir Henry Holland. As previously narrated, the popular baronet had seen the then Foreign Secretary at Brighton when, just before Lord Liverpool's seizure,\* he was confined to his room by the first attack of rheumatic gout, a recurrence of which in an exaggerated form two years later his constitution was unable to bear. The indescribable charm of voice which Mr. Canning possessed delighted alike in private conversation as in the House of Commons, and seems to have remained in his possession until the close of his life. On his death-bed at Chiswick, he remarked quietly to Sir Henry Holland, "I have struggled against this long, but it has conquered me at last." When the physicians saw Mr. Canning for the last time (relates Mr. Percy Fitzgerald, in his *Life of George IV.*), he was in pain, and exclaimed "My God, my God!"

Dr. Farre observed, by way of telling him of his danger, "You do right, sir, to call upon your God. I hope that you pray to Him in secret." "I do, I do," was the answer, "and ask for mercy through the merits of Jesus Christ," a reliance quite justifying Mr. Wilberforce's formerly expressed belief that Canning had never

\* It is remarkable how Sir H. Holland bears testimony to Lord Liverpool's anxiety for Canning's return to health as a matter of vital importance to his Government.

been led into carelessness in such matters by constant debating and preoccupation, a conviction, moreover, which possessed the philanthropist after seeing the statesman moved to tears by Dr. Chalmers' impressive eloquence. We have thus presented to us a glorious combination of religion, genius, courage, and natural nobility possessed by that suffering frame, released from which soon soared away to happier realms one of the grandest spirits which ever guided the destinies of England.

Well may the writers on either side of politics study to carry out Canning's ideas and school themselves in his teachings. In some sort he was a man beyond his time, but his high soul was the same in character that animated Chatham before him, and which burned in the breast of his favourite model, the younger Pitt, and rendered their names dear to every Englishman's heart.

The funeral of Mr. Canning in Westminster Abbey was nominally a private one, but a vast crowd pressed on the closed doors after the sad procession passed by. Following close on his father's remains was a boy of thirteen years old, whose overwhelming grief attracted the sympathy of all beholders. That youth rose to be Governor-General of India, and we know that with a portion of his father's talents he inherited his noble character.

Canning lies in Westminster Abbey, close to the graves of Pitt, Fox, and Londonderry. In the same tomb repose the ashes of his wife and of that son above mentioned, who as Indian Viceroy wrestled ably with



the greatest danger that has ever threatened England's Eastern possessions.

His renown was, therefore, gained where his father's genius had formerly been destined to shine.

Two statues of Mr. Canning adorn the metropolis ; one stands outside Westminster Abbey, looking across the open space towards Palace Yard and the scenes of his former triumphs. The other is placed close to the statesman's own grave.

This chapter can scarcely be closed more fittingly than by the touching verses traced by the loving and able hand of the Right Hon. J. W. Croker : —

“ Farewell, bright spirit, brightest of the bright,  
Concentrated blaze of intellectual light,  
Who show'd alone, or in the first degree,  
Union so apt, such rich variety,—  
Taste guiding mirth, and sport enlivening sense,  
Wit, wisdom, poetry, and eloquence :  
Profound and playful, amiable and great,  
And first in social life, as in the State :  
*Not wholly lost.* thy lettered fame shall tell  
A part of what thou wast. Farewell, farewell.

“ Farewell, great statesman, whose elastic mind  
Clung round thy country, yet embraced mankind,  
Who in the most appalling storms, whose power  
Shook the round world, was equal to the hour ;  
Champion of measured Liberty, whence springs  
The mutual strength of people and of kings,  
'Twas thine like Chatham's patriot task to wield  
The people's force, yet be the monarch's shield :  
*Not wholly lost,* for both the worlds shall tell  
• Thy history in theirs. Farewell, farewell.

Farewell, dear friend, in all relations dear,  
In all we love, or honour, or revere,  
Son, husband, father, master, patron, friend,  
What varied grief and gratitude we blend.  
We who beheld, when pain's convulsive start  
Disturbed the frame, it could not change the heart;  
We whose deep pangs to soften and console  
Were the last efforts of thy flying soul:  
*Not wholly lost*, our faith and feelings tell  
That we shall meet again. Farewell, farewell."



## LORD DUDLEY.

APRIL 1827 TO MAY 1828.



HEN Mr. Canning became Prime Minister, Lord Dudley was one of the influential politicians who followed his fortunes.

The reward of such fidelity was a splendid one, consisting as it did of the direction of foreign affairs, coupled with an earldom. It was upon no ordinary individual, however, that these honours were showered.

Born to great wealth, and heir to a viscountcy, Mr. Ward received the education of a recluse. This being contrary to all the instincts of his generous nature, injured his health, by throwing him too constantly into the society of books when a natural predilection for literature should have been blended with the harmless distractions incident to boyhood.

The Earl was himself fully aware of this disadvantage, and envied the Eton life which his friend and political



Lord Dudley.



model, George Canning, had never ceased to extol. Whatever may be urged on behalf of the private tutor's system, it failed notoriously in Lord Dudley's case, and but for the wise course marked out for the youth at Oriel College, Oxford, by the famous Dr. Copleston, afterwards Bishop of Llandaff, the career destined to prove so distinguished might, and probably would, have been lost to the country.

At the University new interests and warm friendships enhanced the ordinary charms of life, and it is not on everyone that these delights of college life burst with the freshness experienced by the future Foreign Secretary. Dr. Copleston from the first seems to have understood the peculiarity of his pupil's former training, and to have perceived the latent power possessed by the already lettered youth.

Study, and a love for the classics in particular, had become engrained into the nature of the man, so that all his friends and well-wishers could do to prevent over application was to lighten such toil by direction of the course of reading, and above all by encouraging the natural social vein which proved so important an element in Lord Dudley's character.

A subsequent course of training which the subject of this biography received at Edinburgh under Professor Dugald Stewart, appears to have strengthened his understanding and developed his character.

There he was the fellow-pupil of Lord Palmerston and Lord Lansdowne, and established a friendship with those eminent individuals which survived the turmoils of political life.

Contact with such men as these could not but lead to the application of the learning acquired in their company to the more practical questions of the day. When, then, Mr. Ward in natural cause, and in accordance with the custom of his times, entered Parliament, it was soon evident that his talents were of no ordinary description.

He was at first what has been often described as a good listener. He contented himself with an attentive observation of all the arguments put forward by Pitt, Fox, Sheridan, Windham, and Canning.

From the first he was fascinated by the noble and dignified periods of Pitt, and contracted a habit of repeating the more eloquent passages to a select circle of friends, in the performance of which act of reproduction the manner of the master himself was wonderfully portrayed.\*

But his own style in the House was modelled more exclusively on classical forms of composition, and as appeals to the passions of his hearers were made entirely subsevient to refined and logical argument, neither natural fluency or a pleasant manner could atone for the lack of necessary force, a requisite which all great speakers in Parliament have within certain limits possessed, or been led to stoop to the adoption of lower

\* A greater politician than Lord Dudley was accustomed to act in like manner, and when his father in despair said to a friend, "What am I to do with this fellow, constantly repeating Pitt's speeches at home?" "Why, put him into Parliament," was the reply. The result being Peel, the statesman and orator.

oratorical arts against which Lord Dudley's pure taste would have recoiled.

Throughout life a certain constitutional and nervous melancholy pervaded Lord Dudley's path, and led to the adoption of travel as a means of distraction, an advantage which he made the mode of constant acquisition of knowledge such as with his retentive memory never forsook him. Thus it happened that he had a well-considered opinion on all matters of foreign and domestic policy throughout the crisis of the nineteenth century.

In common with Lord Grenville, and many of his more instructed fellow-countrymen, he despaired of British success in Spain, and feared the subjugation of the country by the French to be at the best but deferred. He had, however, the orthodox horror of Napoleon's rule, and in home and foreign politics seems to have at first followed Pitt's system of government, together with the majority of thinking and instructed Englishmen of his time.

Afterwards, however, he inclined towards the party of Lord Grenville rather than of Pitt's friends, and we hear of him as in opposition to the Duke of Portland's Government, and rejoicing in a good upstanding party fight; such at least says Mr. R. P. Ward, a namesake but no relation to our hero, in his famous political recollections.

With regard to Reform the young statesman told Dr. Copleston that the Reformers were lucky to get themselves so called, begging thereby the whole matter in dispute.

Moreover, his argument put forward in the House of



Commons, on May 20th, 1817, is as fresh and pertinent in 1881 as when first delivered. He showed on that occasion that neither universal suffrage nor annual Parliaments could claim the antiquity insisted on for them, inasmuch as the ancient council of the nation consisted of earls, bishops, barons, and mitred abbots, and might assemble *annually*, but could not, from the nature of its composition, be *new*. Graphically, moreover, did he describe the Reformers' paradise as a condition of affairs where discord and wars would cease, taxes become few, no useless talkers, called orators, be found in Parliament, no over-grown pirates and plunderers called generals and admirals exist, no Pitts, no Nelsons, no Wellingtons flourish, no underhand influence, no corrupt sympathy between the two Houses of Parliament be afoot. We have heard similar prognostications used for hustling purposes in our times, but their fulfilment seems as far off as on the day that Mr. Ward made the speech, wherein he declared was contained all he had to say on the matter, and which, we believe, is correctly reported in *Hansard* for May 1817.

In 1825 the future Foreign Secretary first took his seat in the House of Lords moving the Address in a world-renowned speech, of which, a reliable copy having been preserved, we transcribe an extract in a later portion of this memoir. The *Annual Register* for 1825 says that Lord Dudley on this occasion displayed the same ingenuity and precision of thought with the same elegance of style which had so often pleased and instructed the House of Commons. . . .

Notwithstanding early differences of opinion with

Mr. Pitt's friends, Mr. J. W. Ward had allied himself latterly to Mr. Canning's political party, and faithful he remained throughout his career in the House of Lords.

Lord Dudley's social qualities made him a charming companion, notwithstanding a constitutional tendency to fits of abstraction, which came upon him when in company with those unable to sympathise with and understand his feelings.

In foreign affairs, as connected with the times of his elevation to high office, he stood as the incarnation of English educated sympathy for Greece and the Greeks.

This tendency led, when out of office, to the beholding of this subject rather from the ideal point of view, to the exclusion of graver questions of policy.

We have no desire to re-open any controversy here as to the wisdom of the naval demonstration which led to Navarino.

The course of events after Mr. Canning's death were guided by Lord Goderich and his colleagues, with an honest desire to gather the fruits of Canning's diplomacy, inasmuch as the protocol on which the subsequent treaty of London was founded, undoubtedly required an immediate armistice as an indispensable condition preparatory to negotiation.

How to secure this became the difficulty, and it was this secret, doubtless solved in his own mind by Canning, which his late colleagues failed to discover.

It is absurd to believe, as some have affected to do, that Navarino and the consequent defenceless condition of Turkey was desired by Mr. Canning, whose whole career gives the lie to such absurdity, even if Lord Ellenborough's

lately published *Diary* did not show Lord Dudley to have testified distinctly to the contrary.

The man who had all his life opposed himself to foreign aggression on English interests, was not likely to further the domination of the Euxine by Russian fleets, which, in the state of the notorious national relations existing between the two nations, must of necessity have led to the very invasion of Turkey we were striving to avert.

The question of the desirability of coercion as applied to reprehensible and uncivilised conduct in a minor state, which exists merely on sufferance, is not here at issue. The impossibility of laying down any hard and fast line on the subject is apparent equally with the disastrous nature of the results which followed on Navarino.

In July 1827, about a month before Mr. Canning's death, the following determination was arrived at, and led immediately to the formal ratification of the Treaty of London.

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain, His Majesty the King of France, and His Majesty the Emperor of Russia. penetrated with the necessity of putting an end to the sanguinary contest which, by delivering up the Greek provinces and the isles of the Archipelago to all the disorders of anarchy, produces daily fresh impediments to the commerce of the United States, and gives occasion to piracies, which not only expose the high contracting Powers to considerable losses, but besides render necessary burdensome measures of protection and repression ; having besides received on

the part of the Greeks a pressing request to interpose their mediation with the Ottoman Porte, and being animated by the desire of stopping the effusion of blood, and of arresting the evils of all kinds which might arise from the continuance of such a state of things, have resolved to unite their efforts, and to regulate the operation thereof by a formal treaty, with a view for the re-establishment of peace between the contending parties by means of an arrangement called for by humanity and European repose."

The increased horror of the conflict in the Morea clearly justified decisive measures of some kind, and the Treaty of London, as devised by Canning, appears to have been an instrument forged in the cause of humanity.

To statemanship was left the protection of our national interests.

Not only did Ibrahim Pacha contemplate the removal of all the male population of the Morea into Egypt, there to be sold as slaves, but he actually commenced the execution of his scheme.

Moreover, when thwarted by the united squadrons, and unable to evade the terms of the armistice in which he had concurred, Ibrahim proceeded to gain his ends by an absolute extermination of the Christian inhabitants, so that by wholesale murder, pillage, and devastation,\* he might render the Morea an uninhabitable desert.

The allied naval commanders had been somewhat mystified by the character of the orders transmitted to

\* The trees were actually destroyed by the Egyptians.—James' *Naval History*, vol. vi. p. 476.

them, and the British admiral, Sir Edward Codrington, being supreme in command, applied to Mr. Stratford Canning, British ambassador at Constantinople, for his opinion.

That distinguished diplomatist (afterwards Lord Stratford de Redcliffe) replied as follows:—"You are not to take part with either belligerents, but you are to interpose your force between them, and to keep your peace with the speaking-trumpet if possible, but in case of necessity with that which is used for the maintenance of a blockade against friends and foes, I mean *force*." \*

In another private letter Mr. Stratford Canning tells the British admiral that although he was to avoid, if possible, anything that might bring on a war, yet the prevention of supplies was ultimately to be enforced, if necessary, and when all other means were exhausted, by *cannot-shot*.

The admiral has been blamed by those who reprobated the unfortunate ruin of the Turkish Marine, as if by a perverse misinterpretation of orders he had contributed to bring about the untoward event.

The facts, speaking for themselves, give contradiction to any such unhealthy shifting of responsibility. Codrington had seen enough to know that Ibrahim would, if possible, evade the armistice, and carry through his barbarous plan, and that a winter blockade of the

\* Letter of Mr. Stratford Canning to Sir E. Codrington. James' *Naval History*, vol. vi. p. 472.

Morean ports was impossible on that wild and inhospitable coast.

It was under these circumstances, then, that having seen the Turko-Egyptian fleet safe into the bay of Navarino, he resolved to follow them to the anchorage, and so blockade the entrance to the bay.

The vessels seem to have got to rather close quarters, and the Turks, believing their destruction was resolved on, were not slow, on October 20th, 1827, to commence an action which soon became general.

The Turkish fleet, drawn up in crescent form, could concentrate their fire on a limited space, and resistance was prolonged beyond the time that might have been expected.

For four hours did the contest rage, and the ruin of the Sultan's fleet, if not complete, was at least destructive to his power of keeping the seas against any one of the allied nations.

The Turkish fleet contained only three sail of the line, against eleven of their opponents. Some of the frigates were, however, powerful two-deckers, carrying sixty-four guns, and the weight of artillery has been judged not altogether disproportionate.\* Still a doubt of the result could not have existed in the minds of those familiar with naval matters.

It is the painful duty of an historian, recording events connected with Eastern Europe, from time to time, to reflect on the disingenuous character of the policy constantly pursued by a nation with whom we are at this moment at peace.

\* James' *Naval History*.

The man who, in cold blood, and without cause, can proceed to sow unnecessary seeds of offence between two great nations is culpable, and answerable for the malignity of his action far beyond the limited influence of anything he may write.

But the unravelment of the past, alike with the experience of the present, points to Russian schemes of aggression in Europe and Asia, the realisation of which can never be effected without the decadence of England, or openly attempted except in time of war and confusion.

In 1827 the original scheme of the St. Petersburg protocol had been based on the assumption of substantial and faithful accord between the Powers of Europe, unconscious that war was from the first meditated by Russia.

When Canning died, the means of preventing this evil perished with him.

The pilot may have taken the most ample dispositions wherewith to weather the storm, but if a gust of wind thrust him from the helm, small blame to the excellent seamen who fail to gauge the intricacies of the channel, and run the good ship on to as nasty a reef as that upon which Lords Goderich and Dudley found themselves stranded.

The worst of the whole affair was, that after we had maimed the Turkish naval power, on the pretence of stopping all communication between Egypt and Ibrahim Pacha, not only did supplies of all sorts reach the Morea, but cargoes of slaves were sent to Egypt, and the residue of the Turkish fleet allowed to go hither

and thither on its vile errand.\* The condition of the wretched Christians was not in anyway improved, and neither the Sultan nor Ibrahim Pacha was ready to concede anything.

The sole consequence of this well-named untoward event, was that when the Russians, on the pretext of forcing the Turks to fulfil the Treaty of Akerman (gained by them, as we have demonstrated, by notable and glaring deception), proceeded, in April 1828, to invade the Ottoman empire in Europe and Asia, they possessed the uninterrupted command of the Black Sea, and succeeded by that means, and no other, in their burglarious enterprise.

The Goderich Government, having fallen by internal weakness, the Duke of Wellington had become Prime Minister in January, 1828, and was fortunate enough to retain Lord Dudley at the Foreign Office.

Lord Goderich, notwithstanding the special excellence of his talents, acknowledged alike by Castlereagh, Liverpool, and Canning, appears to have been unequal to the duties of Prime Minister. He failed to manage his colleagues, and retired in despair.

Lord Dudley's presence in the new Government was the more to be desired, inasmuch as he represented the strong feeling as to Greece and its reconstruction, which undoubtedly did inspire an influential section of English society. With the Foreign Secretary the sentiment was romantic in its intensity. "I am as enthusiastic" he declares, "as a German student; living in a dream

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\* Hon. E. Ashley's *Life of Lord Palmerston*, vol. i. p. 154.



of general reconstruction, in which the Greek language was to resume its former purity."

He was dazzled by the glorious past, which he could not separate from their fallen present. It is but just to Lord Dudley, however, to say that his desires in this matter were tempered by a wholesome official knowledge of what was due to English interests, and there is no doubt he would have hesitated, equally with Canning, before promulgating theories injurious to England's position in Europe.

But there could remain no alternative for the Duke of Wellington's Government but to carry out the Treaty of London in its spirit, and the presence of Lord Dudley at the council-table was indispensable as Canning's former coadjutor in the matter.

But there were two parties in the cabinet. The Duke of Wellington, Lord Aberdeen, Lord Ellenborough, and others, were aware that England had been duped by Russia, and they declined to weaken Turkey more than necessity compelled. One is inclined to think that the view taken alike by Peel and Prince Metternich was the wiser one. They held that if Greece was to be recreated she should be made really independent of Turkey, and should contain the populations belonging to her race. Instead of this a reservation was made on behalf of certain districts, and the question remains unsettled to this day. The Canningite section of the Duke's Government appear to have disliked and distrusted Metternich. It is possible that they neither gauged his aims nor were correctly informed as to his opinions.

Lord Dudley, for instance, never had the benefit of perusing the plain statement of political views which has lately been published by the great Austrian's executors.

The line mapped out there for his country at least preserved peace for a period longer than the Hapsburgs have enjoyed before or since, and to a nation that suffered as Austria did in 1801, 1805, 1809, and 1815, peace and liberty come to be identical terms.

The day is not far distant when prejudice will yield to a fairer judgment of one who served an empire hedged in with manifold dangers, and shielded her therefrom to the advantage of neighbouring nations, who knew no more the tread of armies nor suffered from the exactions of their leaders.

We in England are apt to underrate the necessities of peace to Continental nations. The immunity from invasion gained for us by our gallant fleets and insular position has prevented the rude horrors of such events being present to the mind's eye.

In May 1828 Mr. Canning's late adherents left the Duke of Wellington's cabinet.

Penryn and Retford were on the point of disenfranchisement in consequence of proved corruption.

Mr. Huskisson had pledged himself to vote for the enfranchisement of one of the great towns, provided only one seat should be available for transference. This actually happened, and Lord Sandon (the present Lord Harrowby) held him to his word, thus securing his valuable adhesion to a great principle. Mr. Huskisson therefore, when the debate took place, gave a silent vote

against his colleagues, who, with the exception of Lord Dudley and Lord Palmerston, were opposed to the immediate enfranchisement of Birmingham or Manchester. Marking, as it were, the importance of his late vote, Huskisson wrote a letter of resignation to the Duke—one which he clearly would have withdrawn had a personal interview been allowed him. But the Duke said there could be no mistake, and acted as if Huskisson's resignation was the absolute one that Dudley and Palmerston assured him it was not designed to be.

Lord Dudley hesitated for some time. He liked his work, was popular with the King, and would have been retained with satisfaction by the Duke and his remaining colleagues. But the advice and example of Lord Palmerston seems to have decided him to resign, and so end his official life in May 1828.

Unfortunately his natural life was likewise to come to a premature close. The brain malformation from which he had suffered since childhood increased during the next few years, and after a period of distressing mental darkness this interesting and learned nobleman followed Canning to the grave.

A Liberal and enlightened politician, he yet possessed all the reverence for the incomparable Constitution of his country, which, in his times, animated Whig and Tory alike. He was, in common with others of the Canning school, opposed to reform in the sense which a thick and thin supporter of the Bill in 1832 would have defined it. On the other hand, when the question of disfranchising Penryn and giving representation to

Manchester was mooted in the Duke of Wellington's cabinet; he was, to use his own words, strongly for seizing the golden opportunity of giving members to great towns, and thus getting rid of the most obvious scandal in our representation.

He could never be induced to give his concurrence to any palpable inequality such as was presented by a state of things where Manchester and Birmingham had no one to speak directly for their interests in Parliament. Reform, but not Revolution, was the burden of his great speech made in Parliament during 1817, and quoted from earlier in this memoir, and there is little stated therein that, writing sixty-four years afterwards, events can be said to have belied.

In like manner he was conscious of the justice of Catholic emancipation.

As a social power in London, whose wit was proverbial, Lord Dudley's memory will remain green for years to come, and his best sayings will probably crop up from time to time, fathered on others guiltless of ever having spoken them.

But the memory of his kind, gentle nature will, we trust, never be forgotten.

The modesty which rendered the man totally unaware of the amount of his own rich store of knowledge, seems to have been thoroughly natural and not the less delightful.

Hospitality was his second nature. He would plan parties of kindred spirits, and make them quite as anxious for the next meeting as he could be to renew the intercourse

People were wont to wonder why, with the little dash of Whiggism he had infused into his political creed, he did not frequent the social gatherings of Holland House, whose owners more than once invited him.

"Because," he replied to a friend who asked him the question, "I do not choose to be tyrannised over whilst I am eating my dinner,"—an allusion to the well-known deference exacted by Lady Holland from her guests.

Lord Dudley had a peculiar dislike to having his picture taken. Once, when a surreptitious portrait had been dashed off for the members of Grillon's Club, it unfortunately fell into his hands, and he crumpled it up. At his death the drawing mysteriously re-appeared, doubtless rescued from destruction by a friend, and a print from the same now adorns this volume.

It is a charming, if, so to speak, shadowy, delineation, and, as those who knew him say, was characteristic of the man.

The small refined features and expressive eyes there serve to fix the interest which a perusal of Lord Dudley's life, public or private, must awaken.

Lord Dudley's passion for the Greek cause had doubtless been inflamed by an intercourse which passed between him and Lord Byron, but Canning's influence was the determining power on his career. At the latter's advice he exercised his literary talents in the *Quarterly Review*, when a highly nervous temperament forbade his undertaking long and sustained work, and not the least pleasing memory we possess of Lord

Dudley consists in affectionate fidelity to the memory of his political mentor.

Subordinate office he certainly refused, although offered by Canning himself, but deliberate choice placed him ultimately in the highest post the Prime Minister had to dispose of.

Lord Palmerston has left on record an opinion of how creditably he filled that exalted position, a view taken, moreover, by the exigent Lord Ellenborough, who, retaining his natural predilection for criticism, nevertheless spoke highly of the Foreign Secretary's talents, and with regard for him as an individual.

The man, known best to London for the eccentric habit he possessed of talking aloud, thus acquitted himself to the satisfaction of Canning, Ellenborough, and Palmerston, whilst he retained throughout the Duke of Wellington's confidence in his diplomacy. On the other hand, notwithstanding differences on minor matters led to subsequent political separation, Lord Dudley in conversation with Palmerston and Lamb (afterwards Lord Melbourne) expressed his opinion of how great a man the Duke was.\*

The stories of the Earl's eccentricities are many, but few will here suffice for purposes of illustration.

When dining at the Pavilion at Brighton during the early months of William IV.'s reign, Lord Dudley was not slow to observe a change for the worse in the *cuisine* of which he was *par excellence* a judge.

\* Evelyn Ashley's *Lord Palmerston*.

“Cold patties and hot champagne,” he exclaimed aloud, to the consternation of his royal hosts.

The King and Queen must, however, have been prepared for some such expression of their guest's inward meditations, for on a previous occasion when entertaining them, as Duke and Duchess of Clarence, in Park Lane, he had loudly exclaimed, “What a bore these royalties are!”

- On another occasion, he asked Sydney Smith to meet himself at dinner, and, to crown all, placed a despatch meant for the Russian ambassador into the envelope directed to his French colleague, so that each diplomatist received the letter intended for his rival.

This occurring just before the battle of Navarino, Prince Lieven conceived it to be a diplomatic ruse on the part of England, and plumed himself on official sagacity for not having fallen into the trap.

The Earl was, moreover, wont to discourse in two separate tones, one deep and the other shrill.

Known alike for a refined taste and singular habits, Earl Dudley had yet never embraced the love of the fine arts, which his great fortune gave him the means of indulging. He was accustomed to declare, that half the people who professed their admiration for the old masters were persuaded into so doing, because they were brought up to believe it right so to do. He, moreover, fortified his opinion by a statement of Sir Joshua Reynolds, to the effect that years elapsed before he, with all his professional study, could learn to duly apprise and appreciate drawing and colouring allowed to be classical in its excellence.

We are inclined, however, to believe this doubt remained in Lord Dudley's mind, because his political duties forbade the close attention necessary for a mastery over what others have declared the most fascinating of all pursuits, but he nevertheless thoroughly appreciated Rome, a city which grew upon him the longer he remained there.

Such was the individual who, to the regret of all who knew him, was overtaken by the most awful calamity to which suffering humanity is prone.

From a child he had suffered from a certain malformation, in the region of the brain, and this defect seems to have affected a mind over-strained by early and inordinate work, and in the year 1832 Sir Henry Hallford, who had been called in, judged it necessary to place him under restraint. It is, moreover, strange to reflect that the final mental catastrophe was presaged by an oft expressed conviction that he was a married man.

In Lord Brougham's opinion the forensic abilities of Lord Dudley were extremely powerful. The great Law Lord went so far as to say, that in a sustained and acute argument he could conduct it to its Parliamentary close better than Mr. Canning himself, who, however, by the magic of his genius, would close the controversy at an earlier stage. As Sir Henry Holland has remarked, it is a curious fact that the brain affection which troubled Lord Dudley through life, and prematurely closed his career, was palliated during the hard work incident to an occupation of the Foreign Office, where he so manifestly distinguished himself. Travel and distraction, of the description most palatable to a man of taste and



learning, by no means seems to have had a similar effect, so that with all his genius and classical sympathy, Lord Dudley appeared to most people strangely constituted. When, for instance, on the summit of the Cathedral at Milan, his companion could elicit no sound of surprise or delight at the grand prospect embracing alike the rich plains of Lombardy and the distant Alps.\*

- . To give an example of his Parliamentary ability ; never was the present more forcibly contrasted with the past, or its course explained, than by Lord Dudley when moving a reply to His Majesty's speech in 1825, to the remarkable character of which we have called previous notice. Lord Dudley said, "Our present prosperity is a prosperity extending to all orders, all professions, and all districts, enhanced and invigorated by the flourishing state of all those acts which minister to human comfort, and by those inventions by which man seems to have obtained the mastery over nature by the application of her own powers, and which if one had ventured to foretell a few years ago, would have appeared altogether incredible, but which now, realised though not perfected, presents to us fresh prospects of a more astonishing career."

There never was a time when the spirit of useful improvement, not only in the arts, but in all the details of domestic administration, whether carried on by the public or by individuals, was so high. That new

\* Sir Henry Holland's *Recollections*.

world, too, which had been first opened to us by the genius of a great man (Columbus), but afterwards closed by the barbarous and absurd policy of Spain, was, as it were, re-discovered in our days.

We saw it abounding not only in those metals which first allured the avarice of greedy adventurers, but also in those more precious productions which sustain life and animate industry, cheering the mind of the philosopher and the statesman with boundless possibilities of reciprocal advantage in civilisation and commerce.

Clarendon, the great historian, had once complained that there was wanting in England a proper sense and acknowledgment of what, according to the times he lived in, was undoubtedly a period of great prosperity. But in 1825 the people both felt and acknowledged their happiness.

Alluding to the benefits which had arisen from the partial removal of commercial restrictions, he recommended that the principle should be persevered in.

After commending Catholic Emancipation as wise and just, he reminded the House that England was not adapted for rapid change, and that our liberties had been of slow growth.

Abroad, he saw two great parties: one striving to restore the ancient order of things, and the other constantly striving after some new order. The former were not contented with that order which existed before the revolution, but wanted something more despotic, such as had been adopted by mankind in an uncivilised age. They desired to destroy our Govern-

ment and institutions as pregnant with principles they desired to repress. The other party were desirous of destroying everything which existed, and the only remedy they could find for all the evils of mankind was to sweep away every institution which had long been held in veneration.

They were, while they boasted of their attachment to freedom, extremely parrow and illiberal, and however they might differ amongst themselves, they were all actuated by a bitter hatred of this country. They were not sincere in their love of liberty, for they had crouched before Napoleon, and had endeavoured to reduce England to an imperial province.

In the Europe fifty-six years ago, as described by Lord Dudley, one seems to recognise its counterpart of to-day in the imperial system now in vogue in Russia, and the miscreant assassins who, travestying the name of liberty, elect to disgrace humanity. So correct was Lord Dudley's description held to be, that Mr. Walpole in his *History* has chosen to quote therefrom as evidencing the state of affairs in 1825.

A few months later, however, and the opening remarks of the above speech would have been strangely out of place, as the great financial crisis of the century oppressed England, but when the above-mentioned clouds passed away the reassertion of general prosperity has continued to prevail until this day. Well might Lord Dudley declare wonders not perfected when neither railway nor the electric telegraph were invented, nor had man learned to combat with one tithe of the diseases, which now pre rendered scarcer and less

dangerous by the more advanced skill of the physician. Lord Dudley did not scruple to state in Parliament, "that although favourable to Catholic Emancipation, he was unable to discern how England had maltreated Ireland since the Union." Now, as Lord Dudley was not in the habit of speaking without careful thought, it may be worth while to weigh his opinion on this subject, even at a moment when violent diatribes are in vogue against the iniquities of English rule and so-called Landlordism. The closing official act of this statesman, so attached to the idea of removing the Turks from Europe, so favourable to the advance of a Grecian empire, was to rebuke the action of Russia in attacking Turkey.

The despatch breathes the true spirit of an English minister, being such in tone as sooner or later every statesman, whatever his previous predilections, has found necessary to adopt.

Discarding anything which at the present moment might be considered controversial, we extract a portion of the despatch in question, the truth of which cannot be gainsaid, and must remain unaltered so long as the Eastern Question exists:—"The Ottoman Empire is not a country like some of those, whose example we could cite within our own times, which after having been invaded resume their domestic tranquillity and their political existence upon the retreat of the invaders. Once broken up, its capital taken, and its provinces in rebellion, the recomposition of it as an independent state would be a work scarcely within the reach of human integrity or human skill. A new

order of things must arise in those countries of which it now consists. What that order would be it is vain to conjecture, but we may venture to foretell that a final adjustment would not take place till after a series of troubles and disasters, for which the greatest benefits that could be supposed to arise from it could not for many years afford a sufficient compensation."

When one reflects that the writer of the above came to his official task burning to drive the Turks from Europe, there must be good hope that familiarity with the subject will incline the most enthusiastic minister to ultimate adoption of the traditional policy of Great Britain, one endorsed sooner or later by all the statesmen who have fully examined this thorny subject.

Having regard to the fact that Lord Dudley practically sacrificed office on behalf of a great principle connected with Parliamentary Reform, it is no marvel to learn that although prevented by indisposition from being present during the final struggle over the Reform Bill, he had previously intimated his intention of suppressing his objections to Lord Grey's measure, and following Lord Harrowby's moderate counsels.

It remains, then, only to estimate Lord Dudley from a literary point of view, and here, unhappily, the materials fail us more than in the collecting together of speeches and despatches which shall adequately discover the statesman's mind to posterity. It so happened that the nervous agitation which throughout life afflicted Lord Dudley, incapacitated him from undertaking any work which required long-sustained energies. But his

fugitive writings are various if, alas ! for the most part anonymous, and, therefore, useless for present purposes. The *Quarterly Review*, for instance, after his death expressed in feeling terms how indebted the direction was to him, whose refined and finished productions had, from time to time, added alike interest and charm to the publication whose influence was, at the time, only inferior to that of its stronger rival.

One paper in the above *Review* we fortunately know to be written by the subject of the present monograph.

In our notice of Mr. Fox's career, allusion has been made to a criticism of the Honble. J. W. Ward's, written in the year 1813, and directed partially against what the writer appeared to believe a social breaking away on the part of Mr Fox when the natural connections of his birth and training were not preferred to other influences and opinions accounted vulgar if not dangerous by the social coterie which, whether Whigs or Tories, were in office, then ruled England. We subjoin the passage in question, which occurs in the article to which allusion has just been made, without, however, making ourselves responsible for the picture of Mr. Fox's political conduct there drawn, and to which, in important particulars, we demur, but in order to show how entirely Lord Dudley's divergence from the views of Mr. Pitt's friends had been on matters of detail, and, therefore, temporary ; and, at the same time, to perpetuate amongst our readers a piece of prose at once refined in style and vigorous in argument. Mr. Ward had prefaced his remarks with regret at the publication of Mr. Fox's *Early History of James II.*, inasmuch as the

great orator having been imperfectly reported in Parliament, future generations would consult these pages for confirmation of the extraordinary eloquence and power, which would otherwise share Pitt's fate, and rest almost exclusively on tradition for its notoriety.

It is somewhat sad to reflect that in Lord Dudley's own case we have meagre accounts of his speeches, and little but anonymous literary contributions, to remind us of remarkable intellectual power expended mainly in composition of letters to friends, and certain State Papers known generally only to students of Foreign Office archives.

With regard to the latter, the eminent statesman, Lord Ellenborough, when in one of his critical moods, spoke of Lord Dudley as writing an essay rather than a despatch, evincing thereby that he descried natural facility of penmanship which combined with Lord Dudley's delicate and correct taste, would at once cause his effusions to become appreciated if not generally popular.

The following criticism will be found in the ninth volume of the *Quarterly Review*, page 322.

"It is not to be supposed that we blame Mr. Fox for not entering into a refutation of Jacobin doctrines, but we cannot help saying that he is far too complaisant in his way of assenting to them. . . . Yet we find him talking of the opinions we profess as if he had been a politician of exactly the same school. But these were the unhappy years of Mr. Fox's life, when long disappointment had ended in despair, and when, unmindful of all that was due to himself and his country, he was

content to purchase a short-lived hollow popularity among miscreants, whom he must have abhorred, and fanatics whom he must have despised, by sacrificing for ever the confidence of the sound, the judicious, and the governing part of the community. Hence that strange anti-patriotic feeling by which, in the discussion of all questions betwixt England and any other Power, he seemed to be actuated. He had come at last to feel a prejudice against the nation which had preferred his rival, and he had learned to look with indifference, at least, to the subversion of that order of things in which he found no place proportioned to his talents. Yet if there ever was a man far removed by nature from that sect with which he now formed a preposterous union, it was Mr. Fox. He was unfitted for playing the part of a Jacobin, by the absolute want of all the necessary qualifications. He had neither the coarseness, the ferocity, nor the ignorant and insolent contempt of all that is ancient and established. He was in everything a gentleman of the highest class. His education, the connections he had formed in life, his habits and feelings—all purely liberal and aristocratic. He was the creature of polished society, such as it existed under the ancient monarchies of Europe. He belonged originally to the good old school of Walpolian Whigs—prudent practical persons, a little too fond of jobbing, quite contented with the Constitution as they found it, and disposed to hold high the honour of the country in its intercourse with foreign nations.

“He had not a single point of contact with the philo-



sophising assassins who, about twenty years ago, first appeared as candidates for the government of the world.

“He was neither bold nor hasty in his application of general principles, and no man was ever less inclined by his own nature to sweep away present liberty, present comfort, and present security, in order to lay a foundation for ideal perfection at a distant period.

“His eloquence, too, was of that chaste, argumentative sort, which can only be addressed with success to an educated and intelligent audience.

“From the loftiness and simplicity of his mind, the delicacy of his taste, a certain natural shyness which might at first be mistaken for coldness or reserve, he was utterly incapable of condescending to those paltry artifices, and performing those mountebank tricks which are necessary to captivate the multitude.

“In the art of cajoling a mob, he was infinitely surpassed by persons who, in point of talents, it would be quite ludicrous to compare with him. He was an awkward, unpractised demagogue, and a lukewarm, unwilling reformer.

“From justice and humanity he was anxious for the happiness of the lower orders—that is, of the bulk of mankind—but no minister would have ever been less disposed to admit them to a large share in swaying public measures. When his friends absurdly called him the man of the people, they seem to have forgotten that the great act of his life was a struggle against the people.

“An appeal to the country was that which he affected to execrate as a crime.

“Such was Mr. Fox, who, by the power of circumstances, which it required something more of firmness and high political virtue than he possessed to resist, was led, in the most important crisis of his political life, to play a part directly opposite to the natural bent of his own inclinations and character. Formed to hold with a high hand the reigns of government in a tempered monarchy, he became the apologist of an insane and flagitious revolution, an advocate for the public enemies of the State in all its contests with foreign powers, the rallying-point of disaffection, the terror of good, the hope and support of bad citizens.”

Lord Dudley might, we think, have added that Mr. Fox's conduct was the means of inducing confidence between the upper and lower classes in this country, and that those who have taken his political faith as their rule of conduct have done so without sacrificing their high territorial position in the country, and remain to this moment a distinct safeguard against the democratic flood which, but for outstretched sympathy between man and man, such as Fox practised and made fashionable, would have, long ere this, endangered England's Constitution.

We may, therefore, pass from this vigorous and remarkable exposition of a teaching which events have somewhat belied. Would that we could believe its warnings to be all proved fallacious: but, so far as the force of example in foreign politics is concerned, Mr. Fox's conduct does seem to have been most injurious. When

however, Mr. Trevelyan takes up the cudgels on behalf of him whose story he has made his own, he will doubtless deal decisively with our doubts, and in so doing grapple successfully with those arguments of Lord Dudley's which time has left unanswered.

But the chaste taste of our great contemporary Whig writer will more surely lead him to recognise the merit of this literary fragment from which we have quoted, and to join us in the lament that some collection of the witty Earl's works does not exist.

We have heard ominous stories of a destruction of family papers; yet we cannot but believe that, with due diligence, materials for a volume of great interest may still be found.

To the last Lord Dudley loved literature, and with it the society of authors and wits. Once when engaged to dine with General Phipps, the popular Member for Scarborough, he was promised that Theodore Hook should be there. The man of letters was, unfortunately, unable to keep this appointment, upon which Lord Dudley ordered his carriage an hour earlier, and announced this resolve aloud to his servant, with that oblivion of circumstances so frequently induced by his state of preoccupation.

Lord Dudley much loved the society of his library, but preferred old books to new, saying, when he saw an announcement of a fresh volume, that he was thereby led to reflect on the excellence of older literature hitherto unconsulted.

The writer closes this notice with an apprehension that lack of material has prevented him

from fairly delineating the character of Lord Dudley. He can only, therefore, ask his readers to study that nobleman's letters to the Bishop of Llandaff. There, politically, he will learn the philosophical truth of that measured liberty which Mr. Canning desired to see effected in England without the subversion of our institutions, a wholesome balance, which, at this moment, many believe to be more or less endangered.

Lord Dudley had an intelligent opinion upon every subject submitted to his notice. His thoughts, submitted to Dr. Copleston, upon University Government, are statesman-like, inasmuch as they are simply prophetic in their completeness.

He advises, for instance, an adherence to the out-of-college residence such as would naturally check the tendency of larger and richer colleges to surpass, if not injure, others where the education is neither inferior nor less, neatly specking, to be desired.

We can only, in recompense for the imperfection of our efforts, desire the reader to consult back numbers of the *Quarterly* for the "Life of Horne Toome," and for a notice where the directors, in common gratitude, felt it their duty to leave on record how much this interesting statesman and philosopher had contributed towards their own prestige.

The portrait which heads this memoir (however characteristic) is but indistinct. The outline of the career we have endeavoured to delineate is, we know, in character therewith, but ill-defined and shadowy, and therefore we look with confidence to a future when some member of the family shall further inform the public

as to the details of a career upon which genius was indelibly stamped.

At Norwood, in March 1833, Lord Dudley faded, so to speak, into forgetfulness at the comparatively early age of fifty-two.



## L O R D    A B E R D E E N .

"I desire not to be minister of Austria or Russia but of England."—*Retort to Princess Lieven, wife of the Russian ambassador, who, on his assuming the Foreign Secretaryship in 1828, had taunted him with Austrian proclivities.*

"I should be perfectly prepared to oppose, even to the extremity of war, the possession by Russia of Constantinople and the Dardanelles."—*Speech in Parliament, Oct. 1853.*

JUNE 1828 TO NOVEMBER 1830.



ORN in the year 1784, the first public duty undertaken by the future statesman, was one of diplomatic attendance on Lord Cornwallis, at Amiens, during the peace negotiations. Educated at Harrow and St. John's College, Cambridge, the young nobleman enjoyed all the advantages of a classical teaching, which, super-added to the natural talents and good breeding which were born in his nature, filled him for the profession of his choice. It was as a diplomatist that he gained the great success of his life in 1813, and special skill in that courtly art led to future preferment in the sovereign councils of England.

Married in 1805 to a daughter of the Marquis of

Abercorn, the fascinating young Scotchman passed seven short years of supreme happiness. When, however, not yet thirty years old he suffered the great trouble of his existence, one from which he never thoroughly recovered, and was a saddened man for life. He then undertook the mission to Vienna in 1813, which was to apprise the Austrians of Wellington's victory at Vittoria, and urge the necessity of immediate action.

Coming as his representations did after the battles of Bautzen and Lutzen, Metternich and the Emperor were aroused to the sense of their position, and to none does the subsequent durability of the Austrian alliance appear to be more due than to England's youthful envoy.

Energy, tact, and manner were one and all exercised for the purpose of detaching Napoleon's father-in-law from the neutrality which, if persisted in, might have prolonged the struggle indefinitely.\* The result was seen first in Metternich's interview with Napoleon at Dresden, and then in the change of Austrian policy, soon to culminate in open adhesion to the allied cause.

Lord Aberdeen followed the fortunes of the allied

\* Lord Aberdeen was asked by that acute observer, Sir G. C. Lewis, his opinion as to the degree England had contributed towards the deliverance of Europe. He replied that great importance was undoubtedly assigned in the allied camp to the Duke of Wellington's southern advance, but that the power of our subsidies had been exaggerated. For instance, in 1813 he was empowered to offer a million to Austria when 400,000 soldiers had to be equipped. Although our subsequent monetary advance exceeded this amount, the actual subsidy could scarcely have decided Austrian councils.

army, and in company with the Emperor Francis had once, in France, to ride for his life.

At Chatillon Lord Aberdeen, Sir Charles Stewart, and Lord Cathcart attended as English plenipotentiaries with Lord Castlereagh, the latter taking precedence as Secretary of State. After the settlement of Vienna, and the overthrow of the first French empire, Lord Aberdeen devoted himself to travel through the classical regions of Greece. Here, in scenes congenial to his taste, he revelled in all the glorious associations which elevate an half-civilised present in the remembrance of a refined and noble past.

On returning to England, fired with enthusiasm for the people, and charmed by the scenes he had witnessed, so often and enthusiastically did he recount his experiences that he gained the name of Athenian Aberdeen, and was as such tilted at by Lord Byron, in his *English Bards and Scotch Reviewers*.

But there was said to be a Scotch family-feeling at the root of this sally, inasmuch as the heritage of Byron's branch of the Gordon family, and whose local habitation had long been at Gight, fell into Lord Aberdeen's hands through the impecuniosity of those who inherited it.

Still the noble poet was not only a kinsman but a brother old Harrovian, which has ever been a bond of union, so that one might have expected a forbearance such as the bard was, however, scarcely in the mood to indulge in.

When the Duke of Wellington became Prime Minister in 1828, Lord Aberdeen accepted office at the Duchy of



Lancaster, and after the secessions of Mr Huskisson, Lord Palmerston, and Lord Dudley, succeeded the latter as Secretary for Foreign Affairs. Chosen by the Duke of Wellington, when Lord Ellenborough's peculiar talents were likewise available, the more credit is due to Lord Aberdeen that he should have succeeded so well as, in the opinion of his eloquent rival, he clearly did.

• It was but in human nature that having himself aspired to the Secretaryship for Foreign Affairs, Lord Ellenborough should be somewhat grudging of praise to a rival preferred before him. But even he in his diary begins by saying Aberdeen is good at all the ordinary Foreign Office work, and that he will do nothing glaringly wrong, assuming, however, that both the Duke of Wellington and himself were really able to overrule the Foreign Secretary's decisions. But later on we read, "Aberdeen is the most obstinate man I ever saw, as to the mere words of a despatch; whilst the remark, "Aberdeen's manner may not be good, but he said good things, and can make a biting speech in a quiet way," proves how the minister made himself respected. True it is that Lord Ellenborough compared Lord Aberdeen's despatches at a disadvantage with those of Lord Dudley, but we should not forget that he was thereby placed in competition with a master of modern prose.

The first matter with which it became necessary to deal, was the war just commenced by Russia against Turkey, combined with the further complications in Greece and the Morea.

Navarino had by no means settled the complicated questions of policy which had arisen. Ibrahim Pacha, being still unsubdued, still ravaged the Morea, and traffic with Egypt does not seem to have been totally suppressed. Something definite had to be decided on to ensure the carrying out of the Treaty of London, to which England and her allies were thoroughly pledged. This, ultimately, took the form of a landing of 18,000 French troops, who never received a check, and cleared the Morea of the Egyptians, who, with their general, returned forthwith to Alexandria. When, however, the French desired to prosecute their march beyond the Morea, international jealousy intervened, and a limit was placed on efforts which might have led to further complications.

The superficial view one is naturally disposed to take of this transaction, is favourable to the French views of those days, leading, as they must have done, to an enlargement of the young kingdom, and a settlement, once for all, of a troublesome question.

But Lord Aberdeen was a diplomatist, and, being familiar with the intricacies of this question, did not allow his judgment to coincide with the well-known sympathy he felt for Greece and her cause. Lord Palmerston's minutes of the cabinet opinions prove this to have been the case.\* He probably suspected that to be true which a few years' time proved.

During the Polish rebellion, the imperial archives of Warsaw fell into the hands of those whose interest it

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\* Mr. E. Ashley's *Life of Lord Palmerston*.

became to divulge their contents in England, where they were quoted from in Parliament and their authenticity never denied.

It was there shown that the Russian minister deliberately acceded to the protocol of St. Petersburg (on which the Treaty of London was based, and through the means of which Greece gained her freedom and existence), with the knowledge and belief that whilst professing to maintain peace, he both knew and desired it might ultimately become a cause of war.

Well might Lord Aberdeen describe Navarino as an untoward event, and the Duke of Wellington's Government take measures to strengthen their naval force in the Mediterranean and conclude an alliance with Austria, which should estop Russia from entering into Constantinople.

For the differences at home were marked. Lord Palmerston at that time went so far as to make a speech in which he declared it to be impossible for England to go to war for the Sultan, and the balance of uninstructed opinion was the louder if not the stronger of the differing expressions of feeling. Possibly Lord Palmerston's future attitude in the Eastern Question may have resulted from knowledge of the edifying disclosure vouchsafed in the Warsaw correspondence, which contained a letter from the Russian ambassador in London, telling the Emperor Nicholas that his policy did not want defenders amongst the most distinguished members of either House of Parliament. And yet the specious pretences, are from the nature of the case certain to reappear every fifteen years or so, and to find believers

in apparently the best-informed quarters—men, however, who, when they come to deal with the matter themselves, one and all take a modified view of the difficulties connected with Constantinople and its ownership, sooner or later declaring for things as they are, rather than deciding to fly to evils that they know not of. Such were Lords Dudley, Palmerston, and Aberdeen, whilst the certainty of a similar tendency ultimately prevailing makes thinking men doubt whether the Turkish Empire is as near extinction in 1881 as some believe.

Lord Aberdeen, however, in 1829–30 was tied by circumstances, and ultimately accepted the provisions of the Treaty of Adrianople, where after two campaigns Turkey came to be cajoled into a degrading submission which the military position did not by any means warrant that she should have accepted. Moltke has told us how the remnant of the Russian army dictated peace whilst in imminent danger and a prey to disease. How the movements of the Pacha of Skadra, with 35,000 fresh troops, were warded off, Marshal Diebitch probably never understood himself.

But the address of Russian negotiators in persuading the Turks of their defeat, was not less noticeable than their original skill had been paramount when they appeared to enlist Europe on their side, and place their opponents in the wrong, before entering on a course of international brigandage.

Lord Aberdeen's original connection with the Treaties of 1814–15 accounts for the attempt at first made to hold Belgium and Holland together, even, as some men declared, to the verge of interference in a quarrel,

where the Dutch King gave his compatriots the kernel and left the husks to the Belgians. Doubtless, as Lord Castlereagh had formerly remarked to Lord Dudley, the King of Holland granted his subjects a respectable Constitution, but so different in manners and feeling were the two people that force could only keep them united even if justice had been fairly exercised between them.

In the case of the British Government the support given to the Dutch King was merely tentative, and received expression in a paragraph of the Royal Speech, which lost many votes at the election and helped to swell the gathering unpopularity of the Duke's rule. In Portugal a resolute course of non-interference was persisted in by Lord Aberdeen, who, judging that the Portuguese preferred Don Miguel, pursued a policy which Lord Palmerston was shortly to reverse.

Such were the public events and the policy decided on in connection therewith during the administration of Lord Aberdeen with which we have immediate concern. The tendency of his mind in relation to Foreign Policy was clearly Conservative.

As he told Baron Bunsen on his second elevation to the office in 1841, "We desire to keep things as they are."

Counting public opinion as a statesman's guide, he yet agreed in the main with Metternich in his fear of change and revolution for its own sake.

• He said of Lord Palmerston that he endeavoured to create revolutions, and was retorted on by the rejoinder that he, Lord Aberdeen, had endeavoured to sustain

despotisms. The difference between the two statesmen has since been shown to have been more imaginary than real; the consequence of their general views being such that not only did Sir Robert Peel on taking office in 1841 declare the general foreign policy to have remained unchanged for thirty years, but a subsequent coalition between the rival occupants of the Foreign Office sealed the opinion as being based on fact.

Acquiescence in one important alteration in the European system was unhesitatingly granted by Lord Aberdeen when he recognised Louis Philippe as King of the French.

This action was interpreted in some quarters as a desire to separate France and Russia, but undoubtedly sprang from an honest determination to avoid interference in French affairs. To Lord Aberdeen it must naturally have been distasteful to abrogate a provision closely connected with that Treaty of Vienna for which he had stood sponsor. Although the return of the Bourbons was brought about by circumstances entirely independent of the Congress of Vienna, it was there that a ratification of the legitimate King's return to his throne was accepted by Europe, now called on to recognise the power of popular will in France. This Russia and Austria distinctly refused to do, and from their point of view, or rather from that of their rulers, Louis Philippe was a mere parvenu, and dependent for moral support on England alone.

The fall of Charles X. can scarcely be regretted by any lover of freedom, still less of religious liberty. The

attempt to return to mediæval forms of rule might, in 1830, obtain tolerance in Spain, but not in France, where modern ideas had worked their way into a position whence they could at any moment combine to overthrow the priestly ascendancy, which was the chief feature of Prince Polignac's political ideal, that man whom Marshal Marmont declared to be the most presumptuous mortal he had ever met. No one class in France, moreover, appears to have desired a return to irresponsible rule, whilst the Sovereign stood isolated from all the aristocratic influences and support which Louis XIV. possessed.

When, unable to repress the Charter granted (formerly in 1815) by his brother, the old King steadily and with dignity moved by easy stages to the coast, his fate may be fairly cited as showing the futility of the struggle between absolute rule and a nation that has once tasted the sweets of freedom. The gist of the compact between Louis XVIII. and his people consisted in the King's promise to sustain Constitutional forms amongst them. This agreement broken, and the Crown could rest on no sure basis.

Sidney Smith has told how, during a visit to Paris in 1829, he saw in the long priestly processions and haughty manners of the priesthood an earnest of that speedy fall which awaited a dignified conscientious but mistaken monarch.

The appeal to the people of Edinburgh which the chivalrous Sir Walter Scott was forced to make for public respect and courtesy on behalf of the royal exiles at Holyrood, marks in no small degree the feeling that

actuated individuals in Great Britain when thrones were falling around and the shadow of a great social change was impending over our home community.

Lord Aberdeen for two successive years paid visits to Charles X. when in his Holyrood retirement. . On the first occasion he found the old King visibly poverty-stricken and sitting in a cold unfurnished bed-room. Not a sign of remorse was apparent as to his unconstitutional conduct in France, and he only admitted to have made one mistake, and that when he neglected to pour sufficient troops into Paris. He was much incensed against Louis Philippe, although of France and her people he spoke in kindly terms, hoping and expecting nothing for himself, but confident in the ultimate recall of the Duke de Bourdeaux, whose education Lord Aberdeen discovered a year later was being carefully attended to.

It was, indeed, a strange turn of fortune's wheel which forty years afterwards fulfilled the uncle's prediction so far as France was concerned, although the decision of the Count de Chambord precluded a Legitimist return to power.

The, so to speak, voluntary poverty of the representative line of France has, doubtless, combined with other circumstances to increase the devotion with which a compact minority continue to do homage to the elsewhere extinct principle of legitimate sovereignty.

The conviction that, whatever their errors, it was not for themselves or their own advantage that they essayed to rule, must, of necessity, lead many to admire and all to respect them.



Lord Aberdeen's kindness is prominent in the delicate manner in which he conveyed sympathy with the exiled Sovereign, without for a moment endorsing the vicious system of rule he had striven to establish.

Lord Aberdeen may have been Conservative in his adhesion to the treaties of Europe, and stubborn in his perpetuation of Lord Liverpool's rule of non interference in the internal affairs of other nations, but he proved himself to be a Liberal statesman as regarded the Catholic Emancipation and Abolition of the Corn Laws, whilst to a modified degree he favoured Parliamentary Reform. The defeat of the Civil List, which overthrew the Duke of Wellington's Government, was in truth nothing less than a branch of the great question destined to overshadow all others.

Statesmen such as the Duke of Wellington and Lord Aberdeen, were unwilling to plunge into a democratic course by the adoption of extreme measures, based and calculated avowedly on hopes of a great party advantage.

But the political storm had been aroused, and was sure to run its course.

How the good ship carrying England's fortune weathered the storm successfully, even after casting overboard much that wise men valued amongst the superfluous ballast which those same shrewd individuals desired to be quit of, has no place here.

It is strange, however, to reflect on the fact that the first demand for Reform came partially from a section of the old Tory party, and so helped to arouse the tempest of feeling before which Wellington, Peel, and

Aberdeen retired. There were also the Tories who honestly thought that reform had become a Constitutional necessity.

Then there were those who conceived it to be the logical outcome of Catholic Emancipation, Repeal of Dissenters' Disabilities, and relaxation of our penal code; whilst a third faction, we fear, desired to retort on the Duke for the support he had given to the measures in question. Thus in politics constantly do we see men, blinded by party passion, resigning the advantage of the morrow in return for to-day's short-lived triumph shared, as they know it must be, by those with whom they have nothing in common.

But the death of King George IV. was the event more immediately leading to the Whig triumph.

When George IV. paid the debt of nature, the party of resistance was immediately weakened and the shadow of a great Constitutional change hovered over the nation. The accession of the Duke of Clarence was at least an earnest of a cessation to Court obstruction. The direction of policy was henceforth open to the guidance of the responsible ministry, who, unimpeded by the Sovereign, well might lay their Reform measures before the legislature.

Whatever may have been the faults and shortcomings of George IV., he never, as a king, neglected public duty. You may disagree with the tenour of his conclusions, deplore the shortsightedness of his policy inherited from the father, but carelessness as to public matters it is at least impossible to charge against this well-abused sovereign.

In the midst of his gaiety at Brighton he was yet prepared to start at half-past 6 in the morning for London, the very minute intelligence reached him from the metropolis requiring his presence. Scarcely, perhaps, unprejudiced in all his conclusions, strange, fantastic, and uncertain in his personal demeanour, it should yet never be forgotten that the unpopular prince had a genuine reverence for the Constitution and traditions of his country. The time, doubtless, did exist when the individual taking up a pen to point out the better points in George IV.'s character would have been open to the imputation of hindering the cause of morality, so grievously ignored by the unfortunate monarch in question. But the failing was, alas! common to the representatives of his class who held sway in his times. It was the bane of society, and a distinct drawback to the excellence of English influence on the world. Why, in George IV.'s case the several evidences of kindness and charity, borne witness to by Alderman Martin in his interesting *History of Brighton*,\* failed to operate in his favour as like excuses have done in the case of other profligate kings, we are not competent to explain, but the poisoned pen of faction

\* *History of Brighton*, by Alderman Martin. Beal, East Street, Brighton. We can likewise recommend to our readers the lately published volumes of Mr. Percy Fitzgerald's *George IV.* There the story of a wasted life is told in detail, and the better points of the man placed forward through his own correspondence. Interspersed with the gossip of the times, and arranged with taste and care, the work is altogether not unworthy to become a companion volume to Jesse's famous *Life of George III.*

has not been idle before and since the death of this unfortunate prince. Exposed to every temptation open to mankind, the same excuse should at least be urged on behalf of George IV. that Mr. Trevelyan, Lord J. Russell, and others have so eloquently pleaded for the memory of his friend Charles Fox. The question arises, have the detractors meted out the same justice they would themselves desire to receive? Conscience can alone answer this, and in the case of many whose harsh judgment has been registered, they likewise have gone to the long home from whence there is no present return.

But Alderman Martin did at least know George IV. personally, and what is more, can attest to the fact that many went to their graves in happiness and content, who, but for the bounty of their Sovereign—silently and unostentatiously bestowed—might have lingered on in poverty and misery.

With their last breath they blessed the memory of him whom no writer of ability has dared to defend, until his old friend Alderman Martin took up the cudgels in that interesting *History of Brighthelmston* which bears his name.

“What, abuse a man in his own house!” said a former Brighton alderman to Mr. Thackeray, then about to give his lectures on the Four Georges in the Pavilion; “go at least to the Town Hall with which his memory has no connection.”

The lecturer, struck with the appositeness of the idea, yielded, and delivered his severe criticisms on more neutral ground.

The reason why such unanimity of condemnation prevailed amongst writers contemporary with, and those succeeding the times of George IV.'s reign, may be explained by the fact that early in life the whole phials of Tory wrath were turned against the royal abettor of Fox in all his schemes.

The Whigs were universally looked on as the party of the Prince of Wales, so that when with the Regency their political hopes were dashed to pieces, and the old ministers were still retained, pledged to sustain the empire in its strength and dignity, it became the fashion for the Whigs in their turn to visit on the Prince's head all the contumely which falls to the share of a turncoat. Consequently the literature which has had most influence over our own times has been devoted to showing up the distressing weakness of a character, which has had a counterpart in more than one ruler whose actions have not been searched out by the fierce light of unfriendly publicity.

We cannot, if we desired so to do, arrest the justice of this judgment, but have a right to claim that the generous actions, borne witness to by Alderman Martin, should receive due attention, together with a general acknowledgment of the political services which the King, with all his eccentricities, undoubtedly rendered the State.

He knew when to yield in the matter of the Catholic claims, and although his death undoubtedly hastened the confusion of parties which brought about the Reform Bill, there is yet no valid reason to believe that George IV. would have opposed the expressed will of

the nation, provided he was persuaded the measure proposed was not injurious to the public weal.

In Mr. Alderman Martin's book no ill-judged attempt is made to extenuate the faults of George IV.,\* but

\* As an evidence of George IV.'s warm-hearted feeling towards friends, combined with an anxious interest in national affairs, the subjoined letter is transcribed from Sir Archibald Alison's *Life of Sir Charles Stewart*.—

“MY DEAR CHARLES,

“After the recent events which have taken place at Vienna, I cannot resist taking up my pen, and sending you a few lines in my own handwriting.

“The sincerity and warmth of the affection I have uniformly felt for you now for so many years, I thought had been such as to admit of little possibility of either addition or increase. But I find myself completely mistaken and deceived; for your conduct on the late occasion, in whatever point of view I consider it, and that it offers itself to my view, has called for, and given rise to, in me, warm feeling towards you, far beyond what I ever did or thought I could have felt for or towards any individual, even yourself.

“Having said this much, you cannot be surprised when I tell you that I cannot find any words or language that are at all adequate to convey (and as I could wish) all that my heart feels towards you.

“The line which you at once laid down for yourself and pursued, portrays not only the discretion, ability, talent, and firmness of the sound statesman and diplomat, but beautifully blends with it all the high sense of private honour, as well as the delicate anxious care of the most affectionate of friends. Indeed, your conduct has been such as to outstrip all and everything that approbation or encomium would convey or offer, and as to the effect it has had upon me, I can only say that it has most indelibly and for ever rooted and engraved itself in my heart. With the most fervent prayers that you may long enjoy health and every other possible

undoubted acts of kindness and benevolence are adduced calculated to temper the severity of an otherwise merciless historical verdict.

“The quality of mercy is not strained,  
It droppeth as the gentle dew from heaven.”

The volume should certainly be read by all interested in the annals of Brighton.

But other influence, beyond the King's death, served to hasten the crisis, which ever since the conclusion of our great war with France had been but deferred, and in one form or the other was inevitable.

We know, however, that Lord Grey's proceedings in the matter of Reform were distasteful to at least one leading politician who as a former colleague had contributed much to the stability of Lord Grenville's administration in 1806.

Lord Sidmouth, for example, had been associated in the Whig ministry known at the time as that of all the talents, but he bitterly resented the Reform Bill of 1832. “God may, and, I hope, will forgive you for this Bill,” he is reported to have remarked to Earl Grey, “but I do not think I ever can.”

worldly blessing, and that myself and the country may long, long, long continue to benefit by the services of so sincere a friend and able a minister,

“I remain, my dearest Charles,

“Ever your affectionate friend,

“GEORGE P. R.”

These professions were accompanied throughout life with actions in perfect unison with the sentiments here expressed.

But the influence, which more than any other succeeded in helping to reconcile Englishmen to unwanted change, was undoubtedly that of Macaulay. On the whole the greatest Whig of the century, Thomas Babington Macaulay, rivalled Pitt and Fox themselves in forensic exposition, and was at least their equal in logical power, whilst possessing a retentive memory never surpassed by mortal man. .

This extraordinary individual overthrew in fair argument all the combined strength of eloquence, wisdom, and authority which the possessor of privilege and power could bring to bear.\* He was for the Bill as adhered to by Grey and Brougham, and in the opinion of many his action turned the scale.† An unrivalled writer, the youth of the last fifty years may be said to have grown up under the glamour of his fascinating pen.

Without presuming either to question or endorse opinions, the magnificent expression of which have become to be studied as a part of our history we may point with just pride to a character noble alike in its public and private relations, and inflexible in its desire to secure the Imperial safety of England.

So far as his furtherance of Reform is concerned, it will become the duty of every historian to extol the high qualities which succeeded in reconciling men to

\* *Hansard*, 1831-32.

† The author of Walpole's *History of England* holds this opinion strongly.



necessary change, when even Grey, Brougham, Erskine, and Plunkett might have failed.

- The increased comfort we, as individuals, enjoy, proceeds in a great measure from the great social upheaving, which either before its consummation, or in its wake, led to juster and milder laws, shaped so as not to exceed the offence committed.

The change was not so subversive in England as a like measure must have proved on the Continent, where public opinion had never filtered through the several processes, issuing whence clean and powerful it had for more than a century swayed the counsels of England.

When the less restricted rush of waters was let loose here, and swept away some landmarks of the past, there might have occurred a fatal forgetfulness of the interests of England abroad, but for the determined attitude of Lord Aberdeen and the Duke of Wellington who by calling timely attention to the importance of the Belgian Question, strengthened Lord Palmerston in the performance of the task he never shrank from fulfilling. Conscious that a minority existed ready to support Government in active measures, Lord Palmerston was enabled to rally the statesman-like instincts of his own colleagues towards the avoidance of a renewed war with France, so certain to follow the prevalence of timid counsels.

Unwise military and naval reductions had most certainly taken place early in 1832, urged by those who looked alone at home and desired to fix national energies entirely on Reform.

The consequence came to be that Palmerston had to

cut his cloth according to his means, and, attending to questions nearer home, concur in the decision of his colleagues to leave Turkey to the Czar's tender mercies. The plea put forward of inability to find ships to sail to the Dardanelles was nearer the truth than it is possible now to believe. On the other hand, the loosening of the flood-gates of Reform had one good effect, it swept away slavery once and for all. No more pandering to West Indian interest in Parliament was admitted, but an ample and immediate compensation of twenty millions sterling was allowed as compensation for loss of capital. The nation was thus saved from a miserable hypocrisy.

We who had our colonies stocked with Africans did not discontinue the institution of slavery, but allowed philanthropy scope in prohibiting the trade elsewhere. A more incongruous, not to say degrading spectacle than that of the Society for Propagation of the Gospel possessing West Indian property, and in lieu of manumitting their slaves there and then, contenting themselves with improving their condition, whilst accepting an income derived from slave labour, the world has seldom beheld.

All this dallying with iniquity was cast to the winds, and England stood in the full purity of her real nature, and therefore guiltless of a wrong denounced by all her greater leaders since Pitt and Fox seconded Wilberforce in the matter.

No Englishman, however strong his love of old institutions and steady his faith in national traditions, could fail to see some advantage in a newer system

which at least displayed strength in the direction where its warmest sympathies were excited.

Moreover, as Lord Palmerston observed, the action of the Reformed Parliament in regard to sedition in Ireland was, to say the least of it, decided, if not despotic.

But the Whigs having come into power by virtue of their now traditional alliance with advanced Liberalism in Ireland, were consequently assailed by a combination of malcontents, of whom Irish seceders and discontented West Indians helped to swell the number, making it possible for William IV. to rid himself of a ministry which had become distasteful to him, and of doing so with a plausible subjection to popular will.

When, therefore, Sir Robert Peel, in 1835, made his ineffectual attempt to secure a Conservative majority, Lord Aberdeen was asked to join the Government, but not this time as Foreign Secretary, that post being offered to and accepted by the great Duke himself, whilst with native modesty Lord Aberdeen accepted a subordinate situation.

The Duke of Wellington's short Foreign Secretaryship occurred after the chronological limit up to which this book has been schemed to give detailed account or attempt any contemporary biographical notice, but as a portion of Lord Aberdeen's career the policy pursued possesses a present interest to the reader. It was in all respects identical in its lines with that professed and carried out before and after by the acute and statesman-like mind whose influence we are employed in narrating.

One rock on which the good ship was nearly

grounding consisted in the appointment of Lord Londonderry as Ambassador to St. Petersburg, he who, as Sir Charles Stewart, had conferred such signal diplomatic services on his country in the Peninsula and on the Continent.\*

\* The life of *le beau sabreur* Sir Charles Stewart afterwards, Lord Londonderry, is a romantic one in the extreme. As a cavalry officer, both in the British and Russian services, his fame ruled supreme. With Sir John Moore, as afterwards with Wellington, his exploits were only equalled by his indefatigable exertions, both of mind and pen, made on behalf of the common cause.

At Leipzig he succeeded in bringing Bernadotte and 18,000 men to the assistance of the allies, and as a Russian cavalry officer had rendered his name famous on the plain of Culm.

One of England's envoys accredited to Chatillon and Vienna, Sir Charles Stewart, manifestly aided his brother at the Congress, and merited the thanks showered upon him in public and private by the Prince Regent.

In 1819 Sir Charles, then Lord Stewart, met Lady Frances Anne Vane Tempest, an heiress of great beauty and fascination, who, in spite of some difficulties incumbent on the fact that the lady was a ward in Chancery, smiled on his suit. His after-career was a universal blaze of success.

As an author he succeeded in placing before the public the salient points in the career of a much defamed brother.

The *Castlereagh Correspondence*, carefully arranged after part of the most valuable letters had been lost at sea, stands of itself as an historical monument to his memory, as to that of his greater brother. The favourite of the British Court, Lord Londonderry, when he succeeded his brother in the title, was likewise as welcome at St. Petersburg amongst his old comrades in arms as if born amongst them.

But he, who of all men knew Russia best, did not fail to warn his countrymen as to the burning desire for Eastern rule at and from Constantinople which animates the breast of every Muscovite. In the *Londonderry Papers* a letter of his, written in 1840, to Sir

The war of opinion which Canning dreaded must have been perilously near dividing the country to her own hurt, when such a bitter controversy could rage over the preferment of one so eminently suited for his task. Quick, impulsive, may be prejudiced as to his likes and dislikes, Lord Castlereagh's brother never had judged Mr. Canning fairly, and the Parliamentary influence of that statesman's political friends was exercised against him on the occasion above mentioned. The resignation of the chosen English representative in the presence of strong feeling against his appointment, was a sign that the Conservative reaction had not yet acquired its full force, and the Whigs soon had matters to themselves again, but with Palmerston at the Foreign Office to curb the vagaries of extreme adherents.

Robert Peel, is extant, published by Sir Archibald Alison, in his *Lives of Lord Castlereagh and Sir Charles Stewart*, vol. iii. p. 274. There he tells how it is the true line of England to defend Turkey against all encroachments, notwithstanding the ebb and flow of public opinion, a resolve which will ultimately be adopted by the British statesman destined to weather any serious Eastern storm.

Lord Londonderry was selected to wear the ribbon of the garter vacant at the Duke of Wellington's death, an honour conferred by the late Lord Derby in fitting terms, and which the veteran soldier-statesman valued accordingly.

One of the remarkable men of his times, Lord Londonderry died in March 1854.

Not the least interesting feature in his career was his love for the great brother who had preceded him to the grave thirty-two years before.

It was said to have been as that of David and Jonathan between them.

His widow survived him.

When at length Sir Robert Peel was installed, both in power and office, Lord Aberdeen again went to the Foreign Office, where his personal character seems to have been of the greatest service to England in a time of temporary if delusive calm. . . .

To him Louis Philippe made the celebrated avowal to the effect that he did not desire a marriage for either of his sons with the Spanish Princess, nor would he accept such an offer for them were it made. At the time, it is reasonable to believe, the King was sincere, but afterwards yielded to mistaken considerations of State policy.

So at least Lord Aberdeen must have judged, or he could scarcely have retained unimpaired his friendship for Guizot, who, equally with his master, must share the infamy of a great State deception. Baron Stockmar's view seems to have been that, so honoured and respected was Lord Aberdeen by the French Court and Ministry, that the attempt to join France and Spain would never have been entered on whilst he presided over the British Foreign Office, but that when the hated name of Palmerston was again pre-eminent the whole instincts of the French executive were utilised to trick him, and if possible foil his policy.

Lord Palmerston undoubtedly suffered much from a foreign misconception of his motives, consequent on a determined resolve to keep for England all that due influence and position in Europe could gain.

Incidentally, during a research into the motives and actions of Lord Aberdeen, one meets with characteristic advice given and acted on generally, in accordance with .

the great Duke of Wellington and Sir Robert Peel. Of the former, as once was written of Pitt, we may say—

“Oh thou, in every form of danger tried,  
The nation's glory and her people's pride.”

Anything added thereto here would be superfluous, and out of place.

But with regard to Sir Robert Peel, it would be undesirable to fail to note how heartily both he and Lord Aberdeen endorsed Lord Palmerston's and Lord Auckland's policy in Affghanistan.

To use Sir Robert's words in 1844, “If either Russia or Persia were intriguing in Affghanistan, the Governor-General should not stop to look at his Vattel or Puffendorf, but hasten to pass through Scinde” (then a neutral country), “to assert his country's influence.” \* In the present advanced state of this question, we may fairly urge, therefore, that these tried statesmen would have acted as England acted in 1878–79.

It was to Lord Aberdeen that Nicholas of Russia opened the conversation, in which he spoke of Turkey as a dying man, and foreshadowed a scheme of proposed partition. The report given in Baron Stockmar's life, tallies so completely with the memorandum sent to Sir Hamilton Seymour, that the authenticity of its reliability as a repetition of that conversation is not to be questioned.

In the memorandum the word sick instead of dying is applied to the Sultan, but the conclusion was in each

\* Debate on Scinde war, 1844.

case identical. It is worthy of observation that a similar proposal was made to Metternich in 1829, by Prince Nesselrode, inspired, doubtless, in the highest quarters. Metternich replied much in the same spirit as Lord Aberdeen received the later communication, saying, that as his mission was to keep things as they are, he was not disposed to discuss a future, the arrival of which it was his desire to delay.

But Lord Aberdeen does not seem to have lost faith in the Emperor personally; and when afterwards Prime Minister, a certain school of historians have declared that he did not put his foot down with the requisite determination. Without entering into a thorny controversy on which no new light can be thrown, we may yet register an emphatic objection against Lord Aberdeen's name being made a scape-goat when a combination of circumstances such as seldom or ever have been seen had overtaken England. It is true that Lord Aberdeen fell into the mistake unfortunately common of late years to both parties in the State, viz. that of being behindhand in their actions towards Russian aggression, when they have to cope with a system avowedly formed to advance its interests if unopposed but to defer them indefinitely when a resolute opponent is encountered. The same fatal spell that hung over Lord Aberdeen's Government in days when experience of Muscovite dealing had been comparatively small, seems rife now when a former colleague of the noble Earl can declare, as did the Duke of Argyll in the House of Lords in March 1881, "that he mistrusted the Russians deeply, and would dread to see them established in.



Afghanistan south of the Oxus," but deprecated, nevertheless, any determined expression of adverse opinion in England. And yet he knew that beyond the Oxus they already were, and into the aforesaid debatable territory intended to go, just as certainly as in Lord Aberdeen's time Nicholas' dearest desire was to advance on and, if possible, capture Constantinople.

Party certainly has little to do with this unfortunate propensity to halt in the presence of a difficulty which the commonest student of history knows, in theory at least, how to combat. When, for instance, in 1877, the Conservative party had commanding majorities in both Houses of Parliament, and the resources of the nation at their back, they positively never called on Austria and France to fulfil their part of the Tripartite Treaty, and protect Turkey (as by Treaty they were bound) from an unprovoked invasion.

It seems, therefore, rather hard on Lord Aberdeen that his indecision should be treated historically, as if it had been the first and last instance of the sort in our records.

Alive to the value of the interests at stake in Constantinople, the heading of this chapter shows Lord Aberdeen to have most certainly been, whilst a perusal of Lord Ellenborough's *Diary* (vol. ii. p. 108) will prove that the Foreign Secretary desired in 1829 to give Turkey an absolute unconditional guarantee of her territory against Russian attack—one, moreover, before which the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1879 would have been small in scope.

Lord Aberdeen was clearly then, in 1853, the victim

of difficulties such as might have overwhelmed Pitt himself, and, indeed, when they had previously appeared in a modified form in 1792, the heaven-born minister's diplomacy received a decided check.

The matter was exhaustively descanted on at the time, by an anonymous author of *Thirty Years' Foreign Policy under Lords Palmerston and Aberdeen*.

There it is clearly shown that the situation of Russia and England in the East, had for years been converging into one incompatible of a peaceful solution to their differences.

Nicholas knew full well that there was an uncertainty how English public opinion would view his encroachments; the British acquiescence in the results of his great deceit of Akerman, and subsequent grudging acceptance of the Treaty of Adrianople, crowned by the refusal to aid Turkey against Mehemet Ali in 1833, were all doubtless in his mind's eye when he resolved to trust to the hazard of war. England might desire a uniform end, and really wish to preserve the integrity of the Ottoman empire, but her action had not certainly been sufficiently decided throughout to make Nicholas and the Russian nation prepared for the storm destined to break over their heads. Add to this uncertainty admitted differences in the cabinet, eloquent and decided action by the Peace Society at home, and an oft-expressed doubt as to the homogeneity of the Anglo-French alliance, and we find ample reasons which impelled Nicholas to his unfortunate resolve, without fastening a stigma on the statesmanship of one who dreaded war because he himself had seen its miseries.

Lord Aberdeen had passed from the field of Bautzen, during 1813, in retreat with the allied armies. He had been eye-witness of the dreadful scenes, amidst which even Napoleon paused in horror whilst contemplating the loss of his beloved Duroc. . . .

To Lord Aberdeen's mind the word "war" conveyed that of which the flighty journalists of the day had only read. He was unable to shield his country from the penalty of its responsibilities, but he entered into the Crimean war with a heavy heart.

As he said in the city to one of the aldermen at a banquet, "I have been very slow to enter into this war." "Yes," answered the rough and ready citizen, "and you will be equally slow to get out of it."

Lord Aberdeen received this retort with the perfect good temper and imperturbable silence of good breeding, but with a sad reserve itself speaking volumes as to the extent of responsibility he felt. .

There may, one day, be a more correct estimate made of Lord Aberdeen's conduct before the Crimean war.

It was next to impossible that party prejudice should not, to a certain degree, have obscured men's judgment at a moment when the Corn Law controversy had left such bitter feelings behind it.

Moreover, an honest and unprejudiced inquirer will find it difficult to tell for what cause, and on behalf of what principle, the House of Commons condemned Lord Derby's first Government in 1852, inasmuch as protection had been renounced by ministers accepting the general election as final on the point. The solution is doubtless connected with that administrative weakness

which the secession of the Peelites inflicted on the great Conservative party, and to which attention has been called in Lord Beaconsfield's *Endymion*. The coalition who essayed to succeed Lord Derby, far more than Lord Palmerston's assailants in the Don Pacifico debate deserved to be styled a fortuitous concourse of atoms, whilst with their advent to power unfortunately the virulence of the original protectionist controversy was galvanised into life again.

When Peel, Aberdeen, and their colleagues saw the necessity of an abolition of the Corn Laws, the circumstances under which it became necessary to act had involved a glaring breach of party confidence.

Looked upon by those who, under the guidance of these same ministers, had become part of a Conservative majority pledged to the very principle they were soon to be called on to concede, the action of their leaders appeared little short of treachery.

Parliamentary expression to this sentiment had been given by one who of all other men seemed fittest to express the burning sense of wrong which animated the breasts of a great, if broken, party—Disraeli.

Time has not only shown that Lord Aberdeen was right in the support he gave Peel on this occasion, but the great exponent of the ancient principle of Protection has seen his error by light of experience. But the bitterness of the Corn Law controversy, rendered more acute in its acerbity by strong and sarcastic language bandied about in Parliament, had certainly not abated when war came upon us in 1853-54.

Consequently the natural alliances of political men in

the face of a common danger were found to be impossible, and recourse taken to the remaining expedient of a coalition depending on a Parliamentary majority which contained Peelites, philosophical Radicals, Irish repealers, and peace-at-all-price men, each section of which had to be conciliated.

Those who contemplate the history of that war, and read it in connection with subsequent history, cannot but regret that the great powers of the late Lord Derby and of his brilliant colleague, Mr. Disraeli, were not associated with Lord Palmerston, Lord Aberdeen, and others pursuing the traditional aims of British policy.

Lord Aberdeen had a true British heart. When accused during his first Foreign Secretaryship by Princess Lieven, wife of the Russian Ambassador, of being a friend of Austria and opposed to Russia, he replied he was no partisan but of Great Britain. Nothing can be more disinterested, nothing more noble, than the way when, after his Government had received their dismissal in 1855, he persuaded his own following to remain in the cabinet, and so left Mr. Gladstone, Mr. Sidney Herbert, and Sir James Graham, free to support Lord Palmerston's Government. The same thing was said of Lord Aberdeen by Baron Stockmar as formerly had passed for description of George Grenville, and been re-echoed by Lord Russell concerning Grenville's perhaps more famous nephew. They did not see when the waters were out, but piloted the good ship well through calm seas. Our belief, however, is that Baron Stockmar would very much have modified this verdict, when he saw how one by one, at each

succeeding crisis, the leading statesmen of the land are spellbound before the difficulties of the same Eastern Question which Lord Aberdeen failed to cope with peacefully.

When Mr. F. Jackson, the diplomatist, heard of Lord Aberdeen's mission to the allied armies in 1813, he spoke of the British envoy as one of the former Pitt connection slightly inclining towards Lord Grenville's shade of thought. It will occur to our readers that no more representative link between the past and the present could possibly be named than the statesman who imbibed his principles under Pitt and Grenville, was a coadjutor of Castlereagh, and lived to be a colleague of Palmerston, Russell, and Gladstone.

Of Lord Aberdeen as a speaker little is told, simply because he had never cultivated the art. May be there was a spice of contempt in his celebrated remark, "This country is not ruled by wisdom, but by talk," for the very first occasion on which he spoke in Parliament his efforts were commented on in a complimentary manner by the then Lord Liverpool, whilst writing to his more distinguished son Lord Hawkesbury.

Again, in the debate on Belgium in 1832, Lord Aberdeen spoke at length and with effect, proving that the few curt sentences with which he was wont to announce his views, were adopted deliberately as a form of communication, and not from any inherent inability to speak exhaustively.

Yet in the mode of mind which has animated the English people during the nineteenth century, it is strong evidence of Lord Aberdeen's wisdom and sagacity

that he should have maintained silence, and yet retained his position and influence. The secret of this success was clearly in a great degree character:

- Early did he sweep away the doubts of those who feared the prominence of an unconstitutional element in the State through the influence of Prince Albert over the Queen. He straightway gauged the capacity of the man whose first object was to help Her Majesty to rule according to the Constitution which he himself had studied so thoroughly. Lord Aberdeen's presence as an adviser and sympathiser seems to have been present to Queen Victoria at the very moment when Lord Melbourne's retirement from office made the want most felt.\*

The man seems to have possessed that enviable facility of drawing others to him in an extraordinary degree. Prince Albert, Louis Philippe, Guizot, Bunsen, one after the other yielded to the spell, whilst one and all of the gifted band who owned his Parliamentary sway have either left behind them due testimony thereof, or to this day attest to Lord Aberdeen's worth in language destined hereafter to influence the judgment of succeeding generations as to the career of this good and wise man.

The charges of too sympathetic inclination towards Russia before and during the Crimean contest were completely dispelled in 1854, when the matter was debated in Parliament. Lord Aberdeen, displaying his natural candour, had previously claimed credit for the

Emperor Nicholas that in 1829 he had not entered Constantinople. This statement, made at the height of the war excitement, increased the unpopularity of the Prime Minister, whose uninspired and almost cold statements were not in unison with the national temper.

Lord Aberdeen was, however, soon enabled to explain that, although he did not doubt the existence of Russian designs on Turkey, he yet disbelieved in the defiance of Europe being encountered, which a capture of Constantinople would entail, a consideration which may be commended to statesmen of our own time who are, apparently, deliberately resolving (Whig and Tory, Liberal and Conservative alike) to go once more through the same phase of gratuitous self-deception.

To restrain Russian power in Turkey and the East Lord Aberdeen held to be a necessary duty of the Powers, who themselves had nothing to fear from Russia so long as the integrity of the Ottoman empire was preserved.

Both Lord Aberdeen and the Duke of Wellington appear to have originally believed in the possession of a reserve power in united Europe which would prevent the absorption of Turkey, or in the last resort wrest the prey from her enemies' grasp.

In this security we recognise the much discussed ~~European~~ Concert sought after diligently by Whig and Tory, and which, traced to its historical source so far as the Eastern Question is concerned, will be found to have originally been set afoot by Prince Metternich, who desired to protect Austrian interests, and induce others



to do the work for him. Infallible we can scarcely believe its conclusions to be with history before us.

Lord Aberdeen went on to quote from a despatch written in October 1829, proving his disapproval of the influence over Turkey gained by the Treaty of Adrianople.

But he was not to be delivered so easily from the results of his first ill-timed speech, claiming justice for the Russian Emperor. Parliamentary attacks continued the conclusions of which have received permanent adoption amongst some thoughtful men, but which the Queen, at the opening of Parliament in 1855, commented significantly upon by the bestowal of a vacant Blue Ribbon, accompanied by a statement of how much she had been impressed by his admirable temper, forbearance, and coolness.

He was, therefore, installed a Knight of the Garter, as a testimony of Her Majesty's continued confidence.

Although Lord Aberdeen never aspired himself to the higher flights of oratory, no one lived in his time better qualified to judge of excellence in others.

As a youth he had been taken constantly to listen to the intellectual wrestling of those giant intellects clustering around Burke, Pitt, Fox, and Wyndham. Burke he had probably never heard when in possession of his full powers, but it was otherwise with contemporaries, who, Lord Aberdeen persisted to the last, were in no degree superior to the late Lord Derby.

Possibly, had he been called on to break a lance with Pitt, he would have risen from the encounter equally convinced of his power, but the sentiment is worth

recording as evidence of the manner in which the Rupert of debate impressed his opponents.

After his resignation of the Premiership, Lord Aberdeen retired, and lived much in Aberdeenshire, where, as a lover of farming and other country pursuits, he spent most of his later years.

The country around Haddo is flat and uninteresting compared to other parts of Aberdeenshire, but Lord Aberdeen planted trees and made the very most of the soil.

The Scotch people were universally and justly proud of the man who had gained such pre-eminence in the State, and who never forgot the interests of his own country.

Hard did he strive to prevent the disruption of the Church in 1843, but his efforts were neither successful nor palatable to the disputants.

Soon after the worries and annoyances of office had ceased, Lord Aberdeen appeared to feel the effects of age stealing on him. In 1858 Guizot paid a visit to the ex-minister at Haddo, and gives a delightful description of the family party there. No less than nine grandchildren were assembled to meet the head of the house, whose family retainers were so numerous as to rival those of the Duke of Argyll himself in number.

Of the Earl, Guizot relates that his mind and heart were the same as of yore, but that his body seemed feeble—the man nervous and shaken. His slow, cold, sometimes shy, and occasionally sarcastic manner, covered, we are, moreover, told, to the last the rarest qualities of head and heart.

His mind, according to the French statesman, was liberal, and he could give a thoughtful opinion on every subject, being a man of rare merit.

We do not claim for Lord Aberdeen to have been a conspicuous leader of men, but an able diplomatist and cautious Foreign Minister. The last of a band who surrounded Lord Castlereagh at Vienna, his name will yet more specially be remembered in connection with the detachment of Austria from her neutrality after Lutzen and Bautzen. He died the 14th December 1860, aged seventy-six.



## LORD PALMERSTON.

"As the Roman, in days of old, held himself free from indignity when he could say *Civis Romanus sum*, so also a British subject—in whatever land he may be—shall feel confident that the watchful eye and the strong arm of England will protect him against injustice and wrong."—*Speech on Foreign Policy, June 25, 1850.*

16TH NOVEMBER 1830 TO 16TH NOVEMBER 1834.



HENRY JOHN TEMPLE, afterwards Viscount Palmerston, was born in 1784. After an education at Harrow, he joined the throng of other promising youths who studied at Edinburgh under Professor Dugald Stewart.

In 1802 he succeeded to the title and entered Parliament five years later, when Lord Mulgrave, who was then First Lord of the Admiralty, perceiving his abilities, secured for him the post of Junior Lord.

From that moment until his death in 1865, he was a member of every Government except those formed by Sir Robert Peel and Lord Derby.

On the resignation of the Duke of Wellington's Government in November 1830, the seals of the Foreign

Office were entrusted to his keeping. Lord Grey had entered on his great reforming task, and Lord Palmerston's familiarity with the intricacies of our relations with European and other states, made his appointment the more desirable in times of change at home and unsettlement abroad.

In comparing the rival methods of Lords Palmerston and Aberdeen at the Foreign Office, an observer is struck by the lack of any general system pursued by the former, who preferred to consider each case on its individual merits.

Thus we find the Whig doctrine of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other nations more than once infringed on. But the ultimate aims of British policy were identical with those pursued since the days of Charles I. and the Commonwealth.

Thus, Portugal was recognised as a stage whereon passing events could not but interest Englishmen; the Low Countries were to be kept free from French domination, and Spanish affairs not allowed to pass altogether under Gallic control.

To these considerations was superadded the additional watchfulness over Constantinople and Egypt, which our increased Eastern empire rendered necessary.

Not a detail was allowed to pass unconsidered; not a decision was taken by subordinates without Lord Palmerston's opinion, being passed thereon, and a general scheme of foreign policy sustained, which contributed to the elevation of England morally and physically amongst the nations.

But it is impossible not to see that the personal

part of the system was liable to utter disintegration whenever administration fell into ordinary hands.

The letters of Lord Palmerston show that for strength of will, acute perception of foreign statesmen's motives, and adaptation of means to the desired end, no individual has approached his mastery over national policy abroad. But he was not either engaged in elaborating a system built up on tradition or creating an absolute new one. His idea seems to have been in some sort similar to that of Earl Grey, when as Lord Howick he administered foreign affairs in 1807, and contended for the same theory through years of Opposition. He resolutely refused to be bound by precedent which did not strictly apply to the matter on hand.

Not that his views by any means coincided in later years with those of Earl Grey, who, differing on individual questions, objected to his resumption of office in 1846.

Lord Palmerston, therefore, pursued the aims of our traditional policy, but reached his objects by diverse and unorthodox means.

The great merit in Lord Palmerston's guidance of foreign affairs appears to us to have been his success in upholding England's interests, when other statesmen were so mersed in home affairs that they displayed a tendency to ignore public dangers. A Castlereagh, with all his address, would have suffered under such circumstances, for the unpopular tendency of the means he could alone employ.

Lord Palmerston, although he enlarged on the sympathy for liberty which the old method had never

ignored, limited such tendency whenever he saw England liable to loss of prestige however minute.

Mr. Canning's eloquence had previously marked the points where British policy gained its secret and overwhelming power, whilst Palmerston, with scant regard for the precedents of his office, yet succeeded in holding all England's prestige, whilst adding to her material prosperity and influence, and effected the whole without firing a shot in Europe.

How this was done is far beyond our scope to describe in detail, but is inalienably connected with the study of modern history.

The adhesion of Mr. Canning's friends to the Duke of Wellington's administration in 1827 has proved an unmingled advantage to the public benefit. In the first place it secured a fairly liberal interpretation of the Greek treaty, without which the reopening of the question would shortly have set Eastern Europe in a fresh blaze, and it precluded subsequent changes from taking the extreme and disturbing form desired by the unquiet spirits of Europe. Two schools of opinion might, and certainly did, exist in England, but neither repudiated the public order ordained by the Treaty of Vienna.

Wide differences of opinion, moreover, existed amongst colleagues, but the reign of revolutionary disorder was never encouraged within the charmed precincts of a British cabinet.

After, as has been previously described, the Canningites retired from the Duke's Government, and the adoption of Reform at home became daily more imminent, thoughtful men dreaded the coming reign of popular

opinion in its relation to foreign affairs, quite as much as the most antiquated Tory could dread a reversal of the internal and domestic policy at home.

When the King and Duke yielded on the question of Catholic Emancipation, no such rock ahead was visible, but, as Gleig has recorded in his *Life of Wellington*, the great Duke believed that in proportion as the popular element gained strength in the Constitution, the foreign policy of England would become vacillating and uncertain, and hence doubtless his opposition to Reform.

Lord Palmerston from the first struggled to prevent this, and so far succeeded that his chief historical monument will remain in the fact of such a result having been, on the whole, attained.

The first Foreign Secretaryship of Lord Palmerston in the Grey administration was passed during four critical phases of Continental convulsion.

First, the unsettlement in France, contingent on the Revolution, which placed the Orleans family on the throne; secondly, the Belgian Revolution and subsequent creation of the new kingdom; thirdly, the apparently impending break up of Sultan Mahmoud's empire in Turkey, caused immediately by the conduct of his Egyptian vassal Mehemet Ali; and fourthly, the disputed successions both in Spain and Portugal, which led to the Quadruple Treaty.

It looked in 1830 as if the efforts of Wellington and Castlereagh were at last to be cast to the winds. The Bourbons in France, reverting to their old modes of Government, leant on the priesthood in the absence of an organised aristocracy.



But the popular rights allowed by the charter of 1815 had been marked out for extinction without the benefits that flowed therefrom being ever positively abrogated.

The people who had, therefore, drunk, however sparingly, at the fountain of liberty, resented more the threatened cessation of constitutional law.

The administration of Prince Polignac having gone the way of all others which, without due diplomatic and statesman-like skill, commit themselves to a contest with a vast majority of the nation they serve, was succeeded by that of Louis Philippe the new French King.

Lord Palmerston heartily endorsed the recognition freely accorded by Lord Aberd  er to the Orleans dynasty, and extended a confidence fully as ready to the ministers who served the citizen king. But the disposition to return such recognition by non-interference, whenever English interests were attacked clearly did not come within the programme chosen by Louis Philippe. Either the well-known desire for glory and prestige which animated France carried the King away in its wake, or the ministers employed by the French Government misunderstood Lord Palmerston's plain-spoken mode of action. Whether it was the question of Belgian independence, Egypt, or the Spanish marriages, differences of a pronounced character existed between Louis Philippe's agents and Lord Palmerston, and yet on all these subjects English diplomacy prevailed.

Belgium was separated from Holland in 1833 without French intervention being prolonged beyond the time necessary for the purpose of driving the Dutch out. Notwithstanding that when the irruption of the French into

Belgium took place; military feeling was such that, on crossing the plain of Waterloo, the Belgian lion was mutilated by the angry soldiery, who burned to revenge that fatal day.

Without giving in an inch, however, the evacuation of Belgium by France was brought about peacefully. The fortresses were either destroyed or left to the new King Leopold's hands, and French domination in the Low Countries secured against by a combination of the Powers agreeing to guarantee Belgian independence.

All this was Lord Palmerston's work, effected in opposition to Sebastiani of Turkish fame in 1806, Thiers, Talleyrand, and, by no means least, the astute French King himself.

The same result, however, was apparent in the Peninsula, where the advocates of irresponsible rule succumbed to those of Parliamentary responsibility.

Isabella of Spain and Maria of Portugal ultimately held their throne on the faith of British promises to uphold such means of Government in opposition to the claims of Don Carlos and Don Miguel, who clung to a system of personal and irresponsible despotism. This, again, was clenched by a well-timed quadruple treaty of Lord Palmerston's, dated April 22nd, 1834, which engaged France, England, Spain, and Portugal to uphold the Constitutional cause in the Peninsula.

At Constantinople matters were not either so easily or so satisfactorily arranged. As we have before shown, Turkey was reduced by the Treaty of Adrianople to practical subservience to her hereditary Muscovite foe. Mehemet Ali, the clever Egyptian Pasha, had long

known this, and under the guise of 'throwing off' such yoke, seized Egypt, and marched on Constantinople. Sultan Mahmoud instantly applied to Great Britain for aid. He conceived that the Greek Question settled, the naturally tendency of England would lead her to protect Constantinople, when a possible change of owners was on the tapis. .

Moreover, to the Sultan, his Russian subserviency had from the first been hateful. The British Government replied, through Lord Palmerston, that they declined to interfere, on the ground of an insufficiency of war-ships. We know, through the correspondence since made public, that this decision was taken by the Liberal cabinet in the teeth of Lord Palmerston's counsel, and but that by his own decided measures he afterwards counteracted the evil effects of this deplorable decision, the name of Palmerston, as connected with Liberalism, would not have deserved the well-merited praise conceded by all who have studied the matter.

It is strange at this distance of time to contemplate Lord Palmerston gibbeted by politicians of a certain school as a friend of Russian schemes against England. But that such a feeling existed the literature of the day will show. Not only by the extreme men of the Urquhart persuasion was such a belief avowed, but it found a more modified echo in the sober pages edited by the refined and eloquent Croker.\* When, however, speaking of Mr. Urquhart as advanced in opinion at the time he lived, we by no means desire to affirm that his

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\* *Quarterly Review*. . .

prognostications as to Russian aggression in the East have been falsified. On the contrary, they have one and all received a fulfilment such as to render the original utterances almost prophetic. At the same time we by no means desire to endorse Mr. Urquhart's charges against Lord Palmerston, notwithstanding that the Whigs hesitated to protect Constantinople in 1833. Whether the desire to please the newly-elected Reform Parliament was, as the Duke of Wellington had feared, uppermost in ministerial minds, or whether the shadow of an unsettled controversy about the Low Countries and consequent possible war with France, oppressed Lord Grey's Cabinet, we know not. The sequel, however, is but too deplorable. Turkey was deliberately abandoned to the protection of Russia, who there and then sent troops to the Sultan's aid.

The Treaty of Uniar Skalessi, in July 1833, foiled Mehemet Ali's designs on Constantinople for a time, but it granted all that Nicholas could desire, and left the Egyptian Pacha supreme in Syria. The claims alleged to have been conferred at Kainardji in 1774 were thus ratified and confirmed in 1833.

Strange, indeed, does it seem that the statesman who, in 1809, sent Sir John Duckworth to force the Dardanelles\* when foreign influence threatened to become supreme at Constantinople, should have succumbed without protest when, as a powerful minister, he allowed Lord Palmerston's advice to be overruled and his country's influence suppressed.

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\* Lord Grey.

But when this crisis recurred in 1839 and 1840 Lord Palmerston arose in all his strength, and by diplomatic fence and skill unsurpassed in our annals, as likewise by courage unbounded alike by its bold face shown to opposition at home and intrigue abroad, rallied England, Austria, Russia, and Prussia in a diplomatic resolve to save Turkey from disruption, and at the same time checkmate Russian hopes of reigning either in influence or person at Constantinople. Well, indeed, had Mehemet Ali played his desperate game. After overthrowing Mahmoud's army at Nezib in June 1839, he had gained by treachery the whole fleet that still remained to the Turks.

The aged Sultan, moreover, lay dead in his palace, and confusion reigned at Constantinople.

The moment was unexampled, and may, we hope, never be seen again. Once more was opposition extant in the Whig cabinet, but a threat of immediate resignation brought the waverers to due appreciation of the crisis, and for the first time Palmerston stood between Turkey and destruction.

Such was the individual who, from that moment, concentrated the hatred of French statesmen upon his devoted head; likewise incurring the jealousy of other foreigners, who knew what great interests he had protected for England.

France and her astute minister Thiers had been checkmated, even when the finesse and power of a Guizot had been brought up in reserve.

Neither of these statesmen could believe that Europe really meant to act independently of France, and when,

instead of securing the desired preponderance of influence in Egypt, they saw their puppet, Mehemet Ali, driven from the seaboard by our fleets under Sir Charles Napier in 1840, and finally forced to abandon Syria altogether, the fiasco became more proclaimed, and French exasperation increased in proportion. The episode of the Spanish marriages may have been a consequence of this feeling. There, again, the two countries were led to the verge of war, which, if averted, led to the ultimate fall of Louis Philippe, even if Palmerston was for once overreached by the disingenuity of Guizot.\*

Moral support was wanting most in 1848 when it was to a degree withheld by England, and the Orleans dynasty expired unregretted by the ruling powers of Europe.

During all these discussions, Lord Palmerston always spoke out plainly, and when apparently nearest to war never relaxed an attitude deliberately assumed. The result was creditable to his foresight, as it was generally advantageous to his country.

The recital of the latter events has purposely been somewhat contracted, because the chronological limit of these pages has been more than attained, whilst for the same reason it passes lightly over an interregnum of five months, which occurred between November 1834 and March 1835, when the Duke of Wellington was at the Foreign Office, allusion to which has previously been made under Lord Aberdeen's biography.

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\* Louis Philippe had previously denied his object to Lord Aberdeen.

There remains but the summary of that completion of Lord Palmerston's career so familiar to most of us.

We see him the constant friend of Italy, even if, in 1859-60, the Emperor Napoleon succeeded in stealing a diplomatic march and annexing Savoy to France. We follow him through various phases of his career, through exciting scenes caused by sympathy with Hungary in 1848, when, although revolution threatened to become general on the Continent, Palmerston supported the Sultan in his gallant resolve to succour the Hungarian refugees.

We read of him in 1850 speaking in stern terms of rebuke to that regenerated Greece, which had been constructed with the minister's full and generous approval.

We find him, on that occasion, urging the just claims of an obscure individual, Don Pacifico, who, as a British subject, was entitled to all the protection such a privilege could give. Then, indeed, did he nobly assert himself before England and the world, when, in the House of Commons, he succeeded in beating off the formidable attack directed against him.

We meet with Palmerston again, the backbone of British counsel during the Crimean war—the designer of the fell, if somewhat protracted stroke which, in sinking Nicholas's fleet and maiming his great fortress, made the subsequent Turkish efforts at Plevna possible to the belligerent who held command of the Black Sea.

\* 1850. Sir Robert Peel on this occasion declared, "We are all proud of him,"

Gradually, then, do we learn to look upon him as the Prime Minister of our own times—sometimes subject, may be, to Parliamentary checks, sometimes even mistaken in his judgment, but ever, as Lord John Russell said of him, the minister of England.

The fortifications of Portsmouth, Plymouth, Chatham and Cork we owe to his prescience in 1860, and if towards the close of his career cabinet opposition to his policy against Denmark led in 1864 to the initiation of an era neither peaceful nor in accordance with international law, there was nothing left undone in the right direction which the efforts of one man could effect.\*

On the other hand we find him in 1862 representing national feeling in the Trent affair, where the provocation had been exceeding great, or such general indignation could never have arisen against those towards whom as a nation we are so generally predisposed.

Modern history tells us how the temper and firmness of Government was seconded by a tact in high places which led to the building of a golden bridge, over which those who had wronged us could honourably retire.

Such is the outline of a career which, with some inconsistencies but few exaggerations, passes for a type of British rule in the decade of the nineteenth century.

On the whole, it may be allowed to deserve the compliment paid by Mr. Disraeli when, leading the Opposition in 1861, he offered a general Conservative

\* Lord Russell supported his chief manfully on this occasion.



support to the minister's foreign policy, thereby throwing a phalanx of 300 votes on the national side.

Leaning to his natural predilections, it was in Palmerston's power to become equally powerful with Pitt.

As an orator Palmerston has never attained the highest reputation, but the author, speaking from a Strangers' Gallery point of view, cannot forget the simple, matter-of-fact mode of expression, not one word of which was lost to an attentive listener in the remotest corner of the House.

Adopting the conversational tone as basis of his speaking, it was at least perfectly clear what the orator desired. More than once, however, he seems to have risen to a great occasion, and in the famous debate on foreign affairs in 1829, delivered himself of the following whilst engaged in criticism of Lord Aberdeen's administration of the Foreign Office.

Without for a moment endorsing the description of sentiments attributed to his Tory opponents as correct, we subjoin an extract worthy of Brougham or Canning at their best.

Speaking of two opposing policies, he declares for his own desire to bear sway in Europe through public opinion rather than physical control. Mind, he contended, must become supreme.

"Look at one of those floating fortresses which bear to the farthest regions of the globe the prowess and glory of England. See a puny insect at the helm, commanding the winds of heaven and the waves of ocean, and enslaving even the laws of nature. And yet the merest breath of those winds which he has

yoked to his service, the merest drop of that fathomless abyss which he has made his footstool, would, if ignorantly encountered, be more than enough for his destruction, but the powers of mind have triumphed and the subjugated elements become obedient vassals. And so it is with empires. Those statesmen who know how to avail themselves of the passions, interests, and opinions of mankind are able to gain an ascendancy over human affairs far out of proportion to the power and resources of the state over which they preside; while those, on the other hand, who seek to check improvement and crush opinion, and to prohibit the human race from thinking, will find their weapon, however strong, break in their hand when they most need its protection."

Lord Palmerston had not allowed for the prevalence of an unquiet spirit throughout Europe, consequent on the fact that so many of the male population had been trained to arms. Fourteen years of peace had not been sufficient to allay the hopes of adventurous spirits, who had everything to gain from war and disorder. When Lord Palmerston ruled over the Foreign Office time was on his side, and the more liberal tone given to our dealings with other states finds ample justification without charging Lord Aberdeen and the Duke of Wellington with pursuing a policy contrary to the dictates of justice and freedom. • •

But the peroration above quoted was much applauded, and for effect was only surpassed by the minister's famous justification of his conduct as regards Greece and Don Pacifico. • •

Then, as an eye-witness told the writer, the success from an orator's point of view was very great, although Lord Palmerston's courage in the face of so redoubtable a combination against him, moved the House of Commons with admiration for qualities it proverbially cherishes.

As an old man the affection of Englishmen for their minister was very general. Amongst the boys of Harrow—which as a reflection of the big world is worth observing—he was simply worshipped.

Well, can we remember the occasion mentioned by Mr. Evelyn Ashley in 1861, when, in laying the first stone of the Vaughan Library, he alluded proudly to the five old Harrovian Prime Ministers of the century, Perceval, Goderich, Peel, Aberdeeen—. He, however, mentioned but these four, and left the young Harrovians to supply the vacant name, which they did amidst general enthusiasm.

Lord Palmerston was wont to tell how that he once got into a scrape for throwing stones at Harrow, a form of indiscipline frequently indulged in from the tempting shape of the round stones there abounding.

People who know the road between Park Lane and High Street, Harrow, will marvel at the vigour of the octogenarian, who, as Mr. Ashley tells us, trotted it within the hour, a visit on horseback to his old school being the form of distraction that the aged statesman most delighted in.

Inquiry has elicited instance after instance of Lord Palmerston's kindness of heart, but space will only allow recital of one or two. When the present Lord

Malmesbury had met with an accident in Germany, Lord Palmerston, then in advanced life, leaped into his saddle and rode from Broadlands to Heron Court, there to learn from the father how his injured son progressed, and returning the same day, traversed fifty miles on horseback.

His last visit was one of kindness, being to the parsonage at Bocket to personally carry thither some game for Mrs. Locock the clergyman's wife.

The life in Hertfordshire seems to have gathered around it all the delights of an English home. The hospitable parties were famous for the old-fashioned etiquette, through which Lady Palmerston and her distinguished husband never broke, and it is worthy of remark that they always led the way, arm in arm, into dinner.

But the time came when failing nature asserted natural sway over constitution and courage such as man is seldom endowed with. The trial of strength which the great statesman was seen to make when he leaped over the rails outside his house was of itself a forerunner of the inevitable end. He doubted and questioned his powers.

The last time he came to Bocket, by a freak of fortune Lord and Lady Palmerston chose the rooms for occupation in which Lord Melbourne breathed his last, and it was in those very apartments that old age killed Lord Palmerston.

As Fox and Canning had died under one roof, and in the same room, so did those two courtly interpreters of the people's verdict, as given in 1832, sink to an honoured rest under precisely similar conditions.

Absolute failure of natural vigour does not appear to have preceded the Prime Minister's death. A cold caught during a drive was the immediate cause of a loss which otherwise might not have occurred for years. But the aged statesman died in harness, and general desire led to the public funeral in Westminster Abbey, where, close to Pitt, Canning, and Castlereagh, he rests.

• It may be consolatory to those who bemoan the raging party spirit of later times to know that, notwithstanding all the tact of the popular Premier, it ran nearly as strong in Lord Palmerston's day—the fact being, that such rivalry is inseparable from our form of Government. Without it the machinery would not work.

Mr. Cobden, for instance, never could be brought effectively into action unless his combative nature was sufficiently aroused on behalf of a principle, and, therefore, of the party acting and thinking with him.

At the same time, nothing is more certain than that political language is apt to be exaggerated, and correspondingly ephemeral in its influence. Who believes in their heart, for instance, that the Queen's ministers are the base-minded individuals that party papers make them out to be before a general election?

It is worth while noting this, inasmuch as the consequence is a future popularity for the minister amongst political opponents, something in common with that expressed by boys for their master after they are out of pupil-room and its discipline. Thus it comes to pass that when no after-prejudice is left on individual minds the reputation of a statesman such as Palmerston grows

greater as time flies by. In the case of another great minister (Lord Castlereagh) a groundless prejudice has poisoned the well of historic truth.

So adapted, however, to the peculiar circumstances in which they acted were these two illustrious ministers, that a Parliamentary supporter of Castlereagh has related with pride to the author how he could always trust in the leadership of unerring tact and discrimination.

This same individual was, however, found in later years a colleague of that other great European Augur, whose biography we have essayed to sketch.

It is not generally known that in 1818 when Under-Secretary for War, Lord Palmerston narrowly escaped assassination of a similar description to that which ended Perceval's career.

A man of the name of Davis, who had been an officer in Spain, met him on the staircase of the War Office, and when quite close to him fired. The ball penetrated his coat and waistcoat about the middle of his spine and glanced off. The minister displayed the greatest *sangfroid*, and although naturally affected by the shock of such an event, calmly gave his reason for not granting a required interview to the would-be assassin, whom he knew to be mad. How Palmerston escaped with a mere contusion we are left to surmise for ourselves, but the ball was found on the staircase, probably turned in its course by some part of the wearer's apparel.

\* Lord Mahnesbury's *Letters*, second series, book ii. p. 523.

Sir Henry Holland has left on record his observations on Lord Palmerston's extraordinary power of bearing pain, during which he would accomplish work when other men would have been sent howling to their couches. His philosophical watchfulness for any trace of decay in his own vigour is not less remarkable.

Sir Henry Holland has also attested to the buoyancy and vivacity of spirits which carried Lord Palmerston through labours and anxieties calculated to overwhelm an ordinary man, and, indeed, the cartoons of *Punch*, representing him with a sprig in his mouth, illustrate the light-hearted nonchalance which served him so well. Such natural advantages were, however, powerfully aided by the untiring exertions of a wife who fully understood the value of social amenities in matters politic.

Herself the sister of the popular Premier and astute man of the world, Lord Melbourne, she united to his well-known gifts the merit of womanly devotion to her husband's interests. How many times moderate Whigs or Conservatives have been led to stay their hands through the influence of Cambridge House hospitalities we shall probably never know, but it is certain that to the close of Lord Palmerston's life he represented a spirit of compromise in political matters which for the nonce satisfied moderate men, whilst the Prime Minister's own conspicuous honesty and love of genuine freedom attached the more Liberal section of the nation to his person.

Lord Palmerston's presence in the more popular party proved a valuable check on extreme legislation which reappears from time to time, either under the name of

Whiggism or other Conservative influence. It will, indeed, be a bad day for England when class is so set against class, that the Liberal families no longer cleave to their traditional side in politics. . . .

At present they give security, by their presence in the Government, not only for the safety of property at home, but again and again have interfered to sustain the continuity of our policy abroad. .

Civil and religious liberty they know to be essentially bound up with Great Britain's prosperity—their own stake in the country being of itself sufficient guarantee against continuous class legislation. .

England is, moreover, indebted for Lord Palmerston's endorsement of the national interests surrounding Herat and Afghanistan, which Moltke has since declared to be the glacis of the fortress of Hindostan.

Despite differences of degree, and as to the expedience of certain measures, the vitality of the points mentioned is never called in question.

Finally, notwithstanding all his differences with Sebastiani, Talleyrand, Thiers, and Guizot, Lord Palmerston seized the opportunity afforded by Napoleon III. for the eradication of the old antagonistic feelings between England and France.

Its total and apparently permanent disappearance has outlived the dynasty which owed the reparation and made it with dignity and frankness.

Humanity has been the gainer by the statesman-like address of Palmerston in this matter. He never hesitated, and incurred some obloquy and much misrepresentation in carrying out this great change of



opinion, in sustaining which Her Majesty the Queen and the late Prince Albert bore so prominent a part.

• Lord Palmerston was in high office, and latterly Prime Minister, during the period that England made the greatest stride towards prosperity. The full advantages of free trade, combined with fresh discoveries of gold, were beginning to be apparent, and between 1845 and 1865 imports from all parts of the world increased, in round numbers, from 85 millions to 271 millions per annum. The domestic comfort of the people seems to have advanced in a like ratio, and wages to have risen as food became cheaper.

This improvement, moreover, not only continues, but is such that, notwithstanding the growing populations of our large towns, and occasional hard times, there is reason for greater contentment than at any period of our history.

But comparative luxury begets a desire for the influence and importance which belong to those higher in society than their neighbours, and special causes are not wanting to influence differences which are, in truth, very small, and disappear, in company with other prejudices, when boldly looked in the face.

The object of all government should be to promote the happiness and safety of the greater number of the governed.

And it is impossible, under present circumstances, that this object can be attained without the co-operation of the nation itself.

Lord Palmerston, wisely or unwisely, as people may think, looked with disfavour on the constant expansion

of the electoral franchise, which has become a feature in our scheme of domestic policy. But he possessed, at the same time, the broadest Liberal sympathies on behalf of the people themselves. His famous protest against iron hurdles in the London parks was given with the true liberty-loving ring about it, when he told the late Sir Benjamin Hall they must come down, and the people be allowed to enjoy themselves on the grass at will.

Since the day when that letter was written a scheme of education has been adopted by Parliament, which must undoubtedly bear fruit within a very few years.

The advance in intelligence will then be great on the part of poorer and uninfluential people, and it will be for our ruling classes to justify and retain the power which, on the whole, they may be said to exercise for good of the commonwealth. But influence, based on superior knowledge and intelligence, can alone render such a consummation possible. Rank and wealth have ruled the nation; wealth shares now with rank and knowledge that pre-eminence which will surely one day be a mental culture supreme.

So attached at heart is, however, as we believe, the English nation to its traditions and institutions, that no great domestic change will ever come upon us, except by constitutional means.

Now thousands amongst us who take a keen interest in public events as they pass, have neither care for nor knowledge of those politics of the past that make up history.

If, therefore, newly enfranchised Englishmen are to

be fitted for their electoral duties, and made conversant with the nature and properties of institutions threatened by designing agitators, it must be partly by means of history, placed before them in plain and simple form.

It can be thus clearly shown how the wisdom of our ancestors has provided many priceless institutions which, according to the modern political rule of thumb, are out of date, and consequently worthless.

. Look, one would say to honest-minded people thus reasoning, look into the records of the past, and there learn that in a vast majority of instances a good and substantial cause exists for that, the utility of which you doubt, and ninety-nine times out of a hundred it will be found to be one you yourself adjudge wholesome and helpful to the furtherance of true liberty and happiness amongst us.

If not, and you remain dissatisfied, by all means give that intelligent vote against its continuance which is respected by opponents and friends alike.

But let us not, whatever we do, act in the dark, or be moved by passion and restless prejudice to overthrow the Constitution, which has hitherto rendered our liberty secure.

It is believing that, by awaking a personal interest in the lives and characters of our rulers, many may be led to pursue the subject through some at least of its simpler phases, that this work has been written."

So much, then, for the domestic happiness of our thirty-four millions.

There remains the safety of the State as a whole, which, as specially bearing on our subject, deserves a

few parting words. It would be vain to deny that there are clouds on the horizon of a future which, if subject to sudden dispersion, require both the attention of our rulers and the co-operation of the governed to enable us to weather what might shortly prove to be a time of tempest and disturbance.

The causes of such forecast being made by thoughtful men are not entirely hid from the common inquirer.

Several of the most commonplace truisms may be adduced, practical realisation of the results of which would lead to grave embarrassment, and the excuse urged for their partial mention here must consist in the importance of the issue at stake. Otherwise, as we are aware, they are but commonplace to those who think or read.

So early as the year 1815 we find Lord Grenville reminding Parliament that the time would shortly arrive when England must be unable to supply her population with food. The hour has long since struck, and but for free trade and its beneficent influence on wages and cheap food, it is impossible that we could have conserved our strength. If not weakened by inevitable internal dissensions, the drain of wholesale immigration would have so reduced the population that we should have fallen an easy prey to the commercial competition around us.

But we are told that the day of universal peace and goodwill is about to dawn on earth—the day when other nations will be content to grant us the share of the world's good things we now enjoy, whilst we shall be contented to let America grow

rich by supplying us with corn, allowing Continental nations to settle their own disputes, whilst picking up such crumbs of commercial advantage as their position and means may allow.

In the first place, according to the latest information from America, such is the influx of emigration from Germany, Ireland, and elsewhere, that it is by no means certain that we can depend on the present overflowing supply of corn being indefinitely continued; and this, moreover, at a moment when the Continental supply has proved itself uncertain, wheat being positively exported from Great Britain to Russia in October 1880, and when the United States threatens a renewed protectionist policy.

More tracts of arable land must, anyhow, be opened up than at present, if the fertility of the West is to be permanently depended on.

In Europe, moreover, England may any day find herself face to face with difficulties, in the settlement of which she is bound to take part, or run the risk of finding a coalition arrayed against her.

Lord Palmerston's letters should be carefully studied for the purpose of learning how rational are such fears, provided due caution be not observed, and an unflinching determination opposed to every lawless attempt to override treaties or create confusion.

There is a class in England who could immensely influence those around them—those who not only have received competent education, but have the requisite leisure in which they could instruct their countrymen.

The plain truths of our position in the world should

be placed before all, and told in as few words as possible.

Men should know that if a naval combination took place against Great Britain, the hostile fleets must either be driven from their attempted blockade or the nation must surrender.

They should learn that it is just as physically impossible for England to step aside from all Continental alliances and complications, and take up the second-rate position some would be content to claim for her, as it originally would have been to sustain the Corn Laws amidst a fast-increasing population stimulated in its growth by the development of railways and the concomitant increase of trade ; \* trade, however, which

\* The words of the aged Lord Lyndhurst, spoken in July 1859, illustrate most fully our meaning. If true then they are surely so now :—

“ It will be necessary for our defence that we should have a military force sufficient to cope with any Power or combination of Powers that may be brought against us. The question of the money expense sinks into insignificance. It is the price we must pay for our insurance, and it is but a moderate price for so important an insurance.

“ I know that there are persons who will say, Let us run the risk. Be it so. But, my Lords, if the calamity should come, if the conflagration should take place, what words can describe the extent of the calamity, or what imagination can paint the overwhelming ruin that would fall upon us? I shall be told, perhaps, that these are the timid counsels of old age. For myself I run no risk. Personally I have nothing to fear. But to point out possible peril, and how to guard effectively against it, that is surely to be considered, not as timidity, but as the dictates of wisdom and prudence.

as Lord Dudley pointed out in 1825, received a potent impulse from the discovery of precious metals, and gold in particular.

With such abnegation of position and responsibility must ensue a total disregard for the balance of power abroad, neglect of which experience has shown to be fatal to the independence of nations.

As such in selfish isolation we must, therefore, suffer national, and, so far as the tradesmen of the country are concerned, individual ruin.

So should we strive to place within easy reach of every average Englishman short and succinct records of the careers of such men as Pitt, Wellington, Grey, Fox, Liverpool, Wellesley, Canning, Castlereagh, Russell, and Palmerston, so that their various ends and aims should be shown to have been based on no class prejudice of any description, but on a simple desire for the common weal. Not that we for one instant desire to exalt the past at the expense of the present. There is reason to believe our rulers, from whichever party they may be drawn, are aware of the necessity which exists for keeping up both army and

"I shall terminate, my Lords, in two emphatic words, *'ie victis.'*"

It may be well, moreover, to supplement these weighty words with those of Lord Macaulay, spoken in 1852, when Mr. Joseph Hume had been talking to him about the necessity of a union of Liberals. "On most matters," said Lord Macaulay, "it would be easy to come to a compromise, but upon the vital question of national defence he feared there was an irreconcilable difference between them." Mr. Hume made no answer.

navy to the requisite pitch. It is refreshing, indeed, to reflect that, subject to professional criticism in matters of detail, both the spirit and design of Mr. Childers' and Mr. Trevelyan's statements whilst introducing the Army and Navy Estimates in March 1881, have been adjudged to be of the character needed for the occasion by all men of unbiassed minds. In fact, despite ominous threatenings, we are not to do penance for the glories of Trafalgar or the Peninsula. To strengthen the healthy current of public opinion which thus keeps both army and navy out of a party sphere, should, therefore, be the aim of those amongst us who regret a certain divergence in the tenour of our Foreign Policy, which from time to time threatens England, such as we fear, moreover, is more or less unavoidable—unavoidable, that is, during what we hope and believe to be merely an interregnum, until it be possible to appeal to an instructed constituency, such as history tells us will at all cost support both the honour and preserve the influence of its country. Meanwhile, the acerbity of feeling in public matters should be calmed by mutual forbearance, and allowed to subside with the least possible irritation.

A compact and enthusiastic minority, banded together to sustain a great principle, or, may be, safeguard a national interest, should not believe the cause they represent to be lost, because for the moment events look askance on their desires.

The spirit they have helped to preserve amongst us may yet ward off many a danger, forming a nucleus around which the great national party of the future may




rally. Above all, we should cleave to the principles of 1688, striving to keep intact the Constitutional liberties then conferred on Englishmen.

Much that we, as individuals, prize, may be unwillingly surrendered, but if taken from us by Constitutional means we should spare vain regrets, and study to instruct others of the value that belongs to institutions and habits not yet called in question.

So shall the England of future times be distinguished alike for its independence and prosperity, propped up by the wisdom of generations yet unborn, who, whilst holding trustfully to the framework of the old Constitution, will not hesitate to amend it as times and circumstances may require.



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